S.P.PANDEY - (1.) THIS is a second appeal, preferred against the judgment and decree, dated 28-7-2000, passed by the learned Additional Commissioner, Moradabad Division, Moradabad, arising out of the judgment and decree, dated 7-3-2000, passed by the learned trial Court, in a suit under Section 229-B of the UPZA & LR Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
(2.) BRIEF and relevant facts of the case are that the plaintiffs, Jagannath Sharma and others instituted a suit under Section 229-B of the Act for declaring him as bhumidhar, with transferable rights, over the disputed land as detailed at the foot of the plaint. The learned trial Court, by means of its order, dated 7-3-2000 has decreed the aforesaid suit. Aggrieved by this order, an appeal was preferred. During the pendency of this appeal, an application was moved on behalf of the defendant appellant for impleadment of the U.P. State and the Gaon Sabha, concerned, as necessary parties. A written objections was filed on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. The learned lower appellate Court has dismissed the aforesaid application for impleadment, by means of its order, dated 28-7-2000 and also dismissed the first appeal on account of technical defects. Hence this second appeal. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record on file. For the appellant, it was contended that the learned lower appellate Courts has committed patent illegality in dismissing the appeal for non-joinder of the parties; that it has also committed a patent illegality in rejecting the application on the ground of limitation, since there is no limitation for arraying the parties under Order I, Rule 10(2) CPC; that non-mention of the names of the Gaon Sabha concerned and the State of U.P. in the array of parties is primarily a mistake of the lawyer and it was pleaded that the appellant was almost an illiterate person; that the impugned order is highly technical and against the guidelines given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court; that the first appeal was maintainable and the Gaon Sabha as well as the State of U.P. were proforma parties and as such the appeal could not have been dismissed and as such, the aforesaid impugned order be set aside. The learned counsel for the respondent, in reply, submitted that as the first appeal, preferred on behalf of the appellant has been dismissed as not maintainable, the order passed by the learned trial Court cannot be challenged in this second appeal; that the provisions of Order XLl, Rule 20(2) CPC may be perused, as per which no respondent shall be added under this Rule after the expiry of the period of limitation for appeal, unless the Court have reasons to be recorded, allow to be done on such terms as to the costs as it thinks fit; that no application for condonation of delay was moved under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, along with the aforesaid application for impleadment before the learned lower appellate Court; that it has been clearly held by the Hon'ble High Court that in a suit under Section 229-B of the Act, State of U.P. and the Gaon Sabha, concerned are the necessary statutory parties; that the limitation for moving the aforesaid application for impleadment was 30 days and as such, this application was time- barred; that the learned lower appellate Court has rightly dismissed the aforesaid application for impleadment as well as the first appeal; that the learned lower appellate Court was not competent to allow the aforesaid application for impleadment without any application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. In support of his contention, he had referred to the case law, reported in 1970 RD 256(BR), 1994 RD 162 (SC).
(3.) I have closely and carefully considered the contention raised by the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the relevant records on file. On a bare perusal of the records, it is manifestly clear that the learned lower appellate Court has rightly dismissed the aforesaid application for impleadment as well as the first appeal, as the U.P. State and the Gaon Sabha concerned are necessary parties, in as suit under Section 229-B of the Act. But in first appeal, neither the U.P. State nor the Gaon Sabha, concerned have been impleaded, as parties as respondents, while these two are the necessary parties. The aforesaid first appeal has been admitted on 22-3-2000, while the aforesaid application for impleadment is dated 3-7-2000 and it is not accompanied with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. The defendant appellant should have moved an application for condonation of delay along with the aforesaid application for impleadment. It is also worthwhile to mention here that in the aforesaid application for impleadment, it has nowhere been mentioned as to under what circumstances, the aforesaid necessary parties have not been impleaded, in the first appeal. The learned lower appellate Court has discussed and considered the relevant and material facts and circumstances of the instant case in correct perspective of law.;