PASHUPATI PRATAP SINGH Vs. CHAIRMAN DISTRICT BOARD GONDA
LAWS(ALL)-1952-8-20
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD (AT: LUCKNOW)
Decided on August 04,1952

PASHUPATI PRATAP SINGH Appellant
VERSUS
CHAIRMAN DISTRICT BOARD GONDA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) THIS is a plaintiffs' appeal which had been dismissed by a learned single Judge on the plea of limitation. The river Eapti separates Gonda and Basti districts and on the banks of the river there are numerous ghats from which ferries operate. On the Basti side of the river there is a ghat known as Befcnar Ghat, the exclusive ferry rights to which were admittedly granted to plaintiff 1, the Raja of Bansi by the Government. Just opposite Beinar Ghat on the Gonda side there is materia ghat which was declared by the Government as a public ferry several years ago. On the same side there is Jigna Ghat. From Betnar Ghat on the opposite side of the river a ferry was operated by Abdul Khalik as a Thekedar of Raja Bahadur Pashupati Pratap Singh of Bansi. In the year 1938 the District Board began to operate a ferry from Jigna Ghat to Betnar Ghat. The plaintiffs claimed that this was an infringement of their right and a notice under Section 192, district Boards Act (Act 10 of 1922), was given and the suit out of which this appeal has arisen was filed on 27-10-1942. Originally the plaintiffs had claimed both damages and injunction, but the claim for damages was given up and their claim for injunction alone has. survived. The plaintiffs' right was denied on behalf of the District Board but after the decision of the lower appellate Court learned counsel has admitted that the finding of that Court that plaintiff 1 had an exclusive ferry right granted to him at Betnar Ghat by the British Government was a finding of fact. He has further admitted that the action of defendant 1 in allowing other contractors to ply boats is an interference with the plaintiff's rights. Learned counsel also admits that this is a continuing breach. He has, however, relied on Section 29 (2), Limitation Act (Act 9 of 1908 and after its amendment by the Indian Limitation Act 10 of 1922) and has urged that Section 23, limitation Act, is not applicable to a suit of this nature for which a period of six months' limitation has been fixed under Section 192 (3), District Boards Act.
(2.) SECTION 29 (2), Limitation Act (Act 9 of 1908, after its amendment by the Indian Limi-tation act 10 of 1922) reads as follows : "where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the peripd prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were pres oribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law: (a) the provisions contained, in Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22, shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such" special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply. '' after its amendment, therefore, the section makes it clear that sections other than Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22, Limitation Act, do not apply where there is a special period oi; limitation lixed by a special or local law for any suit, appeal or application.
(3.) THE U. P. District Boards Act (Act 10 of 1922}, Section 192 (3), provides that: "no action such, as is described in Sub-section (1) shall, unless it is an action for the recovery of immoveable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action. " The suits described in Sub-section (1) are suits against a board, a member, officer or servant or a board, in respect of an act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity. Section 23, Limitation Act, therefore, does not apply to a suit against the board. That section provides that: "in the case of continuing breach of contract and in the case of a continuing wrong independent of contract, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which, the breach or the wrong, as the case may be continues. " It has been urged by learned counsel for the respondents that though the wrong might be a continuing wrong yet as Section 23 is no longer applicable to a suit for which a period of six months' limitation has been lixed under the U. P. District Boards Act, the suit must be filed within six months of the first breach. There can be no doubt that where there is a single cause of action, which gives rise to a right to file a suit, the suit has to be filed within the period of six months as provided for by the District Boards Act. The question is whether where there are successive causes of action every time the cause of action arises or a wrongful act is done there is anything to debar a plaintiff from giving up his right based on the first cause of action and bringing a suit on the last cause of acbion within six months.;


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