- (1.) Through this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for following reliefs: (i) Issue, a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to expunge the alleged and forged amaldaramad made in the CH-Form 23 Part-1 referring the alleged reference No. 388 under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 decided on 20.2.2005 by the respondent No. 1 and alleged Case No. 2089 under Section 9 U.P. C.H. Act decided on 31.1.2005 by the respondent No. 2 (Annexure-4 to this writ petition). (ii) Issue, any other writ, order or direction to which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (iii) To award cost of the petition to the petitioner. Heard Sri L.K. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel appearing for State respondents. Through this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of mandamus directing the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to expunge the forged amaldaramad made in the CH-Form 23 Part-1 referring the alleged reference No. 388 under sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') decided on 20.2.2005 by the respondent No. 1 and alleged Case No. 2089 under Section 9 of the Act decided on 31.1.2005 by the respondent No. 2. It is contended by Sri Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioners that there was no such order as has been noted in CH form 23 either in the reference No. 388 under Section 48(3) of the Act or in Case No. 2089 under Section 9 of the Act passed by Consolidation Officer (respondent No. 2). In his submission, on the basis of forged orders, the said entry has been made which is causing serious prejudice to the petitioners and in that eventuality, the petitioners have filed an application under sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Act before the Deputy Director of Consolidation (in short D.D.C.) for calling the report with regard to forged entry and expunging the same but the same has not been decided hence the petitioner has prayed for issuing writ of mandamus directing the D.D.C. to decide the same.
(2.) The question would be as to whether under sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Act an individual can make a reference and the authority concerned is obliged to decide the same and writ of mandamus can be issued on such application directing the D.D.C. to decide such application. For appreciating this controversy, the provisions contained under sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Act including Explanation 1 and 2 are required to be looked into which are reproduced herein under: Section 48 Revision and reference: (3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1). Explanation (1). For the purposes of this section, Settlement Officers, Consolidation, Consolidation Officers, Assistant Consolidation Officers, Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. (Explanation (2).--For the purposes of this section the expression Interlocutory order' in relation to a case or proceeding, means such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect to finally disposing of such case or proceeding. From the bare reading of sub-section 3 of Section 48 it would transpire that any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1). The Explanation (1) of the aforesaid Section provides that for the purposes of this section, Settlement Officers, Consolidation, Consolidation Officers, Assistant Consolidation Officers, Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. It would further transpire from the conjoint reading of Explanation 1 and sub-section 3 that any authority subordinate to the Deputy Director of consolidation may refer the matter under sub-section 3 of Section 48 to the D.D.C. for taking action under sub-section 1 of Section 48 after giving an opportunity of being heard to the affected parties. Meaning thereby it is incumbent upon the subordinate authority after finding any defect in any proceeding to issue the notice to the parties concerned to the proceeding or person affected inviting their version and only after hearing them, the authority concerned is obliged to prepare the term of the reference or its report and send the same alongwith record to the D.D.C. The D.D.C. thereafter is obliged to decide the same under sub-section (1) of Section 48 after due notice and hearing to the affected parties. The notice and hearing at both the stages (i.e. before making reference and while deciding the reference) are the condition precedent.
(3.) It is well-settled that where a Statute requires to do certain thing in a particular method, then that thing must be done in that very method and other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden. The aforesaid legal proposition is based on a legal maxim "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius", meaning thereby that "if a Statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that very manner and other manner and procedure is ordinarily not permissible'. (Vide Taylor v. Taylor,1876 1 ChD 426; Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, 1936 AIR(PC) 253 Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, 1961 AIR(SC) 1527 Haresh Dayaram Thakur v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2000 6 SCC 179 Dhanajaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka etc. etc., 2001 4 SCC 9; Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and others, 2002 1 SCC 633.;