M.C. Desai, C.J. - (1.) On August 28, 1962, we dismissed this Special Appeal summarily and reserved our reasons, which we now proceed to give. The dispute is about a plot of land which was a grove of the appellant in 1363 Fasli. In 1364 Fasli a notification under Section 4 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, was issued in respect of the area in which the grove was situated. Consolidation to be effected under the Act is of holdings excluding land which was grove in the agricultural year immediately preceding the year in which the notification under Section 4 was issued, vide Sec. 3(2). Accordingly, the grove of the appellant was to be excluded from the scheme of consolidation; it was not to be treated as included in a tenure-holder's holding. The Assistant Consolidation Officer prepared a statement of plots and tenure-holders as required by Sec. 11(1), showing, among others, a list of all plots whether or not comprised in the holding of a tenure-holder together with the soil classification and a list of plots of each tenure-holder showing the areas excluded from consolidation. The statement is then to be published and objections are to be invited; all objections that are filed against it are to be decided by the Consolidation Officer, vide Secs. 11(2) and 12. The decision of the Consolidation Officer is "except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, . . . . . final," vide sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 12. It appears that in I364F. the grove in dispute lost its character as such and presumably on account of this fact, it was not excluded from consolidation in the statement prepared under Sec. 11. No objection, however, was filed against its non-exclusion by the appellant. A consolidation scheme consists of a statement of principles prepared under Section 14, and a statement of proposals prepared under Sec. 19. The former statement has to show- "(d) the allocation of works of public utility and other common use; (e) the basis on which the tenure-holders will contribute towards land re-quired for purposes of common utility and the extent to which vacant land may be utilised with a view to the said purpose; (f) any other matter which may be prescribed." In the statement prepared, the Assistant Consolidation Officer showed the grove in dispute as reserved for public purposes. Under Section 16 the statement of principles prepared under Section 14 is to be published and any person likely to be affected by the scheme is given a right to make an objection in the prescribed manner within 15 days. The statement of principles was published but no objection was filed by the appellant against the statement in it that the grove in dispute was reserved for public purposes. Sec. 17 provides that any objection filed against the statement of principles will be disposed of by the Consolidation Officer, that any person aggrieved by his order may file an appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and that the latters decision "except as otherwise provided by or under this Act shall be final." When no objections are filed on the statement of principles within the time allowed or they have been filed and are finally disposed of, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) is required to "confirm the statement" and "thereupon the statement as confirmed shall become final and be published" in the village, vide Sec. 18. As soon as it is confirmed, the Assistant Consolidation Officer is required by Section 19 to prepare a statement of proposals in accordance with it showing, among other matters, "the areas earmarked for public purposes and the layout of such areas." No objection was filed by the appellant against the statement of principles and it was confirmed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and became final and was published in the village. After it the statement of proposals was prepared by the Assistant Consolidation Officer showing the grove in dispute among the areas earmarked for public purposes. Sec. 20, sub-sec. (1) requires the statement of proposals to be published in the village. Sub-Sec. (2) is to the effect that a person likely to be affected by the proposals may, within fifteen days of such publication, file an objection in writing before the Assistant Consolidation Officer. Taking advantage of this provision the appellant, for the first time, filed an objection against the inclusion of his grove plot in the consolidation scheme and its being reserved for a public purposes. The Consolidation Officer dismissed the objection on the grounds that the land was not grove in 1363 Fasli, that the statement of principles showing that it had been reserved for public purposes had been confirmed on 31-5-1959 and that it was too late to object to it. An appeal is provided from the order and the appellant filed one but it was dismissed on the ground that the objection could not be filed under Section 20 inasmuch as no objection could be filed against the statement of principles, which had become final. A revision application was filed against his order, as allowed by Section 48, to the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who refused to interfere. The Deputy Director conceded that the land was a grove in 1363 Fasli, but held that no material irregularity was committed by the Consolidation authorities in including it in the consolidation scheme, because it had lost its character at the time