- (1.) THE two petitioners run public carrier vehicles in the Neonatal region. The Parliament enacted the Defence of India Act, 1962 (being Act No. 51 of 1962) on the 12th December, 1962. This Act was by Section 1 (3) to remain in force during the period of emergency declared by Presi dential proclamation on the 26th October, 1962 and for a period of six months there after. Section 6 of this Act introduced tem porary amendments in some Acts. By sub-clause (4) of Section 4 of the Act, it sought to amend the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 6 (4) (a) gave powers to the State Government to authorise any person by a notification in the Official Gazette, to per form to the exclusion of the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, such functions as may be specified in the notification. The State Government there after issued a notification on the 26th Nov ember, 1962, authorising the Transport Com missioner to fix the minimum rate for ply ing public carriers, in U. P. Normally this power was exercised by the State Transport Authority under Section 43 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Transport Commissioner in exercise of this power issued a notifica tion on the 19th March, 1963 (Annexure 'B of the petition) fixing certain rates for freights in the hill areas. It appears that the rates fixed were different for the Nainital and Garhwal region. The petitioners ply in Nainital region and the rates fixed for this region are less than that fixed for the Garh was region. The emergency proclaimed on the 26th August, 1962, it is admitted, has come to an end and a further period of six months has also expired. The petitioners challenge this notification on the ground that the notification has become ineffective after the emergency has come to an end.
(2.) SECTION 1 (3) of the Defence of India Act, 1962 prescribed the period dur ing which the Act was to remain in force. Even after the expiry of the period set out therein, sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of this sub-section provided for the continu ance of certain orders etc. Counsel for the respondents has urged that even though the Act is no longer in force, the notification in question would be saved by clause (a) or (b) of this sub-section. It will be convenient to extract these clauses:- "(1) (3) It shall remain in force during the period of operation of the Proclamation of Emergency issued on the 26th October, 1962 and for a period of six months there after but its expiry under the operation of this sub-section shall not affect: (a) the previous operation of, or any thing duly done or suffered under, this Act or any rule made there under or any order made under any such rule, or (b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under this Act or any rule made there under of any order made under any such rule, or (c)..............." So far as sub-clause (a) is concerned, it only protects the previous operation of, or anything duly done or suffered under, the Act or any rule made there under or any order made under any such rule. This is made clear by the use of the words "the previous operation of" in this sub-clause. The protection given by this sub-clause does not extend to orders passed during the period of emergency after the emergency is over. It would be an antithesis to interpret sub-clause (a) as extending the life of orders passed under the Act, even though the Act itself is no longer in force. This sub-clause was enacted for the purposes of shutting out any challenge to acts under the Act or Rules framed thereunder, during the period of emergency, on the ground inter alia of their being unconstitutional. Its purpose does not seem to be to extend the life of Rules or Orders made under the Act even after the emergency is over. So far as sub-clause (b) is concerned, that can apply to cases where some right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the Act or the Rules. The notifica tion in question fixed the maximum rate of freight for public carriers operating hi the region. The order in question has been pass ed in exercise of powers under Section 43 of the Motor Vehicles Act and not under the Defence of India Act. So far as the Act is concerned, all that it did was to em power the State Government to confer power on a person other than the appropri ate authorities constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, to pass orders under that Act. It only brought about a change in the au thority which was to pass the particular orders. The right or liability, if any, created by the fixation of the maximum rate is re ferable to the provisions of Section 43 of the Motor Vehicles Act and not to the pro visions of the Act or the Rules. Thus sub-clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section 1 (3) of the Act do not help the respondents. The notification as such cannot be sustained and has to be quashed. The petition is accordingly allow ed. The impugned notification dated 19th March 1963 (Annexure 'B5) to the petition is quashed. In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed.;