SATISH CHANDRA, J. - (1.) THE Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, has submitted this statement of the case for the opinion of this Court on the following question of law : "Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the assessee -firm was entitled to registration under S. 26A of the Act and the relevant Rules under the Indian IT Act, 1922 ?"
(2.) THE question relates to the asst. year 1959 -60. The assessee -firm consisting of two partners, namely, Rameshwar Nath and Mohan Lal, came into existence on 1st April, 1954. It was duly registered under S. 26A of the Act of 1922 for the asst. yrs. 1953 -54 to 1956 -57. With effect from 1st April, 1956, a change came about in the constitution of the firm. Mohan Lal, one of the partners, who had an eight -annas share, incorporated his brother, Brijmohan Lal, as an additional partner in the firm. Thereafter, Mohan Lal and Brijmohan Lal each had a four annas share in the firm. The partners applied for registration by an application made on 26th December, 1959, for the asst. year 1959 -60. The ITO held that this was the first application for registration by a new firm. It was barred by time, and hence no registration was allowable. The assessee -firm took the matter in appeal. The AAC took the same view, namely, that the said application was the first application for registration and was barred by time. The explanation submitted on behalf of the assessee that the firm had given the registration application to Ram Bharose Lal, its accountant, who could not file the same with the ITO, due to the serious illness of his wife, was not accepted, because there was no material in support of it. It was held that there was no sufficient cause for the delay in making the application. The appeal was dismissed. The assessee then filed an appeal before the Tribunal. At this stage, he filed an affidavit of Ram Bharose Lal in support of the explanation that had been offered for the delay. The Tribunal accepted the plea of the assessee -firm that the events of 1956 did not make the firm a new one, and that the application made in December, 1959, was not the first application, and so, it was not governed by the rule of limitation laid down in r. 2 of the IT Rules. It was held that there was no limitation of time for making such an application. It was held that the Departmental authorities were not justified in considering the application for registration as time -barred. The Tribunal then observed that even assuming that the above view was not correct, even then the firm had made out a case for the condonation of the delay, and the ITO should have condoned the delay and granted registration. On these findings, the appeal was allowed, and it was directed that the assessee -firm will be allowed registration with all the consequent benefits thereunder. At the instance of the CIT, the Tribunal has referred the question mentioned above for our opinion.
(3.) AFTER the dismissal of the application under S. 66(1) of the IT Act, the CIT moved another application before the Tribunal, praying that question No. 2 mentioned in the earlier application also should be referred to the High Court. The Tribunal had in its original order of reference stated that question No. 2 was covered by the question already referred to. It stuck to this opinion and rejected the application. Aggrieved, the CIT had moved an application under S. 66(4) of the Act, praying that the Tribunal be directed to refer the same questions to this Court. Having heard learned counsel, we are satisfied that questions Nos. 1 and 3 mentioned in this application are clearly covered by the question referred to us. Question No. 2, namely, whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for registration is also within the purview of the question which has been referred to us by the Tribunal. Under the circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to require another reference. The application under S. 66(4) is hence rejected. On the question whether there was sufficient cause for the delay, the Tribunal has given a finding in favour of the assessee. According to it, in the circumstances of the case, the delay was liable to be condoned. Apparently, this finding is on a question of fact. We have to see whether it is contrary to law.;