Satish Chandra, J. - (1.) A learned Single Judge of this Court felt that the decision of another Single Judge in Parma nand v. Smt. Chimmawati, AIR 1955 All 64 requires reconsideration. He referred the case to a Division Bench.
(2.) THE plaintiff-applicants institut ed a suit for a declaration that they are the original owners in possession of the house in dispute and for a permanent in junction to restrain the defendant No. 1 from interfering with the plaintiffs' posses sion either by executing the decree granted to him under Section 6 of the Specific Re lief Act or through any other means or ways. Along with the plaint the plaintiffs filed an application for an ad interim in junction to restrain the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiffs. The trial Court relying upon the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in AIR 1955 All 64, held that the applicant was not en titled to an injunction and rejected it. This view was confirmed by the Civil Judge on appeal. In Parmanand's case, AIR 1955 All 64 a suit under Section 9 of the Speci fic Relief Act was decreed. The defend ant to that suit instituted a regular title suit praying for an injunction restraining the defendant from executing the decree granted under Section 9. It was held that such a suit does not lie because if the prayer for an injunction is granted the very object and purpose of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act will be defeated. The object and purpose of that suit was that if a person takes the law in his own hands and forcibly dispossesses another otherwise than in accordance with law he must sur render possession irrespective of any title that may vest in him. If a plea of title cannot be set up in the suit itself, it can also not be set up as a bar to execution proceedings. In our opinion this decision does not represent the correct position of law.
(3.) SECTION 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 corresponds to Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Sub- section (1) of Section 6 of the Act provides that if any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claim ing through him may, by suit, recover pos session thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. Such proceedings are summary and are intended merely to adjudicate the question as to which party was in possession on the rele vant date and whether the plaintiff was dispossessed without his consent. Ques tions of title are outside the purview of such a suit. It is specifically provided in sub-section (4) of Section 6 which says that a decree under sub-section (1) shall not preclude him "from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof". Section 5 further pro vides that a person entitled to the posses sion of specific immovable property may recover it in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.;