R. R. MISRA, J. - (1.) Against an order imposing penalty for concealment to the turn of Rs. 17,200 for the assessment year 1969-70, the assessee had preferred an appeal before the Sales Tax Tribunal, which has been knocked off by the Tribunal by the impugned order dated March 27, 1987. I have heard learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the department. Nobody appeared for the assessee. From a perusal of the impugned order of the Tribunal it is clear that the Tribunal has allowed the appeal of the assessee mainly on three grounds. The same are, first, at the relevant time penalty could be imposed under section 15-A (1) (b) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for concealment of the particulars of turnover and not under section 15-A (1) (c) of the Act. In the present case notice was issued under section 15-A (1) (c) of the Act and ultimately proceedings also culminated in passing of a penalty order under section 15-A (1) (c) of the Act, the Tribunal has taken the view that since section 15-A (1) (c) of the Act was not in existence at the relevant time in regard to penalty for concealment of the turnover, the authorities were wrong in law in imposing penalty in question. Second, penalty notice given jurisdiction to proceed. Since in the present case penalty notice was illegal, consequential penalty proceedings became void. Third, assessment and penalty proceedings being entirely different and the penalty having been imposed on the basis of the findings for the assessment, the said penalty is liable to be set aside as no independent findings have been recorded in regard to the penalty proceedings. I, however, find that the Sales Tax Tribunal is in error on all the aforesaid three counts. It is now by settled law that for the purposes of imposition of penalty the date referable will be the date of default. The present case relates to the assessment year 1969-70, that is to say, the law applicable for the default committed was the law as it existed up to March 31, 1970 and on the law stood at the time penalty was exigible. At the relevant time the relevant provisions of section 15-A (1) of the Act read as under : " 15-A (1 ). If the assessing authority, in the course of any proceeding, is satisfied that any dealer - (b) has concealed the particulars of his turnover or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such turnover; or (c) has without reasonable cause, failed to pay, within the time allowed the assessed on him, he may direct that such dealer shall pay, by way of penalty. . . . . . . . . . and in the cases referred to in clause (b), in addition to any tax payable by him, a sum not exceeding one and one-half times the amount of tax, which would have been avoided, if the turnover, as returned by such dealer had been accepted as the correct turnover : Provided that no penalty shall be imposed under the forgoing clause - (i) except after notice to the dealer, and. . . . . . " It is therefore, abundantly clear that the relevant provision to which the penalty was referable was under section 15-A (1) (b) and not under section 15-A (1) (c) of the Act. From a perusal of the impugned order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, it is clear that the facts in the present case are not in dispute. The question, therefore, that arises for consideration is as to whether the mere mention of a wrong provision in the show cause notice or even in the ultimate penalty order invalidates the action or not ? Admittedly, under the law as it existed at the relevant time penalty could be imposed on the assessee for concealment of the particulars of his turnover under section 15-A (1) (b) of the Act and not under section 15-A (1) (c) of the Act as held by the Tribunal. Therefore, the said notice as well as the order are referable to the power that has been exercised and could be exercised under the law by the assessing authority while imposing the penalty in question. It has been held in a catena of cases and by now it is settled law that a wrong reference to the power under which action was taken would not invalidate the action if jurisdiction is there under some other power under which lawfully vested and under which that act could be done. See the leading case of namely Hazari Mal Kuthiala v. Income-tax Officer [1961] 41 ITR 12 (SC); AIR 1961 SC 200 and the cases of Hukumchand Mills Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1964] 52 ITR 583 (SC); AIR 1964 SC 1329, Nani Gopal Biswas v. Municipality of Howrah AIR 1958 SC 141 and Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Ben Hiraben Mani Lal (1983) 2 SCC 422 and Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398. In view of the above settled position of law, therefore, the first ground taken by the Sales Tax Tribunal for knocking off the penalty, in my opinion, does not hold goods. As regards the second ground, section 15-A (1) (b) of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time and as has been extracted above, manifests that if the assessing authority in the course of any proceeding is satisfied that any dealer had concealed particulars of his turnover he may direct such dealer to pay the penalty. The only condition envisaged in the provision of that sub-section is that the penalty shall not be imposed without notice to the dealer. It does not mean that it is penalty notice which gives jurisdiction to the assessing authority. On the other hand, from a reading of the relevant provision it is clear that it is the satisfaction of the assessing authority that concealment of particulars of turnover has taken place which gives him jurisdiction to issue notice. The question relating to issuance of notice is meant only for affording an opportunity to the dealer with regard to the said satisfaction so arrived at the assessing authority. If we compare the above provision with the provision of section 21 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, we find that the position is clarified, in as much as relevant provision of section 21 (1) of the Act reads as follows : " 21 (1 ). If the assessing authority has reason to believe that the whole or any part of the turnover of a dealer, for any assessment year or part thereof, has escaped assessment to tax. . . . . . . . . . . the assessing authority may, after issuing notice to the dealer and making such inquiry as it may consider necessary, assess or reassess the dealer or tax according to law. " A perusal of the above shows that issuance of a notice under section 21 of the Act is matter of jurisdiction and the said notice is a jurisdictional notice. Thus in the present case I find that under the substantive provision, i. e. , under section 15 - A (1) (b) of the Act, as it stood then, the jurisdiction of the assessing authority was vested and exercise of the jurisdiction it was not incumbent, as a condition precedent, that a notice has to be issued. When we come to the next stage after the "satisfaction" of the assessing authority is arrived at, then only we find, as has also been stated by the Standing Counsel, that by way of procedural part of the machinery no penalty should be imposed without notice, that is to say the question of issuance of notice comes in on the procedural aspect of it and not on jurisdictional part of it. Therefore, the view taken by the Sales Tax Tribunal in the impugned order on this aspect of matter is also erroneous in law. With regard to the last ground on which the appeal has been allowed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, I find that incorrect finding of facts has been recorded by the Tribunal in this regard inasmuch as from a perusal of the impugned penalty order passed by the assessing authority in this case it is clear that not only the assessing authority had issued penalty notice and had considered the explanation of the assessee in regard thereto but it has arrived at its independent finding in regard to concealment in the penalty proceedings itself and has only referred to the findings arrived at in the quantum matter as one of the circumstances in penalty proceedings. In view of the same, the view taken by the Sales Tax Tribunal and the said finding arrived at by the Sales Tax Tribunal being the record of the case, is vitiated in law and has to be set aside. Thus, as a result of the above discussion, all the three grounds on which the appeal of the assessee has been allowed by the Sales Tax Tribunal vanish and the impugned order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal being against law is liable to be set aside. In the result, the revision succeeds and allowed with no order as to costs. The impugned order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal is set aside with direction to rehear and redecide the appeal in question on merits in accordance with law. Petition allowed. .;