- (1.) The petitioner was employed as an armed guard in the United Commercial Bank, Robert Sganj Branch District Mirzapur (Now Sonbhadra) by an order of the Branch Manager on 20.3.1958. The post of armed guard admittedly is class IV post. At the time of entry into service the recorded age of the petitioner was about 27 years: No exact date of birth was entered any where in his service record. By order/notice dated 18.12.1990 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition), the petitioner was informed that since at the time of his entry into service on 20.3.1958 his recorded age was about 27 years, he would be attaining the age of superannuation on 20.3.1991 and accordingly he would be retiring from bank service on the last date of the month i.e. 31.3.1991. It is his order/notice 18.12.1990 which is sought to be quashed by means of this writ petition.
(2.) Sri S.N. Verma Senior learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and has raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner had been alternative remedy by way of the reference under the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He has placed reliance upon a Full Bench Decision of this court in Charndrama Singh v. Managing Director, U.P. Cooperative Union Lucknow,1991 2 UPLBEC 898.
(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioner, however contended before me that the petitioner was almost illiterate and ignorant of the formalities about the entries of his age in his service book and that the bank authorities too did not require him to complete any formality or furnish any document with regard to his exact date of birth and without any basis they have superannuated the petitioner on the basis of his approximate age entered at the time of his entry into service, he further contended that the order impugned in the writ petition was passed in breach of principles of natural justice and hence the plea of alternative remedy would not be available to the respondents. Sri Sidheshari Prasad learned senior counsel for the petitioner has further contended before me that the remedy by way of reference of industrial dispute under section 10 of the Act is not a remedy which may said to be available to the petitioner.;