MAHENDRA PRATAP KAPUR Vs. BURMAH SHELL OIL STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTING CO LTD
LAWS(ALL)-1972-3-19
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on March 17,1972

MAHENDRA PRATAP KAPUR Appellant
VERSUS
BURMAH SHELL OIL STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTING CO.LTD. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) THE plaintiff applicant fil ed a suit for restraining the defendants from removing the plaintiff from the dealership of outlet No. ODD 803 situate at G. T. Road, Lahartara, Varanasi of which he claimed to be an authorised dealer on be half of defendant No. 1. Along with the suit an application for temporary injunction was also filed. The defendants immediately put in appearance and alleged that they had appointed some third person as a dealer and that they have sponsored the name of that third person before the Excise Officer for grant of a licence. After hearing the parties the trial Court, by its order dated 10-3-J 972, granted three days' time to the defendants to file documents and detailed objections and in the meantime issued a temporary in junction as prayed for. Against the afore said order the defendants filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Varanasi, the very next day and made an application for staying the operation of the injunction order passed by the trial Court. The learn ed District Judge passed the following order: "Heard counsel for the appellant. Mean-While operation of the order dated 10-3-72 shall remain stayed." Against the aforesaid order of the learned District Judge dated 11-3-1972 the present revision has been filed. The primary ques tion for consideration is whether the pre sent revision is maintainable inasmuch as the impugned order amounts to a "case de cided" within the meaning of Section 115, C. P. C. or not. It is not disputed that the order passed by the learned District Judge is an ex parte order and the application for injunction is still pending before him. In Major S. S. Khanna v. Brig. F. J. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497 the Supreme Court thus interpreted the word "case": 'The expression 'case' is a word of comprehensive import: it includes civil pro ceedings othe_r than suits and is not restrict ed by anything contained in the Section to the entirety of the proceeding in a civil Court." The Supreme Court further observed: "The expression 'case' includes a suit, but in ascertaining the limits of the jurisdic tion of the High Court, there would be no warrant for equating it with a suit alone." The words "case decided" used in Sec tion 115, C. P. C. have been the subject-matter of innumerable judicial decisions. It is not necessary to refer to the various deci sions wherein these words have been inter preted. It is sufficient for my purpose to refer to the Full Bench case of Rama Shan-ker Tiwari v. Mahadeo, 1968 All LJ 109 (FB). In this case the earlier decisions have been fully considered and analysed and the following observations from a Full Bench decision of seven Judges of the Lahore High Court in Bibi Gurdevi v. Chaudhari Moham mad Bakhsh, AIR 1943 Lah 65 (FB) has been cited with approval: "The word 'case' in Section 115 does not always mean the whole suit. It is of a very wide import and means any state of facts judicially considered. This meaning is Wide enough to include a decision on any substantial question in controversy between the parties affecting their rights, even though such order is passed in the course of the trial of the suit. An interlocutory order de ciding a question of this kind as distin guished from purely formal and incidental order is a 'case decided' within the meaning of Section 115, It, therefore, follows that there must be a decision on any substantial question in con troversy between the parties affecting their rights. If the controversy has arisen by means of an independent application, that application must be finally disposed of by the court before it can be said that a case has been decided within the meaning of Sec tion 115, C. P. C.
(2.) A careful reading of the aforesaid decisions indicates that although the word "case" is wider than the word "suit", the order sought to be revised must decide the controversy between the parties affecting their rights. Various interlocutory orders may be passed while that proceeding is pending, but every interlocutory order would not amount to a case decided. While enter taining an application, the court may pass an ex parte interim order, but that order would not amount to a case decided. It is only when a final order is passed deciding that application that it can be said that a case has been decided. Learned counsel for the applicant relied on the case of Ajaibul Hasan v. S. Chiranji Lal, AIR 1951 All 564. In that case certain orders were passed by the trial Court on various miscellaneous applications moved before it while the suit was pending. One of the orders was challenged in appeal be fore the learned District Judge. An applica tion was also filed staying the operation of the order of the learned Munsif. After hear ing both the parties the learned District Judge stayed the operation of the order. The order of the learned District Judge was challenged in revision in this Court. A pre liminary objection was raised that no revi sion lay as there had been no 'case decided' within the meaning of Section 115, C. P. C. Dealing with the preliminary objection this Court observed: "There is, however, no doubt that, where an order has been passed in a pro ceeding which is separate and independent of the suit or the appeal, as the case may be, it would be a 'case decided'. The words 'separate and independent' indicate that the proceeding is not part of the main process which leads to the termination of the suit or the appeal, but it is something detached from the same, in the sense that the suit or the appeal can be disposed of even with out there having been such a proceeding. An application for injunction pending a suit or an application for stay of the order of the trial Court pending an appeal would certainly be a separate and independent pro ceeding in the sense that it is not a part of the proceeding leading to the termination of the suit or the appeal." It is evident from a reading of the facts of the aforesaid case that the order of the learned District Judge sought to be revised was a final order passed on an application for staying the operation of the order of the trial Court. There can be no dispute that if a final order is passed deciding the con troversy between the parties it would amount to a case decided, but this case is no autho rity for the proposition that even an ex parte interim order which does not dispose of the controversy between the parties would also amount to a case decided.
(3.) THE case of H. Bevis and Co., Kanpur v. Ram Behari, AIR 1951 All 8 is of no assistance in interpreting the words "case decided". la this case the question was neither raised nor decided. Only an obser vation was made that the order may be re-Visable. A decision is an authority only for a proposition which is raised and decided by it ;


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