when the notification under Section 4 was issued. He also observed that it was through the statement of principles that it was reserved for public purposes and the appellant failed to file an objection against it as permitted by Sec. 16(2) and that he could not file an objection under Sec. 20. Thereupon the appellant came to this court with an application for a writ of certiorari for the quashing of the orders of the consolidation authorities. The writ was refused by our brother Nigam, mainly on the ground that an objection on the ground that the land was a grove and could not be included in the consolidation scheme and, therefore, could not be reserved for a public purpose was not one that could be advanced for the first time against the statement of proposals under Sec. 20(2). He conceded that the Deputy Director could in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction correct the mistake of including it in the consolidation scheme, but refused to interfere with his order, because he had not been asked to do so by the appellant in his revision application. He disagreed with the contention of the appellant that his objections was against the entry made in the statement of proposals that the land in dispute was earmarked for public purposes. 3. Sec. 20(2), which is the only authority relied upon by the appellant, gives a right to file an objection to a person likely to be affected by the statement of proposals. We find from the above statement of facts that he was not affected by anything contained in the statement of proposals. He was certainly affected by his grove being included in the consolidation scheme, though it was to be exempt from consolidation. It is immaterial that on the date on which the notification under Section 4 was issued the land had ceased to be a grove; every land that was a grove in 1363 Fasli was excluded from consolidation regardless of whether it retained its character or not on the date of the issue of the notification. The grove was included in the consolidation scheme, not through the statement of proposals but through the statement of plots and tenure-holders prepared under Section 11 and the statement of principles prepared under Sec. 14. It was through those statements that it was decided that the grove would be included in the consolidation and that it would be reserved for public purposes. The appellant was affected by those statements and should have filed objections against them but did not. The statement of proposals did not contain anything new in respect of the grove being included in the consolidation scheme and of its being reserved for public purposes. A statement of proposals has to show the area earmarked for public purposes and their layout, but this only means that it has to show areas already earmarked for public purposes through the statement of principles. Nothing is to be earmarked for the first time through the statement of proposals for certain reasons the legislature required that the statement of proposals should (again) show again the areas earmarked for public purposes, but this showing of the areas earmarked for public purposes is in no sense a proposal within the meaning of Sec. 20(2). A thing that has already been confirmed and has become final can never be described as a proposal and once the statements of plots and tenure-holders and of principles were confirmed and became final, nothing contained in them could be described as a proposal. So long as they were not confirmed and had not become final and were subject to objections and appeals they were proposals, but after the statements were confirmed and became final they ceased to be proposals. Therefore, the statement that the grove was included in the consolidation scheme and was reserved for public purposes was no longer a proposal but was a decided fact; it was, no longer open to revision or alteration. The proposals referred to in Sec. 20(2) by which a person should be affected in order that he has a right to file an objection are the new proposals contained for the first time in the statement of proposals. They are the proposals mentioned in Section 19 (1) (b) (c) (d) (f) and (g). Neither are the particulars specified in clause (a) proposals though they are required to be recorded in the statement of proposals, nor are the areas earmarked for public purposes. The words "likely to be affected" in Sec. 20(2) are highly significant; a person already affected by something done previously, (such as the inclusion in the consolidation scheme of his land exempt from consolidation) cannot be said to be a person "likely to be affected"; "likely to be affected" means "likely to be affected in future." Here the appellant was already affected by the confirmation and the finality of the statements of plots and tenure-holders and of principles which recorded the fact that the grove in dispute was included in the consolidation scheme and was reserved for public purposes. He was, therefore, not a person contemplated by Section 20 (2). 