A.K. Kirty, J. - (1.) THIS is an appeal Under Section 6 -A of the Court -fees Act.
(2.) THE Appellant filed suit No. 1 of 1969 for cancellation of sale deed dated 9th January, 1967. The sale deed was executed for a consideration of Rs. 5600/ -. The property conveyed consisted of some land and building and some machinery. In the plaint it was alleged that the market value of the land and building on the date of suit was Rs. 20,000/ -. Court -fee, however, was paid on the amount of Rs. 5600/ - which was the sale consideration. No objection in regard to Court -fee was raised and the suit was decided in Plaintiff's favour by the trial court. The Defendant filed an appeal. In the appellate court a report was submitted by the Inspector of Stamps and the appellate court same to the conclusion that the suit was one to which the provisions of Section 7(iv -A) of the Act applied and that the Plaintiff was liable to pay Court -fee which was to be calculated on the market value of the land and building as mentioned in the plaint. That is to say, the Court -fee payable on the plaint would have to be calculated on the basis of the market value of the land and building which was stated to be Rs. 20,000/ -. The Plaintiff accordingly was called upon to make good the deficiency on the plaint by the appellate court. It is against this order that the instant appeal has been filed. It is not disputed by the Appellant that Section 7(iv -A) of the Court -fees Act applies to the case. It has, however, been contended that in determining the amount of Court -fee payable on the plaint, the relevant factor in the instant case was the amount for which the instrument, namely the sale deed, was executed and not the value of the property itself as has been wrongly held by the court below. The relevant part of Section 7(iv -A) reads as under: In suits for or involving cancellation of or adjudging void or voidable a decree for money or other property having a market value, or an instrument securing money or other property having such values: (1) where the Plaintiff or his predecessor -in -title was a party to the decree or' the instrument according to the value, of the subject -matter and (2) ...and such value shall be deemed to be - -if the whole decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount for which or value of the property in respect of which the decree was passed or the instrument executed....
(3.) IT was contended that the value of the subject -matter, under the provisions of section itself, must be deemed in the instant case to be the amount for which the instrument was executed. It was urged that the section contemplates two categories of cases and provides for separate method of determining the value of the subject matter in respect of each category. According to the learned Counsel, in the case of a suit for cancellation of an instrument securing property, the value of subject -matter must be deemed to be the amount for which the instrument sought to be cancelled was executed. In such a case no question of determining the market value of the property can arise. There is considerable force in this submission. But a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Kumar v. Damodar Das, 1949 AWR 67 construed the provisions of Section 7(iv -A) and held: We are, therefore, of opinion that where the decree is for money or the instrument secures money, the value of the subject -matter is the amount of the decree or the amount of the money secured by the instrument; where, on the other hand, the decree is for other property having a market value or the instrument secures other property having such value, the value of the subject -matter for the purposes of court -fee is the value of the property in respect of which the decree was passed or in respect of which the instrument was executed. With respect, if I may say so, I entertain some doubt in regard to the correctness of the interpretation by the Division Bench of the relevant provisions of Section 7(iv -A); at the same time I must mention that as a Single Judge I am bound by the decision of the Division Bench. The said decision was given in 1949 and the correctness of that decision does not appear to have been questioned during the last 22 or 23 years. I do not think that in the circumstances I would be justified in referring the matter for decision by a Full Bench.;