K. N. Singh, J. - (1.) THE petitioner is a teacher in Sardar Patel Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Varanasi, an aided and recognised institution. THE management of the institution framed certain charges and held enquiry against the petitioner. THE management proposed the punishment of termination of service and submitted the papers to the District Inspector of Schools. THE District Inspector of Schools by his order dated 6-12-1975 refused to accord approval to the termination but he substituted the punishment of termination by stoppage of three increments permanently. THE order of the District Inspector of Schools was served on the petitioner on 9-12-1975. THE petitioner filed an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education on 9-1-1976 under section 16-G (3) (c) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. THE Deputy Director by his order dated 3-6-1976 rejected the petitioner's appeal on the ground that it was barred by time. THE petitioner has challenged that order by means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(2.) SRI Virendra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that the petitioner had filed appeal within one month from the date of communication of the order of the District Inspector of Schools, which was within time. The Deputy Director committed patent error in rejecting the appeal on the ground that it was barred by time. I find force in the contention. Section 16-G (3) (c) of the Act provides that any party may prefer appeal to the Deputy Director under clause (b) within one month from the date of the communication of the order. An appeal filed within one month from the date of communication of the order would thus be within time. The question arises as to what is the meaning of the expression "one month". The 1921 Act does not define the expression "one month". Section 4 (28) of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904, defines "month". According to that definition "month" shall mean a month reckoned according to the British Calendar. The expression "one month" as used in section 16-G (3) (c) of the Act therefore means a month according to the British Calendar. Computing one Calendar month from 9-12-1975 would expire on 9-1-1976. It appears that the Deputy Director calculated one month on the basis of 30 days. There is difference between the use of the expressions "within thirty days" and "within one month". Under the former, appeal is to be filed by 30th day whereas under the latter limitation would expire on a date when the calendar month is completed. In Provas Chandra v. Visyaraju, AIR 1962 Orissa 149 validity of the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was considered by a Division Bench. The Bench held that the period of one month's notice beginning on 28th January and terminating on 28th February in ordinary years was valid as a calendar month would expire on 28th February and not before that. In Re : V. S. Mehta, AIR 1970 AP 234 the question was whether a prosecution launched by the Factory Inspector under section 106 of the Factories Act was barred by time. Section 106 of the Factories Act lays down that no court shall take cognizance of any offence unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of offence came to the notice of the Inspector. The question arose as to the interpretation of the expression "within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the notice of the Inspector". A Division Bench referred to the definition of "month" as contained in the General Clauses Act and held that the period of three months would mean a period of three calendar months and not 90 days. The same view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in Sashi Kumar v. Mrs. D. J. Hill, AIR 1951 Cal 316. The petitioner's appeal was within time in view of the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases. There is yet another reason to hold that the petitioner's appeal was within time. It is a salutary rule that while computing the period of limitation for filing an appeal or application the date of knowledge or communication of the order is to be excluded. Section 9 of the U. P. General Clauses Act lays down that where the word "from" and for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time the word "to" is used, it shall be sufficient to exclude the first day. In the instant case section 16-G (3) (c) contains the words "within one month from the date of communication of the order to that party". The provisions of section 9 are thus fully attracted. The date on which the order of the District Inspector of Schools was communicated to the petitioner has to be excluded while computing the limitation for the purpose of filing appeal against that order. This principle is codified in section 12 of the Limitation Act also.
(3.) FOR the reasons stated above, I am clearly of the opinion that the appeal filed by the petitioner on 9th January, 1976, was within one month from the date the order of the District Inspector of Schools was communicated to the petitioner and as such the appeal was well within time. The Deputy Director of Education committed patent error in rejecting the same on the ground that it was beyond time. The petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The order of the Deputy Director of Education dated 3-6-1976 is quashed. He is directed to hear and decide the petitioner's appeal on merits. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.;