Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J. - (1.) ADMITTEDLY , result of examination in question was declared on 14.9.2010 and this writ petition has been filed after one and a half years.
(2.) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners admitted when writ petition of some other candidates, who had approached this Court in 2010 itself was decided on 8.2.2012 that these petitioners then became aware of the matter and now have filed this writ petition. There is virtually no explanation for delay and laches what to say of satisfactory explanation. Delay and laches constitute substantial reason for disentitling relief in equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Pan Singh and others : J.T. 2007(4) SC 253, the Apex Court observed that after a long time the writ petition should not have been entertained even if the petitioners are similarly situated and discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approached the Court after a long time. It was held that delay and laches were relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. In M/s Lipton India Ltd. and others vs. Union of India and others : J.T. 1994(6) SC 71 and M.R. Gupta Vs. Union of India and others : 1995(5) SCC 628 it was held that though there was no period of limitation provided for filing a petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India, ordinarily a writ petition should be filed within reasonable time. In K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty Vs. State of Mysore : AIR 1961 SC 993, it was said that representation would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. Same view was reiterated in State of Orissa Vs. Pyari Mohan Samantaray and others : AIR 1976 SC 2617 and State of Orissa and others Vs. Arun Kumar Patnaik and others : 1976(3) SCC 579 and the said view has also been followed recently in Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India and others : AIR 2007 SC 1330 : 2007(1) Supreme 455 and New Delhi Municipal Council (supra). The aforesaid authorities of the Apex Court has also been followed by this Court in Chunvad Pandey Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2008(4) ESC 2423. This has been followed in Virender Chaudhary Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation & Ors. : 2009(1) SCC 297. In S.S. Balu and another Vs. State of Kerala and others : 2009(2) SCC 479 the Apex Court held that it is well settled principle of law that delay defeats equity. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioners approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on account of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to other candidates who have got the benefit. In Yunus Vs. State of Maharashtra and others : 2009(3) SCC 281 the Court referred to the observations of Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company Vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurde etc., (1874) 5 PC 239 and held as under: Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material....... Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.
(3.) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners however placed reliance on Apex Court decision in Lt. governor of Delhi and others Vs. Const. Dharampal and others : AIR 1990 SC 2059 wherein some persons of Police Force who had participated in agitation were terminated but later some constables were reinducted. The Apex Court held that same treatment ought to have been given to all others. The judgment has no application in the case in hand inasmuch as the matter of termination of an employee relates to his personal cause of action and even if he is reinstated, it would not cause any impediment to any body else in his right.;