SURESH PRASAD MISRA Vs. MUNICIPAL BOARD DEORIA
LAWS(ALL)-1991-11-35
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on November 13,1991

Suresh Prasad Misra Appellant
VERSUS
Municipal Board Deoria Respondents

JUDGEMENT

A.N. Varma, J. - (1.) THESE three petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment. The Petitioners claiming to be the operators are aggrieved by the levy and collection of parking fee from them by the Respondent Municipal Board or the contractor to whom the right to collect fee has been auctioned.
(2.) THE challenge to the levy was threefold: First, that no bye -laws have been framed to authorise the Municipal Board to levy and collect parking fee from those stopping at the parking places earmarked by the Municipal Board. Second, that such a bye -law could be framed only under Section 298(2)H(b) of the U.P. Municipalities Act and not under Section 298(2)E(b) of the Act under which the bye -laws relied on by the Respondent Municipal Board have been framed. Third, that at any rate, no rates have been prescribed for the levy of parking fee. None of these three grounds has any merit. So far as the first ground is concerned, the same stands completely negatived by the counter -affidavit which has been filed on behalf of the Municipal Board in writ petition No. 1059 of 1986, Suresh Prasad Misra and Ors. v. Municipal Board Deoria and Ors. with this counter affidavit a copy of the bye -laws has been annexed as annexure 5. These bye -laws furnish a complete answer to this contention of the Petitioner.
(3.) COMING to the second ground, it is now too late in the day to contend that absence of reference to the relevant bye -laws in the pre -amble has effect of invalidating the bye -laws themselves, it has been settled by a line of decisions that if the power to levy fee in the bye -laws is available and there is a mere inaccuracy or omission to refer to them in the pre -amble, the bye -laws are not there by invalidated. The bye -laws in question clearly provide that the vehicle passing through the Municipal Board shall be parked only at the places earmarked for them. That such a bye -law can be framed under Section 298(2)H(b) and cannot be seriously disputed. The mere fact, therefore, is that instead of quoting Section 298(2)H(b) a reference to Section 298(2)E(b) has been made will not, in our considered view, have the effect of vitiating the bye -laws. The power to levy such a fee is also available to the Municipal Board under Section 293 of the U.P. Municipalities Act by a bye -law framed in that behalf or by a public auction or agreement. In all the three modes laid down under Section 293 the Municipal Board can levy parking fee for the use and occupation of the land belonging to or vesting in it.;


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