G.P.Mathur - (1.) THE petitioner has challenged the order dated 14-11- 1991 by which, he has been placed under suspension.
(2.) THE first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that appointing authority of the petitioner Is joint Director of Medical and Health, as is evident by the appointment order dated 6-7-1978, but he has been placed under suspension by the Chief Secretary to U. P. Govt. It is not disputed that the Chief Secretary, who has passed the impugned order, is higher in rank to the joint Director. Article 311 (1) of the Constitution provides that no person, who is member of Civil Services of the Union or State, shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which, he was appointed. In State of U. P. v. Ram Naresh Lal, AIR 1970 SC 1263, it was held as follows : "THE Government can confer powers on an officer other than the appointing authority to dismiss a Government Servant provided he is not subordinate in rank to the appointing officer or authority." A similar controversy came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Sampuran Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1407. The petitioner was a Sectional Officer (overseer) in Punjab Public Works Department and he was being prosecuted under section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (c) and (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act. Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under section 5 of the Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with previous sanction of the authorities enumerated in sub-clause (a), (b) or (c). The case of the petitioner was governed by sub-clause (c) which reeds as follows : " 6 (1) (c) : In the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office." The sanction of Chief Engineer, who was the authority competent to remove him from office within the meaning of section 6 (1) (c), had not been obtained by the prosecution and instead the sanction had been accorded by the Chief Minister. This amounted to sanction by the State Govt, which was the appellate authority under the rules. It was contended that sanction to prosecute the petitioner was illegal. After considering the law in great detail, the Honourable Supreme Court held as follows ; ' Section 6 (1) stipulated that the removing authority will be the sanctioning authority. In view of Art. 31 i (1) of the Constitution the removing authority cannot be subordinate in rank to the appointing authority. By necessary implication the removing authority may be higher in rank to the appointing authority."
(3.) THERE is another aspect of the matter. The petitioner is an employee of the State Government. On general principles the State Government being employer has a right to suspend a public servant. The government acts through its secretaries and the Chief Secretary is the highest Civil Servant of the State. THEREfore the impugned order can be treated to be one passed by the State Government which has the authority to suspend the petitioner. In R. P. Kapur v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787, it was held as follows in part-11 of the reports ; "The General principle therefore is that an employer can suspend an employee pending any enquiry into his conduct and the only question that can arise on such suspension will relate to the payment during the period of such suspension......" These general principles in our opinion apply with equal force in a case where the government is the employer and a public servant is the employee with this modification that in view of the peculiar structural hierarchy of the government, the employer in the case of government must be held to be the authority which has the power to appoint a public servant On general principles therefore the authority entitled to appoint a public servant would be entitled to suspend him pending a departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal proceedings, which may eventually result in a departmental enquiry against him This general principle is illustrated by the provision in section 16 of the General Clauses Act, No. X of 1987, which lays down that where any Central Act or Regulation gives power of appointment that includes the power to suspend or dismiss unless a different intention appears. Though this provision does not directly apply in the present case, it is in consonance with the general law of master and servant." Therefore, in my opinion, the suspension order passed by the Chief Secretary is perfectly valid.;