4. The scheme of the Act is against the appellant's having a right to file such objection at this stage. Consolidation is done village wise; each village forms a unit of holdings which will be consolidated. The necessary consequence of this is that the rights or interest of a tenure holder in the village are so intimately connected with the rights or interests of others that the slightest alteration or modification in them must call for alteration or modification in the rights or interests of other tenure-holders. If, after the consolidation has been affected, the rights or interest of a tenure-holder are altered, the consolidation of other tenure holders will require revision. Consolidation is a protracted and costly operation and the legislature could not have intended that a tenure holder should have an unlimited right to have his rights or interest examined and reexamined. Since consolidation is a protracted and costly operation, it had to be split up into various stages. First there is a revision and correction of records of the village, so that it is ensured that the entries in them are correct. The basis of the consolidation is the entries in the records. There is sufficient opportunity given to all tenure-holders to file objections against the entries and to get mistakes corrected. Once the records are corrected, the next stage is reached and the statement of plots and tenure-holders is prepared on the basis of the records. If there are any mistakes in the statement the tenure-holders affected are given a right to get them corrected. After the statement is corrected it is confirmed and made final and then the third stage of preparation of statement of principles is reached. It is prepared on the basis of the statement of plots and tenure-holders, and, if anybody is aggrieved by any mistake in it, he is given a right to have it corrected. After it is corrected and confirmed and made final, the next stage of preparing a statement of proposals is reached. The operation of each subsequent stage is so dependent upon the operation of the previous stage that any alteration in what is done in the earlier stage must call for a revision of what is done in the subsequent stage. For this reason the legislature laid down provisions for confirmation and finality of the operation of each stage before the operation of the next stage is under taken, so that what is done in the operation of the next stage may not have to be revised later. Full opportunity is given to every tenure-holder to object to a statement prepared at one stage so that its correctness is ensured and after it is confirmed and made final there should arise no question of any tenure-holder's objecting to any entry made in it later. If a consolidation scheme has reached the stage of preparation of statement of proposals and a tenure holder has still a right to object to any entry in the records, or in the statement of plots and tenure-holders, or even in the statement of principles, it would mean upsetting everything that was done previously and undertaking revision of these documents on a large scale again and there would be no finality. The legislature could not have contemplated that there should be such a lack of finality in the statements prepared at different stages in spite of its having laid down that the statements were confirmed and had become final. The provisions in respect of their being confirmed and having become final must be given full 'effect and it must be held that what has been confirmed and become final is not open to alteration or correction subsequently. Every provision allowing an opportunity to file an objection after an earlier provision confirming and making final something must mean that the former provision relates to an objection in respect of a matter not confirmed and made final. In other words, Sec 20(2) allows a tenure-holder to file an objection against anything contained in the statement of proposals which has not been confirmed or made final under any of the provisions, such as Sec. 18. 5. We are not unmindful of the provision in Sec. 12(7) to the effect that a question of title in respect of any plot mentioned in a statement of plots and tenure-holders which might and ought to have been raised under sub-sec. (1) but was not raised shall not be raised in any objection filed under Sec. 20(2) or under Sec. 34(1). Sec. 20 (2) is the provision under consideration and Sec. 34(1) allows any person aggrieved by an order passed under Section 29 or under Section 31 in respect of compensation or encumberances to file an objection. It can be contended on the strength of the provision in Section 12 (7) that the legislature did not exclude an objection on the basis of title from the scope of Sec. 20(2). If a question of title arises, it would arise much earlier either when a statement of plots and tenure-holders is prepared or when a statement of principles is prepared; it is not likely to arise for the first time when a statement of proposals is prepared. We do not consider that the fact that the legislature expressly provided in Sec. 12(7) that no question of title in respect of any plot mentioned in the statement of plots and tenure-holders can be raised under Sec. 20(2), means that any kind of question can be raised in an objection under Sec. 20(2). There is no question of a statement of plots and tenure-holders being confirmed and becoming final. What prevents certain matters being agitated in an objection under Sec. 20(2) is the confirmation and finality of the statement of principles. The legislature probably enacted Sec. 12(7) to give effect to the rule of constructive res judicata. 