- (1.) ASHOK Bhushan, J. Heard Counsel for the petitioner and learned standing Counsel.
(2.) BY this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the suspension order dated 14-11-2002. The petitioner was working as Lekhpal and by the order dated 14-11-2002 he has been suspended in contemplation of the enquiry. The suspension order mentions eight charges against the petitioner. The Counsel for the petitioner, Sri A. K. Singh, contended that since no enquiry officer has been appointed in the suspension order, the suspension is bad in view of judgment of this Court in 1997 (1) LBESR 211, Smt. Suresh Mukul v. The State of U. P. , through the Secretary, Secondary Education, U. P. Government, Lucknow and others. The Counsel for the petitioner further contended that a First Information Report has been lodged against the petitioner under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 420 of I. P. C. He has submitted that since First Information Report has been lodged, suspension order cannot be passed. He has contended that two parallel proceeding cannot be continued. Reliance has been placed on a judgment of Apex Court in 1999 (1) LBESR 969 Capt M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and another. I have considered the submissions of Counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. The first submission of Counsel for the petitioner that enquiry officer has not been appointed, hence, the suspension is vitiated cannot be accepted. The decision of this Court in Smt. Sudesh Mukul's case (supra) is not attracted in the present case since in the aforesaid case it was held that suspension order did not state that enquiry is pending or in contemplation. In the present case suspension order clearly states that enquiry is contemplated against the petitioner, hence, the first submission has no merit. The second submission of Counsel for the petitioner that departmental proceeding and criminal proceeding cannot be proceeded simultaneously is to be considered. The law, which has been laid down by the Apex Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony's case (supra), is well established and conclusions of the Apex Court have been recorded in paragraph 22 of the said judgment. Paragraph 22 of the said judgment is extracted below: " (22) The condition which are deducible form various decisions of this Court referred of above are: (i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. (ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are base on identical and similar set of facts and the charges in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated question of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. (iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case in grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet. (iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the Departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed. (v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty administration may get rid of him at the earliest. "
(3.) THE aforesaid principles have been laid down by the Apex Court for staying the disciplinary proceedings. THE aforesaid proposition does not down that when a First Information Report has been lodged against an employee of a serious offence and he is facing criminal trial, he cannot be suspended. THE aforesaid decision does not lay down any such proposition. THE proposition is regarding desirability to proceed with the departmental enquiry and the said question has to be decided on the facts of each case. THE submission of Counsel for the petitioner that suspension order cannot be made in those cases is without any basis. THE Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in 1998 (1) LBESR 723, Dr. Shivraj Singh v. State, specifically paragraph 339. In the aforesaid paragraph 339, the Division Bench has as under: " (339) How a suspension can be described as arbitrary and irrational when the enquiry has not started. THE suspension is desirable in corruption embezzlement or misappropriation of Government money possesion of disproportionate assets misuse of official powers for personal gain, serious negligence and dereliction of duty resulting in considerable loss to the Government. " The Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on paragraphs 163, 164 and 236 of the aforesaid judgment. The aforesaid judgment do not lay down any such proposition that if a First Information Report is lodged against an employee, he cannot be suspended. The aforesaid judgment does not, in any manner, help the petitioner. Both the aforesaid submissions have no substance and cannot be sustained. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed. Petition dismissed. .;