A. N. Verma, J. - (1.) THE petition is directed against the order dated 22-5- 86 passed by the Labour Commissioner holding that the petitioner corporation is bound by the settlement reached between the management and the workmen on 23-6-74 as well as the Government order dated 15-7-82 and that the petitioner should abide by the same.
(2.) THE facts relevant for the decision of this petition are simple and may be stated thus. THE petitioner runs a sugar factory. It appears that there was a demand raised by the workmen of the factory for absorption of the heirs of the workmen who die in harness or who retire upon attaining the age of superannuation in the petitioner factory in a post available and suitable for the heirs considering their fitness for the same. THE demand eventually resulted in a settlement reached between the Management and the workmen. Under this settlement, the sons of the workmen were to be considered for appointment either on the death or retirement of their father employed in the petitioner factory. It appears that in accordance with the settlement until 1981-82 as and when occasion arose, the sons of the workmen were absorbed in the petitioner factory according to their suitability for the post falling vacant. Sometime in the year 1982, however, the petitioner corporation appears to have declined to absorb the sons of the retiring employee or employees who had died in harness. THE corporation took the stand that the Government was issuing various Government orders from time to time providing that the petitioner corporation should first fill the vacancies arising from the death or retirement of employees with the applicants belonging to Schedule or Backward classes. Another ground put forward by the corporation was that under a G. O. dated 15-7-82 the corporation was obliged to fill up the vacancies only from what has been described as 'surplus pool'. All these factors were put forward by the corporation as grounds on account of which it was unable to comply with the terms of the settlement referred to above providing for absorption of the heirs of the employees in employment either on the death of the employees or their retirement. THE workmen, on the other hand, claimed that the Management was bound by the terms of the settlement. THE settlement had a binding effect and the petitioner corporation could not be permitted to resile from the same on the grounds urged by them. The dispute between the Management and the workmen was finally taken up by the Lobour Commissioner who has passed the impugned order dated 22-5-86. Before the Labour Commissioner, both the parties advanced the pleas mentioned above. It appears that the Labour Commissioner on the basis of the stand taken by the parties proceeded to examine the matter and made an attempt to adjudicate whether the petitioner was justified is not complying with the terms of the settlement dated 23-6-74. On a consideration of the various facts and circumstances mentioned in the impupned order, the Labour Commissioner came to the conclusion that the petitioner was bound by the settlement and by the Government order dated 15-7-82. It had no option but to comply with the same. The Labour Commissioner has further observed that it was improper on the part of the corporation to resile from the terms of the settlement. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner has approached this Court. For the petitioner it was urged that the Labour Commissioner was only acting as a Conciliation Officer under Section 4-F of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. As a Concilation Officer all that the Labour Commissioner was authorised to do was to make an endeavour to bring about a settlement between the parties. If the Labour Commissioner found that it was not possible to bring about such a reconcilation he could only report the failure to the State Government for necessary action. He had no jurisdiction to embark upon any adjudiction which is a function assigned only to the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal under Section 4-K or 6-H etc. of the Industrial Disputes Act.
(3.) THE learned counsel seems to be right in his contention. As a conciliation Officer the Labour Commissioner is authorised under section 4-K only to mediate in and promote industrial disputes in the manner prescribed under the statute. Rule 4 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Rules lays down the powers, procedure and duties of conciliation Officers. THE provision only authorises the Conciliation Officers to hold meetings of the representatives of all the parties and try and attempt to bring about an amicable settlement between them. If no settlement is reached, the Concoliation Officer submits the report of his failure to the State Government setting forth the steps taken by him for ascertaining the facts and bringing about reconciliation between the parties. In any case, the Labour Commissioner has not been invested with any adjudicatory powers, that is, the power to determine industrial disputes. That power belongs to the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal upon a reference made under Section 4-K. Nor has the Labour Commissioner been authorised to exercise the powers for recovery of money due from an employer under Section 6-H of the said Act. Even under Section 6-H the power which a Labour Court has been authorised to exercise is to determine the amount which may be due to a workman from an employer under the provisions of the Act or under a settlement and to recover the same in accordance with the procedure laid down therein. Under this provision claims to only such benefits as may be computed in terms of money can be examined. THE present is not a claim of that nature at all. THE claim is for seeking employment of persons who have yet to become workmen. Under Section 7 (ii) of the Act also the power to enforce in the Prescribed manner the whole or any part of an agreement between the parties to an industrial dispute vests only in the State Government and not in the labour Commissioner and that too for the purpose contemplated under Section 3 of the Act for the limited purpose of preventing strikes, lock-outs, etc It will thus be seen that the Labour Commissioner did not have the power to adjudicate the dispute raised between the parties, namely, whether the settlement reached between the parties was still binding on them or whether the stand taken by the petitioner that it had been disabled from performing its obligations in view of the Government Orders issued from time to time since the settlement, was correct or not. Nor did the Labour Cnmmissioner have the power to direct the enforcement of that settlement. The Labour Commissioner thus clearly travelled beyond his powers in proceeding to determine the aforesaid disputes or to issue directions to the parties with regard to the settlement.;