- (1.) Heard learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the records. During the course of hearing on 30.11.2012, allegations were made against the District Judge, Faizabad, who is related with the opposite and this transfer application has been moved on the ground that he is pressurizing the Learned Judge (S.D.), where the suit is pending. The entire allegations relate to pressure being applied by District Judge, Faizabad. The Court of law is not presumed to function under pressure on anybody, what to say of District Judge of another District. A case cannot be transferred on mere suspicion. If the cases are being transferred on mere suspicion, the entire judicial system will break down. Transfer of a case cannot be allowed as a matter of course. Cogent and concrete reasons are to be established by a party seeking transfer because transfer of a case affects the wisdom of a Judge. A case cannot be transferred on mere apprehension. Adversely affecting a fair trial is the imperative and basic requirement of the dispensation of justice. This cardinal principal cannot be overlooked before allowing a transfer application, particularly, when allegations are made against the integrity of the Presiding Judge. Mere apprehension that a person is holding the Court of District Judge of another District may make recommendation to the Presiding Judge has no legs to stand in the eyes of law. In exercise of the supervisory powers of this Court, the paramount consideration is to ensure that justice according to law is done in order of achieve this objection. It is to be seen whether transfer of case is imperative. If there is a ground that there should be no hesitation to transfer a case even if it is likely to cause some inconvenience to the other party. The petitioner's plea for transfer of case must be tested on this touchstone.
(2.) In Maneka Sanjay Gandhi v. Rani Jethmalani, 1979 4 SCC 167, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the Court to consider when a motion for transfer is made is not the hypersensitivity or relative convenience of a party or easy availability of legal services or like mini grievances. Something more substantial, more compelling, more imperiling, from the point of view of public justice and its attendant environment, is necessitous if the Court is to exercise its power of transfer. This is the cardinal principle although the circumstances may be myriad and vary from case to case. In Kulwinder Kaur v. Kandi Friends Education Trust and others, 2008 70 AllLR 471, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held: Reading sections 24 and 25 of the Code together and keeping in view various judicial pronouncements, certain broad propositions as to what may constitute a ground for transfer have been laid down by Courts. They are balance of convenience or inconvenience to the plaintiff or the defendant or witnesses; convenience or inconvenience of a particular place of trial having regard to the nature of evidence on the points involved in the suit; issues raised by the parties; reasonable apprehension in the mind of the litigant that he might not get justice in the Court in which the suit is pending; important questions of law involved or a considerable section of public interested in the litigation; interest of justice demanding for transfer of suit, appeal or other proceedings etc. Above are some of the instances which are germane in proceeding. They are, however, illustrative in nature and by no means be treated as exhaustive. If on the above or other relevant considerations, the Court feels that the plaintiff or the defendant is not likely to have a fair trial in the Court from which he seeks to transfer a case, it is not only the power, but the duty of the Court to make such order.
(3.) In view of these authorities, there are no cogent reasons to transfer the case. While holding this, I find it necessary to issue directions to the learned Trial Court to dispose of the case within sixty days, in such a fashion that no aspersion should be caused against the impartiality, fairness and confidence reposed by a litigant in a Court of law.;