ANJANI KUMAR, J. - (1.) By means of this petition, petitioner Rajesh Kumar Sharma had challenged the award given by the Central Government, Industrial Tribunal, Kanpur dated January 19, 1996. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi vide its notification dated January 21, 1992 has referred the following dispute before the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication: "Whether the action of the management of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur in terminating the services of Sri Rajesh Kumar Sharma, w.e.f. October 19, 1985 was justified? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to?"
(2.) It is admitted case of the parties that the petitioner was employed on purely temporary daily wage basis for a fixed period of 76 days w.e.f. August 5, 1985 and his services terminated on October 19, 1985. According to the case of the petitioner-workman, when services of the petitioner were terminated, juniors to him were retained in service and further no opportunity of re-employment was given to him when fresh hands were engaged by the bank. It is also submitted that no steps have been taken by the Bank for regular selection. Industrial Tribunal recorded finding that as the best case that can be taken for the petitioner is that his appointment is fixed term appointment and termination whereof is not covered by the definition of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of Industrial Disputes Act as amended in the year 1984. It is admitted case of the petitioner that the petitioner has not put in 240 days during the service, therefore even Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act need not be complied with. The Industrial Tribunal had arrived at a finding that the petitioner's appointment was fixed term appointment, that the petitioner has worked only for 76 days and thus the petitioner has not completed 240 days, therefore Section 25-F of the Act has not been complied with against the workman concerned. Before me, learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated the same arguments as were advanced before the IndustrialTribunal.
(3.) The Industrial Tribunal has considered all the arguments and material evidence on record. Nothing has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, which may bring notice of this Court to the conclusion that the findings arrived at by the Tribunal are perverse. In this view of the matter, the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal cannot be interfered with by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.;