R.A. Sharma, J. - (1.) PETITIONER , who was Cashier in Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd. Ghazipur (hereinafter referred to as the Back), was prosecuted for offence under Section 409, I.P.C. and was found guilty by the Court but he was released under Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by order dated 29 -5 -1981. Thereafter a notice dated 4 -8 -1982 was issued to the petitioner, asking him to show cause as to why he be not dismissed from service. The petitioner submitted his reply and thereafter by order dated 8 -9 -1982 he has been removed from service. It is against this order that this writ petition has been filed before this court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made two submissions, namely, (i) after the release of the petitioner under the aforesaid Act, 1958, no disciplinary proceeding can be taken against him and (ii) no formal disciplinary enquiry was initiated against the petitioner.
(2.) SUPREME Court in the case of Union of India v. Bakshi Ram : AIR 1990 SC 1987 while considering the effect of the provisions of the Act, has laid down that the release of the offenders on probation does not obliterate the stigma of conviction. The relevant passage from the aforesaid Supreme Court decision is reproduced below: In criminal trial the conviction is one thing and sentence is another. The departmental punishment for misconduct is yet a third one. The Court while invoking the provisions of Section 3 or 4 of the Act does Dot deal with conviction; it only deals with the sentence which the offender has to undergo. Instead of sentencing the offender, the Court released him on probation of good conduct. The conviction however, remains untouched and the stigma of conviction is not obliterated. In the departmental proceedings the delinquent could be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Learned counsel for the petitioner has however, argued that in view of the provisions of Section 12 of the Act, which provides that a person found guilty of an offence and released on probation "shall not suffer any disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law" no disciplinary proceeding can be initiated. The submission is that as the petitioner cannot be allowed to suffer disqualification in view of the provisions of Section 12 of the Act, no disciplinary action can be taken against him. It is not possible to agree with the learned counsel. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Union of India v. Bakshi Ram (supra) has negatived the similar submission, relevant extract from which is as follows: Section 12 of the Act does not preclude the department from taking action for misconduct leading to the offence or to his conviction thereon as per law. The section was not intended to exonerate the person from departmental punishment. The question of reinstatement into service from which he was removed in view of his conviction does not therefore, arise. That seems obvious from the terminology of Section 12. Section 12 is thus clear audit only directs that the offender "shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law". Such law in the context is other law providing for disqualification on account of conviction. For instance, if a law provides for disqualification of a person for being appointed in any office or for seeking election to any authority or body in view of his conviction, that disqualification by virtue of Section 12 stands removed. That in effect is the scope and effect of Section 12 of the Act. But that is not the same thing to state that the person who has been dismissed from service in view of his conviction is entitled to reinstatement upon getting the benefit of probation of good conduct.
(3.) THE second plea is also liable to be rejected. The petitioner was issued a show -cause notice and he has submitted a representation in reply thereto. The competent authority thereafter passed the impugned order. The disciplinary enquiry initiated against the petitioner was fully in accordance with the principles of natural justice. It is not the form of the notice which matters. What is relevant is that the employee should be informed of the charges and be given an opportunity of being heard, before taking any action. In the instant case, this has been done. No exception can be taken to such a procedure. The writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.;