- (1.) THIS Civil Revision hat been filed by the Chief Inspector of Stamps, U. P. under Section 6-B of the Court Fees Act and arises from an order dated 21-8-1968 passed by the Civil Judge, Unnao, re jecting his opinion on the question of defi ciency fa court-fees by holding that the court-fees paid on the plaint by the opposite party was sufficient The suit out of which the present revision arises was filed by the Zila Parishad, Unnao, against the State of U. P. and another. The subject-matter of dispute is open land with a building, well etc. According to the plaintiff the building on the disputed land was constructed with funds belonging to the erstwhile District Board of Unnao and the land as well as building and well in dispute have been and are fa the plaintiff's possession. The plaintiff has re ceived a notice of resumption of this pro perty from the defendants who claimed that the land is Nazul property and the building was constructed with public donations. The plaintiff denied that this is Nazul property and, contested that it could not be resum ed and alternatively they contend that work of permanent character having been put up, land could not be resumed under law even if the Zila Parishad was not found to pos sess any right or title thereto. On these facts the plaintiff claimed a decree for dec laration that it is the owner of the suit pro perty and permanent injunction by which the defendants may be restrained from interfer ing with its possession.
(2.) THE plaintiff paid maximum court-fees prescribed by law on the relief of dec laration and separate court-fee on the relief of injunction on the ground, as stated fa the plaint itself, that injunction was being claimed as an independent relief. During the trial the Chief Inspector of Stamps rais ed an objection that the plaintiff-opposite party had not paid the court-fees required by law. In his opinion the relief of injunc tion was consequential to the relief of decla ration and, therefore, court-fee was liable to be paid under Section 7 (iv) (a) of the Court Fees Act on the market value of the immo vable property fa suit. This opinion of the Chief Inspector of Stamps was not accepted by the Civil Judge who relied upon the case of Murli Dhar v. Bansidhar, AIR 1963 All 86 and distinguished the case of Vibhuti Narain Singh v. Municipal Board, Allahabad, AIR 1958 All 41 on which reliance wat placed by the Chief Inspector of Stamps. I have heard for the State the learned Chief Standing Counsel and for the opposite party-plaintiff Sri Umesh Chandra Srivastava, learned Advocate for the Zila Parishad. The question for determination is whether the relief of injunction was a con-lequential relief within the meaning of Sec tion 7 (iv) (a) of the Indian Court Fees Act. The Full Bench of seven Judges of this Court in the case of Chief Inspector of Stamps, U. P., Allahabad v. Mahanth Laxmi Narain, AIR 1970 All 488 (FB) overruled the earlier Full Bench case of this Court in Kalu Ram v. BabuLal, AIR 1932 All 485 (FB) and laid down that in order to ascer tain the real nature of the reliefs claimed, the substance of the plaint has to be con sidered. It was further held that the words consequential relief imply that the other relief should be one which flows directly from the declaration which the plaintiff de-lires to be made which means that the plain tiff should be entitled to the other relief only as a necessary consequence or result of granting of the declaratory relief. The otheu relief must be so dependent on the decla ratory relief that it cannot be allowed if the principal relief is refused. Applying this test, it is clear to me that the relief for injunction claimed by the op posite party could not be held to be "conse quential relief" within the meaning of Sec tion 7 (iv) (a) of the Court Fees Act No doubt the plaintiff asserted his own right OB title to the disputed property denying that the property was Nazul, but the plaintiff also raised an alternative plea that even if the land was not found to belong to it and was Nazul building of permanent characteu having been put, the property was no longer resumable. It is on this second alternative plea also that the plaintiff claims relief of in junction. If the plaintiff had not raised an alternative plea and it had claimed injunc tion only on the basis of ownership then Certainly the relief of injunction could be regarded as consequential relief inasmuch as the relief of injunction could not be granted unless the plaintiff was found to possess title or in other words relief of injunction would have flowed from a declaration of title in its favour. But this cannot be said when the plaintiff may ask for the relief of injunction on the second ground, having failed to esta blish its title or right in the property. If the plaintiff succeeds in the second alternative plea then it will be entitled to injunction in dependently of any declaration of right in its favour. In that view of the matter and hav ing regard to the pith and substance of the plaintiff's claim the relief of injunction, can not, to my mind, be held to be consequen tial relief as urged for by the petitioner. The lower court appears to be right in the view that the case of Vibhuti Narain Singh, AIR 1958 All 41 (Supra) did not apply for in that case there was a positive finding that the relief of injunction could not be grant ed in the absence or independently of, the declaration of existence of right in favoun of the plaintiff. In the present case, upon the view which I take, injunction can be granted independent ly of any declaration of right in favour of the plaintiff. The decision in the case of Murli-dhar, AIR 1963 All 86 (Supra) appears to apply to the case. In that case the plaintiff had claimed injunction on the ground that certain resolutions passed by the defendants in a meeting held in its absence were ultra vires ab initio void and without jurisdiction. As the relief of injunction could, therefore, be granted on the success of this plea inde pendently of any declaration of right in favour of the plaintiff, it was held that in junction was not consequential relief and court-fees could be payable in terms of Article 17 (iii) of Schedule IT of the Court Fees Act, as here.
(3.) I , therefore, find that there is no substance in the petition which is liable to be dismissed and held that the court-fees paid by the plaintiff-opposite party is suffi cient and in accordance with law. The petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.;