R. M. Sahai, J. - (1.) How has petitioner successfully eluded through process, of law opposite party No. 4, his brother's wife (hereinafter referred to as O. P.) from reaping benefits of decree for ejectment in a suit under Section 209 of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act I of 1951 for nearly two decades by making her run between revenue and Civil Court in series of litigations is demonstrated by this petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India directed against order of Board of Revenue in proceedings arising out of execution History of litigation goes back to 1944 when Narain, husband of opposite party, despite contest from petitioner, got his share partitioned through Court. After his death in 1960 petitioner who did not appear to have reconciled to partition decree forcibly trespassed over share of Narain leaving no option to opposite party except to file suit for ejectment which was decreed on 16. 10. 1962. Rowing through appeal, second appeal, writ petition and special appeal to this Court it attained finality on 8. 3. 1972. But hardly had a month rolled since finality of first phase of litigation, but even before opposite party set the machinery for execution in motion, petitioner set up Kedar, opposite party No. 5, his son and obtained an ex-parte injunction on 13. 4. 1972 from Civil Court. Unaware of this order and probably permitting sufficient time to elapse for any further move in highest Court opposite party filed an application on 11. 11. 1972 before sub-divisional officer for execution. For this petitioner had already prepared itself, therefore immediately an objection was filed on 16. 11. 1972 on strength of in junction order dated 13. 4. 1972. Proceedings went on till the crucial dated 5. 2. 1974 when according to petitioner the execution application was dismissed in default whereas according to opposite party they were stayed. This has not only been subject of controversy in Courts below but has been seriously pressed in this petition as well. In fact so far merits of the matter, namely, whether the sub-divisional officer could pass the order on 30. 1. 1980 for issue of warrant of possession on application dated 11. 7. 1979 hinges on this. But before adverting to it and to complete the narration of facts nothing happened in executing Court. After 5. 2. 1974. On 30. 3. 1976 the Civil Suit filed by Kedar was decreed exparte and on 2. 12. 1977 the sub- divisional officer, obviously on strength of decree directed expunction of peti tioner's name from revenue records, Reference against order dated 2. 12. 1977 on recommendation of additional Commissioner in revision filed by opposite party appears to be still pending in Board of Revenue. In the meantime exparte decree dated 30. 3. 1976 was set aside on 2. 7. 1979 and the appeal against this order was dismissed on 17. 5. 1980. It appears, although it is not clear, but it can be reasonably presumed as petitioner has not controverted that after setting aside of exparte decree the injunction granted on 14. 3. 1972 also was discharged as on 16. 7. 1979 opposite party presented an application before executing Court praying that proceedings for execution may be given effect to as the injunction due to which proceedings had been stayed had been vacated, Petitioner who till now was behind the scene and fighting through Kedar lost no time in objecting to this application by filing objection on 8. 9j 979 that the execution application filed by opposite party had been dismissed in default on 5. 2. 1974. And as the Civil Court had not stayed execution proceedings the present application was not maintainable, it was barred by time and the execution application was liable to be dismissed. Not finding any merit in objection the executing Court rejected it and directed warrant of possession to be issued on 30. 1. 1980 against which petitioner went up in appsal and second appeal to Additional Commissioner and Board of Revenue but with no success and has finally come to this Court. Whether those orders are erroneous or suffer from any manifest mistake of law, as vehemently claimed by petitioner's counsel, may be considered a litle later as even assuming in favour of petitioner is it a fit case for exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction in the light of facts detailed above. And there can be no hesitation in saying that substantial justice, for which the Courts are primarily meant, having been done this Court should refrain from issuing any writ even if the order is illegal or erroneoas. True, as argued by learned counsel for petitioner, that by lapse of time even a decree passed in accordance with law is rendered ineffective and Court while upholding the plea of limitation shall be upholding the law. According to him equity follows law and not precedes it. But the argument proceeds on mis-conception. Refusal to issue writ although the order is erroneous or against law because petitioner has been guilty of fraud or has not approached the Court with clean hands or has disentitled himself for any other reason pertains to discretionary jurisdiction. Discretion is freedom to choose out of possible course of action or the decision to adopt that which appears more reasonable in facts and circumstances of a particular case. It cannot be defined