M.C. Desai, J. - (1.) This is an appeal from a judgment of Tandon, J. quashing by certiorari an order of a Rent Control and Eviction Officer, exercising the powers of a District Magistrate under the Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, directing respondent No. 3 to let out the front portion of the ground floor of a building known as "Aditya Bhavan," owned by her, to the appellant. Aditya Bhavan is a double-storeyed building; respondent No. 3 is in occupation of the upper story and she had let out the ground floor to one Dr. Hukku on monthly rent of Rs. 68-12-0. Dr. Hukku used to run a clinic in the front portion of the ground floor under the name of Hindu Muslim Pharmacy and used the back portion for accommodation of his patients. He died in February, 1954, and the clinic was inherited by his sister and heir Srimati Brij Pati Kaul respondent No. 2, who obtained possession over the entire ground floor. She commenced to reside in the back portion and reserved the front portion for use as a clinic to be run in the name of her brother. She entered into a partnership with the appellant under a deed dated October 1, 1954. Under its terms the partnership was to run a pharmacy known as "Dr. Hukku's clinic and pharmacy" in the front portion, the appellant was to attend to the pharmacy every morning and evening and make available his professional services to the patients and the partnership was to pay the entire rent of the ground floor Rs. 68-12-0 per month to respondent No. 2. The deed further provided that on the partnership being dissolved the goodwill of the partnership would be sold to the partner who offered a higher amount and that the purchaser of the goodwill would run the pharmacy in the same name and would pay rent for the front portion direct to respondent No. 3 after settling the amount with her.
(2.) The partnership continued in force till August 16, 1958, when respondent No. 2 served a notice upon the appellant for its dissolution. On 6-9-1958 she filed a suit for dissolution and rendition of accounts. The appellant, however, continued to be in occupation of the front portion and started his own clinic in the name "Dr. A. C. Das's clinic." He entered into a partnership with his own wife for running the clinic and she applied to the District Magistrate for allotment of the front portion to her, but her application was rejected on the ground of no vacancy, respondent No. 2 being in occupation of the back portion and the appellant, of the front portion. Later the appellant himself applied for the front portion to be allotted to him and on May 30, 1959, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer granted his application and on June 1, 1959, he issued an order, now quashed by Tandon, J. through his order under appeal directing respondent No. 3 to let out the front portion to the appellant and the back portion to respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2, aggrieved by this order in respect of the front portion, applied for certiorari for the quashing of it. The gist of the case set up by her was as follows:- In the suit brought by respondent No. 2 for dissolution of the partnership a receiver had been appointed by the civil court to take possession over the front portion and the effect of the impugned order was to interfere with the civil suit and to set at nought the civil court's order of appointment of a receiver. The ground floor was all the time in possession of respondent No. 2 and never fell vacant and was not likely to fall vacant. Respondent No. 2 was a tenant of the entire ground floor and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to split it into two portions and direct respondent No. 3 to let out one to one party and the other, to the appellant. The order of allotment was obtained by the appellant through misrepresentations and in collusion with respondent No. 3. Respondent No. 2 did not press before Tandon, J. the contentions that the impugned order was likely to interfere with the civil suit and was obtained by the appellant through misrepresentations and fraud, and they have not been pressed before us. The grounds on which she assailed the impugned order were mainly that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to pass it because there was no vacancy and that he could not split up the tenancy of respondent No. 2 into two parts. The learned Judge held that the tenancy rights of Dr. Hukku passed on, on his death, to his heir respondent No. 2 and consequently there was no vacancy of the accommodation on his death and that no vacancy was brought about by the deed of partnership or by the dissolution of the partnership or by the subsequent payment to respondent No. 3 of rents of the two portions of the ground floor separately by respondent No. 2 and the appellant. Merely because he found that the tenancy created in favour of Dr. Hukku had never been terminated, he held that the accommodation never fell vacant and that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. The appellant has preferred this appeal against the aforesaid order.
(3.) The question before us is whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had jurisdiction to pass an order under Sec. 7(2) directing the proprietor, respondent No. 3, to let out the front portion of the ground floor to the appellant. By sub-sec. (1) of Section 7 every landlord is required to give notice to the District Magistrate of an accommodation becoming vacant by his ceasing to occupy it, or by his tenant's vacating it, or otherwise ceasing to occupy it, or by termination of his tenancy, or by release from requisitioning, or in any other manner whatsoever. By sub-sec. (2) the District Magistrate is authorised to require a landlord to let, or not to let, to any person any accommodation which is, or has fallen, or is about to fall, vacant. "Accommodation" is defined in Section 2 to mean "residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building," and to include gardens, grounds and out-houses, furniture and fittings, and "vacant" is defined to include "an accommodation about to fall vacant, an intimation whereof has been sent by the landlord or the tenant to the District Magistrate." Neither of these two definitions is a definition in the real sense. They do not explain what is meant by "accommodation" and by "vacancy," but simply lay down what is included in their (ordinary) meanings. It has been left to the court to ascertain what are their ordinary meanings. "Accommodation" as used in the Act is not synonymous with building; a whole building may be one accommodation or more accommodations. When a part of a building is an accommodation, it follows that another part of it may be another accommodation. What is meant by "accommodation" is an exclusive occupation whether in the whole of a building or in a part of it, by a person with his licensees, such as members of his family, other relations, guests and servants. If an owner of a building occupies the whole of it, the whole is an accommodation. If two owners jointly owning a building occupy separate portions of it, each portion becomes an accommodation. If an owner himself occupies part of a building and lets out the other part to a tenant, he and the tenant are each in possession of an accommodation. If a building owned by a person is let out to two different tenants, occupying different portions of it, each portion is an accommodation. If a tenant of a building sublets a portion of it, the portion retained by him in his occupation is one accommodation and the portion sublet, another accommodation. If a building consists of several shops which are let out separately, each shop is an accommodation. Thus, every portion of a building occupied by the proprietor and every portion let out to a tenant and every portion sublet to a sub-tenant is an accommodation.;