- (1.) UMESH C. Banerjee, J. The matter under consideration pertains to the effect of statutory presumption as envisaged under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. For convenience sake, it would be worthwhile to note the provision for its true purport. Section 16 reads as below: "16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption.- Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any Court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved. "
(2.) THE section thus envisages a statutory presumption that in the event of there being a registered document pertaining to adoption there would be a presumption that adoption has been made in accordance with law. Mandate of the statute is rather definite since the Legislature has used "shall" instead of any other word of lesser significance. Incidentally, however the inclusion of the words "unless and until it is disproved" appearing at the end of the statutory provision has made the situation not that rigid but flexible enough to depend upon the evidence available on record in support of adoption. It is a matter of grave significance by reason of the factum of adoption and displacement of the person adopted from the natural succession thus onus of proof is rather heavy. Statute has allowed some amount of flexibility, lest it turns out to be solely dependent on a registered adoption deed. THE reason for inclusion of the words "unless and until it is disproved" shall have to be ascertained in its proper perspective and as such the presumption cannot but be said to be a rebuttable presumption. Statutory intent thus stands out to be rather expressive depicting therein that the presumption cannot be an irrebuttable presumption by reason of the inclusion of the words just noticed above. On the wake of the aforesaid observations of the learned single Judge in Modan Singh v. Mst. Sham Kaur & Ors. , AIR 1973 P&h 122, stands confirmed and we record our concurrence therewith. In the contextual facts, a deed of adoption dated 1-6-1973 came into existence and stands registered in the sub-registrar's office at Charkhi Dadri in the State of Punjab. Adverting to the factual backdrop briefly at this juncture it is to be noted that the dispute relates to the estate of one Sunda Ram and the contest stands out to be between one Shakuntala being the daughter of Sunda Ram and Jai Singh, who claims to be the adopted son.
(3.) RECORD depicts that the plaintiff (respondent herein) filed a suit for declaration that she was the owner in possession of the suit land and that the decree dated August 1, 1986 passed in civil suit instituted on July 23, 1986 and registered Will dated February 14, 1974 alleged to have been executed by her father together with the adoption deed dated June 1, 1973 recording that Jai Singh had been adopted by Sunda Ram were illegal and result of misrepresentation of facts and thus not binding on her. The trial Court decreed the suit. Appeal therefrom filed by the defendant/appellant was dismissed and even the second appeal also stands dismissed. Mr. Jain, the learned senior Advocate appearing in support of the appeal contended that in the event of due compliance with the four requirements as envisaged under Section 16 of the Act of 1956, question of there being any further requirement depicting acceptance thereof does not and cannot arise. The submissions undoubtedly at the first blush seem to be rather attractive and it is on this particular issue which prompted this Court to have the matter argued in detail irrespective of the technicality as raised before this Court pertaining to the maintainability issue vis-a-vis the appeal. While scrutiny evidence does not stand out to be totally prohibited in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction in the second appeal and that would in our view be too broad a proposition and too rigid an interpretation of law not worthy of acceptance but that does not also clothe the superior Courts within jurisdiction to intervene and interfere in any and every matter. It is only in very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity that the authority to examine the same in extenso stands permissible, it is a rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can thus be safely concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only be had in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper circumspection. This is, however, without expreession of any opinion pertaining to Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.;