- (1.) Heard Sri Lal Babu Lal, learned counsel for petitioners and Sri P.N. Srivastava, learned counsel for respondents. Petitioner-landlord filed application, i.e. P.A. Case No. 89 of 1986 before the Prescribed Authority/Second Addl. Civil Judge, Varanasi seeking release of House No. K 46/108A, Harteerath, Varanasi to the extent of the accommodation on its western side consisting of one dalan, Latrine and Bathroom and the first floor consisting of four rooms and open roof on the ground of personal need. The aforesaid house is said to be the ancestral property of petitioners. Sri Chhannu Lal (now deceased) is the father and Sri Babbu and Sri Mahesh Prasad, petitioners No. 2 and 3 are his sons. Respondents 3 and 4 (now deceased and have been substituted by the legal heirs! were the tenants in the said premises. The application was partly allowed by Prescribed Authority vide order dated 14.9.1988 by releasing the accommodation on the ground floor but in respect to the accommodation on the first floor, It was rejected. Two appeals were filed, namely, Rent Appeal No. 232 of 1988 by petitioner-landlords and Rent Appeal No. 241 of 1988 by-respondent No. 3, i.e., the tenant. The appellate court vide judgment dated 18.7.1988 has dismissed petitioner-landlords' appeal but has allowed the respondent-tenant's appeal. Hence this writ petition challenging both the orders to the extent they have not been adjudicated in favour of petitioners for accepting their request for release of the entire accommodation as sought for.
(2.) Learned counsel for petitioners submitted that it is for the landlord to decide as to how and in what manner petitioners should live and they cannot be compelled to live in a particular manner by adjusting themselves; either by tenant or by Courts. The courts below in taking view otherwise have acted illegally. He placed reliance on Apex Court's decisions in R.C. Tamrakar v. Nidi Lekha, 2001 AIR(SC) 3806 and Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, 1996 5 SCC 353.
(3.) He further contended that question of comparative hardship has also been illegally considered by the courts below and therefore, impugned judgments are liable to be set aside. He further contended that the tenant's wife had acquired an accommodation in Tarna Industrial Area. Varanasi, i.e., House No. Shiv-13/89A-1A and that being so the tenant having got an alternative accommodation, the question of considering comparative hardship was redundant and the issue ought to have been decided in favour of petitioners but the courts below have erred in law and in this regard he placed reliance on Apex Court's decision in Shiv Singh Chak v. Baby Jain, 2008 5 SCC 486 and Ganga Devi v. District Judge, Nainital and others, 2008 7 SCC 770.;