- (1.) S. K. Singh, J. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. In spite of the orders having been passed on 8-2-2002, no counter-affidavit has been filed by the state authorities and thus with the consent of the parties, the matter is being finally disposed of.
(2.) BY means of this petition, the petitioner is challenging the order dated 3-12-1999 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) passed by the District Inspector of Schools. The petitioner claims to have been appointed in a short term vacancy on account of ad-hoc promotion given to one Fakir Mohammad. It is stated that the management wrote a letter to the District Inspector of Schools on 6-11-1998 intimating the aforesaid vacancy and seeking prior permission for making appointment. Copy of the said letter is Annexure-2 to the writ petition. As nothing has been communicated by the District Inspector of Schools, after making advertisement, the petitioner was duly selected. In pursuance of the appointment letter issued to the petitioner on 23-12-1998, the petitioner claims that he has joined the post and is continuously working. As no decision was taken by the District Inspector of Schools, the petitioner came to this Court and in pursuance of the direction given in Writ Petition No. 25333 of 1999, now the matter has been decided by the order impugned in this petition. Learned Counsel submits that the ground as given by the District Inspector of Schools in its order for rejecting the petitioner's claim are totally frivolous and they are not sustainable in the eyes of law. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that on own finding of the District Inspector of Schools, short term vacancy in the L. T. grade came into existence on account of ad-hoc promotion of Fakir Mohammad. Learned Counsel points out that two reasons given that the management has not sought prior permission and there was ban, the appointment of the petitioner cannot be approved are in the teeth of the decision of this Court. It has been submitted that the management has already written letter to the District Inspector of Schools on 6-11-1998 intimating the vacancy, copy of which is annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. In respect to the ban, learned Counsel submits that this Court has already held in series of decisions that the ban has no application in the private aided institution. Otherwise also, on the relevant date, there was no ban. Learned Counsel in support of his submission has referred decision reported in 1998 (3) UPLBEC 1722, Ashok Prasad Shukla v. The District Inspector of Schools and others. It has been held in the aforesaid decision that in absence of approval by the District Inspector of Schools, if the appointment has been made in short term vacancy, that will not be invalidated automatically and the only effect is that if the appointment is found valid otherwise, then its effect can be given after approval of the District Inspector of Schools.
(3.) ALTHOUGH no counter-affidavit has been filed by learned Standing Counsel, but in the light of reasoning given in the impugned order, learned Standing Counsel has tried to justify the decision of the District Inspector of Schools. In view of the submission, it appears that the District Inspector of Schools has not properly considered the claim of the petitioner. Both the grounds has been given that prior approval was not taken by the management and there was ban appears to be incorrect and non-existent and therefore, rejection of the petitioner's claim on those grounds cannot be justified. The proper consideration for the District Inspector of Schools was that whether there was proper advertisement and the candidate's merit has been properly judged and to consider the propriety of the appointment on completion of selection process. As the order of the District Inspector of Schools lacks proper consideration and it rejects the petitioner's claim on incorrect and non-existent grounds, is required to be quashed.;