Gulati, J. - (1.) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(2.) ONE Lala Beni Madho Agarwal of Allahabad died on September 29, 1964. His estate became liable to estate duty under the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (No. 34 of 1953). The petitioner is his son and is an accountable person under the Act. He filed a statement of accounts declaring the value of the estate of the deceased liable to estate duty at Rs. 4,96,196. The first respondent, the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Allahabad, assessed the value of the estate at Rs. 20,27,189 and determined the estate duty payable at Rs. 3,37,543.40. The petitioner has filed an appeal against the assessment which is still pending. The petitioner has already paid a sum of Rs. 79,429-40 towards the duty and a sum of Rs. 2,58,114 still remains payable. The estate of the deceased which was subjected to duty, includes an item of immovable property known as premises No. 1, Phaphamau Read, Allahabad. This premises consists of one main building and several outbuildings and a large area of land. Under the Defence of India Act, the Government of India requisitioned the open land on all the four sides of the main building, leaving only the main building, the out-buildings and an approach road. The main building was at one time occupied by the State of Uttar Pradesh but after the Central Government requisitioned the open land, the State Government vacated it. It is now lying vacant. This building had been valued for purposes of the estate duty at Rs. 2,53,625. The petitioner by his letter dated 16th February, 1971, addressed to the second respondent, the Central Board of Direct Taxes, Government of India, New Delhi, offered to transfer the said building to the Government of India towards the payment of the balance of the estate duty. The Central Board of Direct Taxes has by its letter dated September 16, 1971, declined to accept the offer. Thereafter the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Allahabad, by his letter dated October 21, 1971, allowed the petitioner to pay the arrears of duty in instalments of Rs. 10,000 per month during the pendency of his appeal and the balance within two months after the decision of the appeal. The petitioner is aggrieved. His contention is that under Section 52 of the Act he has a right to offer in satisfaction of the estate duty any item of the immovable property of the deceased upon which duty has been levied and the Government is obliged to accept the offer. He has accordingly prayed for the following reliefs: " (1) to issue a writ of mandamus or any other suitable writ, order or direction directing the Central Government to consider the offer of the petitioner for payment of estate duty by transfer of immovable property being the premises No. 1, Phaphamau Road, Allahabad, and to negotiate and settle the price of the said property and to give credit of payment of the estate duty by such transfer of property. (2) to issue a writ of certiorari or any other suitable writ, order or direction quashing the notice No. 32-B/ED dated October 21, 1971, issued by the respondent No. 1. (3) to grant to the petitioner such other or further relief or reliefs as the court may deem fit and proper. "
(3.) SECTION 52, so far as it is material for our purpose, reads : "52. Payment of duty by transfer of property.--(1) The Central Government may, on an application of the person accountable for estate duty, accept in satisfaction of the whole or any part of such duty any property passing on the death of the deceased at such price as may be agreed upon between the Central Government and that person, and thereupon such person shall deliver possession of the property to such authority as may be specified by that Government in this behalf. " The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that although Section 52 seems to confer discretion upon the Central Government to accept or not to accept property towards the payment of estate duty, yet the discretion is coupled with a duty to accept such an offer whenever made by an accountable person provided there is no disagreement on the price of the property. In other words, what is contended is that the discretion vested in the Government is coupled with a duty and, therefore, the word " may " used in Section 52 must be construed to mean " must " or " shall ". The learned counsel has cited a large number of authorities in support of this proposition but it is not necessary to notice them all. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the use of the word " may " in statutory provisions would not by itself show that the provision is directory in nature. In most cases the legislature may use the word " may " as a matter of pure conventional courtesy and yet intend a mandatory force. In order, therefore, to interpret the legal import of the word "may ", one has to consider various factors, namely, the object and the scheme of the Act, the context and the background against which the word has been used, the purpose and the advantages sought to be achieved by the use of that word and the like. It would be sufficient to refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh: " There is no doubt that the word ' may' generally does not mean ' must' or ' shall'. But it is well settled that the word ' may ' is capable of meaning ' must' or ' shall' in the light of the context. It is also clear that where a discretion has been conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word ' may ' which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command, " ;