- (1.) V. N. Mehrotra, J. This revision has been filed against the order dated 28. 2. 89 by Sri S. S. Ashutosh, Sub Divisional Magistrate, Handia, District Allahabad, dropping the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C.
(2.) THE facts of the case are that on the basis of the report by S,o. P. S. Handia dated 9. 9. 86 the S. D. M. concerned initiated proceeding under Section 145 Cr. PC. and passed order under Section 145 (i) Cr. P. C. on 15. 9. 86. THE proceedings related to agricultural "land. THE first party, Smt. Usha Devi asserted that there was apprehension of breach of peace. THE second party, Rakesh Kumar, filed written statement asserting that he was the owner of the land in question. He also asserted that he was in possession over the land and that the first party was not in possession over the same. He also asserted that a civil suit is pending before the authorities in respect of the same land, hence the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. could not be filed or continued. THE opposite parties Nos. 2 and 4 also filed the written statement making allegation against the opposite party No. 1 THEy also alleged that a suit was pending in the court of Munsif concerned in respect of the property in dispute. THE learned Magistrate by the impugned order held that as a civil suit was pending in respect of the property which was in dispute in the proceedings, under Section 145 Cr. P. C. these proceedings cannot continue. Reliance was placed on the rulings in the cases Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U. P, 1985 (22) ACC 45 (SC) and Shiv Muni Pandey v. Bharti Lal, 1988 ALJ Page 123. In this revision it has been asserted that the learned Magistrate was totally wrong in dropping the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. merely on the ground that a suit had been filed by Smt. Usha Devi. THEy have asserted that in that suit neither the question of title nor the question of possession was in issue, hence merely because Smt. Usha Devi had filed that suit which was for main tenance, the learned Magistrate could not have dropped the proceedings. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the revisionist as well as by counsel for the opposite parties. It will be proper to refer to the ruling in the case of Ram Sumer Puri (supra) which has been relied upon by the learned Magistrate. In Ram Sumer Pun's case a civil suit was pending between the parties, includ ing some relatings of the plaintiffs, in respect of certain immovable property. The suit was for possession and injunction. It was a title suit in respect of that property. The suit was dismissed by the trial court, against which an appeal was filed which was still pending before the appellate court when proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. were initiated in respect of the same property. It was on these facts that the Supreme Court held that the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. should not continue. It was observed that when a civil litigation is pending for the property, wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under S. 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is, binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us. It was further observed that the counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the Civil Court, the criminal jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. Thus in this case the Supreme Court had directed that the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. should not continue in view of the fact that the civil litigation in which the reliefs for possession and injunction were claimed the court concerned could determine the title to the property. It could also pass interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during the pendency of the suit. The decision by a Magistrate under Section 145 Cr. P. C. is always subject to the determination of the question of title and possession by competent court when the question of title or possession was already before a competent court. Obviously there could be no justification for initiating proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. As observed by the Supreme Court multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over such litigation. However, this ruling could be applied only when it is shown that in the litigation pending before a competent court in respect of the same property the question of title and possession was involved. In case the question of title and possession was not involved then obviously the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. could not be dropped on the ground that some civil litigation in respect of the same property was pending.
(3.) IN the present case the copy of the plaint in suit No. 1012 of 1985 filed by Smt. Usha Devi against Rajesh Kumar and four others has been filed. It will be clear from the averments made in the plaint in that suit and also from the relief sought that the suit did not involve the determination of the question of title and possession over the land in dispute. The plaintiff in that case did not challenge the title of the defendant No. 1, Rajesh Kumar over the land in dispute nor she claimed her possession over the land. She made allegations against the character of defendant No. 1, Rajesh Kumar and alleged that he was friltering away this property. She also alleged that the defendant No. 1, who was her husband was neglecting her and was not maintaining her. It was in these cir cumstances that she prayed that the defendant No. 1 be restrained by means of an injunction from transferring or otherwise disposing of the property. She also prayed, in the alternative that she be allowed maintenance Rs. 500. 00 per month and the main tenance should be made a charge over the property in dispute. It is obvious that the question of title and possession over the land was not in dispute in that suit. It appears that subsequently the suit was withdrawn. However, that is not very material for deter mination of this revision. What is material is that in that suit also same property was subject matter of the suit which was in dispute in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. also. However, as mentioned earlier, that suit was not for or the determination of title or possession over the land. IN view of these proceedings the ruling in Ram Sumer Puri's case could not be made applicable to the present case nor the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. could be dropped merely because Smt. Usha Devi had filed the civil suit in the civil court. The second ruling relied upon by the learned Magistrate, as mentioned above, follows the ruling in Ram Sumer Puri's case and it is not necessary to refer to the same. In view of the above discussion the learned Magistrate was wrong in dropping the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. His judgment dated 28. 2. 1989 is therefore set aside. The learned Magistrate is directed to further proceed in the matter in accordance with law. Revision allowed .;