R. R. Rastogi, J. - (1.) THIS is a defendant's application to revise an order passed by the Civil Judge, Bijnor on 1-11-1980. The brief facts necessary for the decision of this revision are that the plaintiff-opposite-party had filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 18-9-1974 in respect of some land. The consideration had been agreed at Rs. 57,307.20, out of which a sum of Rs. 12,000/-was paid by way of advance. It appears that the defendant-applicant did not put in appearance in the case and it was decreed ex parte on 5-12-1978. The operative part of the decree reads as under :- "The suit is decreed ex parte with costs. The plaintiff is hereby ordered to deposit a sum of Rs. 45,307.20 in court or to pay the said amount to the defendant within one month from the date of the order failing which the suit shall stand dismissed with costs. If the amount is duly deposited, the defendant shall execute a sale deed in respect of the land mentioned in the agreement Ext. 1 and shall also deliver possession of the said land to the plaintiff within two months from the date of this order. If the defendant fails to do so, the sale deed can be got executed through the process of the court. Let a notice of the decree be also sent to the defendant through registered post for which the plaintiff will take steps within two weeks."
(2.) THE plaintiff-opposite-party did not make the deposit as directed by order dated 5-12-1978 by 5-1-79. He, however, made an application for extension of time by two months to deposit the money. THE ground taken in that application was that on account of illness the plaintiff had not been able to arrange for the money. THE court allowed one month's time on that application for deposit of the money. THE plaintiff, however did not comply with that order and on 6-4-1979 moved another application in which it was stated that the plaintiff wanted to get the decree amended and also prayed for two months' time to deposit the money. On that application as well the court allowed him one month's time to deposit the money. That order was also not complied with. Several months after, to be exact on 13-2-1980, the plaintiff-opposite-party moved another application and it was stated therein that he had been under an impression that he was to deposit the amount only after the defendant had been served with the notice of the decree. It was on that application that the trial court passed the impugned order dated 1-11- 1980. It accepted the plaintiff's contention that he could have been under such an impression as alleged and approved the deposit of the money which had been made in the meantime on 13-2-1980. It is this order which the defendant-applicant seeks to be revised. After hearing counsel for the applicant at some length I find that the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction in passing all the aforesaid orders. The first order passed on 5-1-1979 extending the time for deposit of the money by one month was absolutely without jurisdiction the reason being that it was a self-operative decree which had been passed in the suit. Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides for enlargement of time does not cover such an order. It is only procedural order in respect of which time for compliance can be enlarged. It is not in respect of conditional decrees, which are self-operative, that time can be enlarged under this provision. In Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 SC 882 it was observed by the Court that how undesirable it is to fix time prematurely for a future happening which leaves the court powerless to deal with the events that may arise in between. Such orders may turn out to be inexpedient and such procedural orders though prematurely passed, are in a sense, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants may put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not completely estop a court from taking into account all events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. Their Lordships expressly excluded conditional decrees from the ambit of these observations. It is established, therefore, that in respect of a conditional decree time cannot be enlarged by taking recourse to Sec. 14?, CPC. Learned counsel has also invited my attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Bhujangrao Ganpati v. Raja Ram, AIR 1974 Bombay 104 which is exactly apposite to the instant case. In that case also in a suit for specific performance a conditional decree was passed in the following terms :- "Defendant shall execute a sale deed in respect of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall deposit in court the cost for the exemption and the registration of the sale deed within one month from this date. In case the plaintiff fails to deposit the costs as aforesaid, the suit shall stand dismissed. On his depositing the costs in court the defendant shall execute the sale deed and get it registered. In case of failure of defendant to do so, the plaintiff should be entitled to get the sale deed executed and registered in execution of the decree through court." Relying on a Division Bench decision of that Court in Civil Application No. 3964 of 1958, the learned Single Judge, who decided that revision, held that the failure on the part of the plaintiff to carry out the terms of the decree had automatically resulted in the disposal of the suit and the court had become functus officio and had no power to grant an extention of time fixed by the decree.
(3.) IF the decree in the present case is analysed, it would lead to the same result. I have reproduced the operative part of the decree above. It would be seen that it was in two parts. The first part placed an obligation on the plaintiff to deposit a sum of Rs. 45,307.20 in the court or to pay the same to the defendant, within one month from the date of the decree. It was clearly provided that in the event of his failure to do so the suit shall stand dismissed. The second part of the decree related to the obligation placed on the defendant. That part was to come into effect only when the plaintiff had complied with the obligation placed on him. Thus it was a self contained operative decree and time could not have been enlarged by taking recourse to Sec. 148, CPC. On this view the order passed on 5th of January, 1979 and all subsequent orders suffer from lack of jurisdiction.;