6. Srivastava, J. in Ganga Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1962 RD 107 held that a decision on an objection to a statement of plots and tenure-holders does not prevent an objection on the same facts under Sec. 20(2) What happened in that case is as follows. There was a dispute between G and B, G claiming sirdari rights in certain land and B claiming one-third share in it. The dispute arose first during the revision and correction of records and it was decided in favour of G. When the statement of plots and tenure-holders was published in the village B again raised the dispute claiming one-third share in the land and his claim was rejected by an order under Sec. 12. B filed an appeal, but, during its pendency, statement of principles was prepared and confirmed and became final. Then a statement of proposals was prepared and B again filed an objection claiming one-third share in the land. His claim was upheld and G filed a writ petition for the quashing of the order on the ground that no objection under Sec. 20(2) could be filed in respect of a matter which was still pending in an appeal under Section 12, and that, in any case, the objection should have been decided in terms of the order against which the appeal was pending. The second objection was repelled by Srivastava, J. on the ground that the order being under appeal was not final. In this connection it was contended before him that the legislature did not intend Sec. 20(2) to permit an objection which could have been raised and had actually been raised and decided under Sec. 12. The contention was rejected by the learned Judge, who relied upon Sec. 22(2). The facts of that case are distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. The dispute there was in respect of a title and Sec. 22(2) deals with disputes about title. The dispute in the instant case is not about title and we are not concerned with Sec. 22(2). Secondly, the order passed under Section 12 had certainly not become final. Thirdly, the finality given under Sec. 12(3) to the Consolidation Officer's decision is not absolute, but "as otherwise provided by or under this Act," and no such words qualify the finality given to the statement of principles under Sec. 18. There are, however, certain observations made by the learned Judge which call for comments. One is that he takes the phrase "except as otherwise provided by or under this Act" to cover a provision for an objection, and we respectfully do not think this is correct. What is required by the phrase is a provision which would affect the finality of the decision, and a provision permitting an objection to be raised against a statement prepared at a later stage can hardly be said to be a provision contemplated by the phrase. We think that the only provision contemplated by the phrase is that contained in Section 48, which allows the Deputy Director of Consolidation to call for records and to revise orders. That is the only provision which allows a decision to be revised; other provisions relating to objections against statements and orders thereon do not expressly allow revision of decisions arrived at previously. The learned Judge then observed with respect to Sec. 20(2) at page 108: "There is nothing in this sub-section to show that the objection must be confined only to some particular matters or that the objection cannot raise the same point which has already been raised under Section 12 but in respect of which the decision had not become final. The statement of proposals prepared under Section 19 . . . . . contains details about the original holding of the tenure-holder also. If, therefore, any person has any objection against those entries in the statement of proposals he will also be affected by the proposals and can raise an objection in respect of those entries under Sec. 20(1). Sec. 20(2) is, therefore, another provision which may prevent the decision of the Consolidation Officer under Section 12 from becoming final." With great respect we do not agree that Sec. 20(2) is not confined to new matters included in the statement of proposals or that an objection can be filed against an entry in a statement of proposals even though there existed previously a right to object to such an entry contained in another statement prepared earlier. The words "any person" are wide enough, but their width is controlled by the scope of the objection permitted under Sec. 20(2). If the objection is of the nature contemplated by sub-sec. (2), it can be raised by "any person." 7. We, therefore, hold that the appellant had no right to file the objection against the statement of proposals. 8. Coming to the revisional powers of the Deputy Director, we agree with the learned single Judge that, though the powers may be wide, they are discretionary and that the Deputy Director was not bound to interfere with every incorrect order. In this particular case he would have been justified in refusing to interfere, because the grove did after all lose its character in the very next Fasli year. The appellant did not now stand to suffer on account of its being included in the consolidation scheme. 9. As regards the third point raised by Sri Hargovind Dayal before Nigam, J., it could not be raised for the first time in a petition for certiorari. Even otherwise, we agree with our learned brother that if there could be any objection against the entry made in the statement of proposals under Cl. (e) of Section 19 earmarking the grove for a public purpose, it could be only on the ground that it should not be reserved for that purpose or that the layout should be different. 10. There is thus no force in this special appeal. Appeal dismissed.;