precisely or with any mathematical accuracy. It begins where law ends. It is a necessary tool in modern com plexities and growth of statutory law and rules to cope with unimaginable situations brought about may be by abuse of process of Court to frustrate or defeat justice. By refusing to issue writ on error of law is not ignoring law or by-passing it but accepting it yet refraining from exercising discretion because that appears more reasonable and just. From narration of facts it is more than apparent that petitioner has been unfair to opposite party. Law recognises possession of a party contrary to law. A flouter of law may succeed on the language of statute but cannot invoke the conscience of Court. Forcible occupation by petitioner of land in dispute after his brother's death, continuance over it under interim orders despite successive failure, right from trial Court to this Court, resisting execution through son on ex-parte injunction and decree which were discharged and set aside respectively and then objecting to execution on plea that it has become barred by time on strength of documents which do not inspire confidence are sufficient for refusing to exercise discretion in favour of petitioner. Instead of resting judgment on refusal to exercise discretion under Article 226 the merits may also be examined. Plea of limitation is founded on alleged dismissal of execution application on 5. 2. 1974 and then moving of application for execution in July, 1 979. It is urged that once execution was dismissed in default and opposite party did not take any step to get it restored then pro ceedings came to an end and the application dated 16. 7. 1979 could be nothing but second application which was hopelessly barred by time. Foundation for this argument was built on Annexures 10,11 and 12 of the writ petition, the order dated 5. 2. 1974 dismissing the execution application for default, extract from misilband register showing that file had been consigned as execution had been dismissed and an application dated 24. 5. 1974 filed by opposite party before executing Court for return of documents as proceedings having been dismissing in default on 5. 2. 1974 she desired to take back her papers respectively. This very argument advanced before Board of Revenue and Additional Commissioner was repelled as after examining the record it was found that order dated 5. 2. 1974 infact, was for staying the proceedings. It has been found that there was no fraud or forgery and the order was written in one hand. Normally it is a finding of fact but Annexures referred to above for a moment created some doubt which, however, was cleared after examining the record which had been sent for. The entire order sheet of 5. 2. 1974 is written at one strength, in one hand writing by one pen and ink. There is no cutting or over writing. It mentions. @hindi (therefore, the application for execution is dismissed in default) is not in the original. From where did the petitioner procure certified copy is indeed a mystery. But that need not detain as the learned counsel had to concede that other six orders recorded on both side of the order-sheet appeared to be genuine. If this be so then the order dated 5. 2. 1974 passed on the reverse side and that being the last order, and the order-sheet being same, and there being no cutting, eraser, over-writing etc. it cannot be accepted that original order was different. If the petitioner's case would have been that the entire order-sheet was substi tuted then probably something could be said in their favour but once that is not the case, rather could not be, as on each date including 5. 2. 1974 the presiding officer had initialled then it has to be accepted that execution pro ceedings were stayed on 5. 2. 1974 and not dismissed in default. Having arrived at this conclusion it is not necessary to say anything further as Annexures 11 and 12, which are based on Annexure 10 cannot alter the order. In this regard some sp2culatton was indulged. Reliance was placed on Annexure 12 as admission of opposite party. Annexure 11 is the copy of mislband register and application of opposite party. Learned counsel urged that these documents leave no room for doubt that certified copy of Annexure 10 was correct. On the other hand the learned counsel for opposite party urged that a person like petitioner must have forged certified copy of order dated 5. 2. 1974 and easily manover the mislband register. Both parties indulged in some speculation. In any case the explanation of opposite party that the application was made under erroneous impression appears to be correct. It may be as argued by learned counsel that opposite party or her pairokar reached late and they took it for granted that application has been dismissed in default on information fed either by petitioner or her own counsel. Even accepting that application was dismissed in default opposite party never moved any second application and the argument that proceedings were barred by time could be repelled but in view of the finding that proceedings were stayed it is not necessary to examine this. In the result this petition fails and is dismissed. Conduct of petitioner justified exemplary cost but the learned counsel became so pursuasive that the opposite party has to content herself with costs only. .;