S. C. Verma, J. - (1.) AS both the writ petitions relate to the same controversy, they are being disposed of together.
(2.) THE Nagar palika, Sikendra Rao, was constituted after the general election of the Members and President on 17-11-1988. THE notification under section 56 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, was issued on 21-11-1988. One Sartaj Ali Khan was elected as President of the Nagar Palika. THEreafter the election of the Senior and Junior Vice President was held in accordance with the provisions of section 54 of the Act and by special resolution dated 14-6-1989, Sri Jai Charan Lal Anal was declared elected as Senior Vice President and Sri Amar Singh as Junior Vice President. THE Senior and Junior Vice President continued to function. However, some dispute arose and a motion of no confidence was passed on 15-4-1991 by majority of 14 Members against the President Sri Sartaj Ali Khan. The proceedings of the meeting of the motion of no confidence were challenged in Writ Petition No. 10972 of 1991 and an interim order was passed under which Sri Sartaj Ali Khan was allowed to function as President of the Nagar Palika. The writ petition was ultimately dismissed on 21-5-1991 whereafter the resolution of no confidence against the President Sri Sartaj Ali Khan became operative and he ceased to function as President of the Nagar Palika. The Senior Vice President Sri Jai Charan Lal Anal became entitled to officiate as the President of the Nagar Palika. An order dated 29-5-1991 purported to be in exercise of the powers under section 54-A (1) of the Act was passed. By this order, the District Magistrate held that the President has been removed on account of no confidence motion being passed against him which has been upheld by the Honourable High Court and the same became operative with effect from 25-5-1991 and there is a casual vacancy in view of the provisions of sections 44-A and 47-A on the post of President. The election of Senior and Junior Vice President held on 14-6-1989 was after three months of the constitution of the Board, there could be no Vice President elected in accordance with the Act and, as such, fresh elections for the post of Vice President, Senior and Junior, are required to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-A (2); The District Magistrate, in these circumstances, exercising the powers under section 54-A (1), appointed the Pargana Magistrate as Administrator of Nagar Palika, Sikendra Rao to function till the election for the post of President is held. The order dated 29-5-1991 has been impugned in Writ Petition No. 17324 of 1991. The other Writ Petition, namely, Writ Petition No. 24214 of 1991 has been filed by a Member of the Board for a Writ of quo warranto calling upon respondents 3 and 4 the Senior and Junior Vice President to show under what authority of law they are holding the office. It has been alleged that as the Board was notified to be constituted on 21-11-1988, the election of Senior and Junior Vice President was admittedly held on 14-6-1989 beyond three months and, as such, it would be null and void and respondents 3 and 4 had no right to hold the public office of Senior and Junior Vice President of Nagar Palika, Sikendra Rao. In support, the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case Kalyan Datt Kaushik v. The District Magistrate Haridwar, 1991 UP LB EC 991 (FB), has been relied upon.
(3.) IN dealing with Writ Petition No. 17324 of 1991, the petitioner contended that the impugned order of the Distt Magistrate is illegal, void and without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside as the District Magistrate, in exercise of the powers under section 54-A (i) of the Act, could not decide as to whether the election of the Vice President was valid or not. The question of consideration of validity of election of Vice President or the consideration of the special resolution by which the Senior and Junior Vice President were declared to be elected can not be adjudicated by the District Magistrate. IN support of this contention, the law laid down in the case of Rishi Kumar Gupta v. Nanhoo Mal Yadav, 1976 ALR 210, has been relied. We find substance in the contention raised by the petitioner. While considering the powers exercised by the District Magistrate under section 34 of the Act, the learned Judges in Rishi Kumar Gupta's case held : "The first question which is required to be considered in the present case is whether the Commissioner could legally cancel the resolution dated April 29, 1975. The said resolution has been cancelled by the Commissioner in exercise of his power under section 34 of the Act. Under section 34 the Prescribed Authority may, by order in writing prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed or made under the Municipalities Act or any other enactment by a Board or a Committee of a Board, or a joint committee, if in its opinion such resolution or order is of a nature to cause or tend to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury to be public or to any class or body of persons lawfully employed and may prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any set in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order." "This section confers extraordinary power on the Prescribed Authority to be used in urgent cases to prohibit the execution of a resolution passed by a Municipal Board. The pre requisite for the exercise of this power is that the Prescribed Authority must be of the opinion that the resolution passed by a Board is of such a nature that if it is given effect to the same is likely "to cause or tend to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury to the public". None of these three words have any technical legal meaning. The word obstruction means 'obstacle placed on the use of a highway. Every member of public has a right to pass or repass. But if by any action an attempt is made to obstruct the user or the obstacle placed renders the exercise of that right unsafe or inconvenient the same would amount to obstruction. ' Considering the scope of this section in the light of the above it appears to us that the power given by it can be exercised only when a resolution passed by a Board affects public in the sense in which these words are understood in their ordinary use. No member of the public could be said to have been obstructed, annoyed or injured by the fact that the resolution electing respondent no- 1 as Vice President had been passed by the Board in April 29, 1975 despite the fact, notices of this meeting had not been served on all members. It is settled that the words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary and popular sense unless there is something in the context requiring a conclusion to the contrary interpreting the section in its ordinary grammatical sense, we find that neither the language employed nor the context warrant the conclusion which the learned counsel for the appellants wants us to arrive at.;