ANSHUMAN SINGH, J. - (1.) This revision under section 11 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), is directed against the judgment dated July 24, 1991, passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, Saharanpur Bench, Camp Dehradun, relating to assessment year 1983-84 remanding the case back to the Deputy Commissioner (Executive ). The assessee, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Dehradun, is a statutory body constituted under the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as "the Gas Act" ). The activities and functions of the Commission are circumscribed to plan, promote, organise and implement programmes the development of petroleum resources and for its production and sale. The commission has also to perform such functions besides the above, as the Central Government may, from time to time, assign it so to do. During the assessment year 1983-84 it is alleged that the assessee-Commission sold certain number of motor vehicle in the specified amount on which the assessment order was passed on December 19, 1985. The aforesaid assessment order was later on rectified twice under section 22 of the Act vide order dated September 22, 1986 and November 5, 1986. Subsequently it was also discovered that at certain stage the assessee-Commission had made purchases of steel and cement, etc. , in large quantity and had given the same to the various contractors which were utilised in the construction of different buildings of the Commission and while making payments to such contractors the price of such supplies of steel and cement, etc. , was deducted or adjusted in terms of the agreement between the Commission and such contractors. The assessment order passed under rule 41 (7) of the Rules framed under the Act did not include such supplies of cement and steel, etc. , to the contractors. Consequently upon the information so received, the Deputy Commissioner (Executive), Sales Tax, Saharanpur, issued a notice to the assessee-Commission under section 10-B of the Act and directed to submit a written statement on the points covered by such notice and then after affording an opportunity to the assessee, the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) remanded the matter to the assessing officer for assessment and the liability of the assessee thereto on account of the supplies made to the contractors in the light of notice under section 10-B of the Act. Before the matter could be taken up by the assessing officer in compliance with the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Executive), the Commission preferred an appeal and objected to the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) firstly on the ground that no supply was made to the contractors and as much the notice under section 10-B of the Act and the proceedings thereon were uncalled for. In the alternative it was pleaded that the material issued to the contractors was in pursuance of the agreement entered into with the contractors for the construction work of Commission on its own premises. At no stage the title to the materials so given to the contractors passed hence the supplies so made could not be termed "sale" legally particularly when the business of the assessee-Commission was not of cement and steel and as such the assessee-Commission could not be termed as "dealer" within the eye of law. Jurisdiction regarding initiation of proceedings under section 10-B of the Act was also challenged. It was further contended that in any case it could be a case of escaped turnover and could have been investigated under section 21 of the Act and not under section 10-B of the Act. Ultimately an order was passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Executive), Sales Tax, on December 15, 1989 remanding the case to the assessing authority for making a fresh assessment. The assessee feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order preferred an appeal under section 10 of the Act before the Sales Tax Tribunal, Dehradun. The Tribunal by the impugned order dated July 24, 1991, has allowed the appeal of the assessee and modified the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Executive ). However, it directed the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) to all for the assessee to produce the documents through which deductions were made while making payments to the various contractors and decide the matter again under section 10-B of the Act. I have heard Sri Bharatji Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the assessee, and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Revenue. From the narration of the above facts it is crystal-clear that the controversy involved in the instant case is whether the materials supplied by the Commission to the various contractors amounted to sale within the meaning of "sale" as defined under section 2 (h) of the Act and whether the supply of cement, etc. , made by the Commission to the various contractors could be exigible to sales tax or not. Before deciding the controversy it is pertinent to mention certain provisions of the Gas Act. Section 14 (1) and 14 (2) of the Gas Act relate to the functions of the Commission which are as under : " 14. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the functions of the Commission shall generally be to plan, promote, organise and implement programmes for the development of petroleum resources and the production and sale of petroleum and petroleum products produced by it and to perform such functions as the Central Government may, from time to time, assign to the Commission. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of foregoing provisions the Commission may take such steps as it thinks fit - (a) for the carrying out of geological and geo-physical surveys for exploration of petroleum; (b) for the carrying out of drilling and other prospective operations to prove and estimate the reserves of petroleum; (c) to undertake, encourage and promote such other activities as may lead to the establishment of such reserves; (d) to undertake, assist or encourage and promote the production of petroleum from such reserves and its refining; (e) for the transport and disposal of natural gas and refinery gases produced by the Commission : Provided that no industry which will use any of these gases as a raw material, shall be set up by the Commission without the previous approval of the Central Government; (f) to undertake, encourage and promote geological, chemical and other scientific investigations weather in or outside the laboratory; (g) to undertake, assist or encourage the collection, maintenance and publication of statistics, bulletins and monographs; (gg) to promote and form companies in compliance with the requirements of the Companies Act, 1956, for any of the purposes aforesaid; (h) to perform any other function which is supplemental, incidental or consequential to any of the functions aforesaid or which may be prescribed. " Besides taking into account the functions of the Commission it is also essential to have a glance at the relevant clauses of the agreement/contract entered into between the Commission and the contractors regarding the supply of materials which will ultimately be of paramount help in determining the nature of transaction as to whether the said transaction can be termed as business. Secondly whether it is a sale and the same can be exigible to sales tax. In this connection clauses 10, 11 and 33 of the contract appear to be relevant which are mentioned below. Under clause 10 of the said agreement/contract the materials and stores are to be supplied by the Commission to the contractors. The relevant part of the clause 10 reads as follows : " All materials as supplied to the contractors shall remain the absolute property of the Commission and shall not be removed on any account from the site of the work, and shall be at all times open to inspection by the engineer-in-charge. Any such material remaining unused and in perfectly good condition at the time of the completion or determination of the contracts shall be returned to the engineer-in-charge at a place directed by him. . . " Clause 11 of the said contract under the heading "social conditions of contract" provides as follows : " The contractor at his own cost shall construct a godown for storage of cement which shall not permit entry of moisture or rain water. The godown shall have a double lock. One key shall be with the contractor or his representative and one key with engineer-in-charge or his representative who will issue the cement. For this purpose a register shall be maintained by the engineer-in-charge or his representative which will show the receipt and issue of the cement. This register shall be signed by the contractor or his representative after every transaction. " Clause 33 of the contract provides as follows : " Notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in any or all of the clauses of this contract, where any materials for the execution of the contract are procured with the assistance of the Commission either by issue from Commission's stocks or purchase made under order or permits or licences issued by the Commission the contractor shall hold the same material economically and solely for the purpose of the contract and not dispose of them without the permission of the Commission and return, if required by the engineer-in-charge, all surplus or unserviceable materials that may be left with him after the completion of the contract or at its termination for any reason whatsoever on being paid or credited such price as the engineer-in-charge shall determine having due regard to the condition of the materials. The contractor, however, shall not exceed the amount charged to him excluding the storage charge, if any. The decision of the engineer-in-charge shall be final and conclusive. In the event of breach of the aforesaid condition the contractor shall in addition to throwing himself open to action for contravention of the term of the licences or permit and/or criminal breach of trust, be liable to pay to the Commission at double the issue rate or double the market rate as the case may be and for all moneys, advantage or profits resulting or which in the usual course would have resulted to him by reason of reason of such breach. " A perusal of the aforesaid clause 33 of the contract makes it clear that there was no composite transfer of property inasmuch as the material which remained unused was required to be returned by the contractor to the Commission and if he fails to return the he shall be liable to criminal breach of trust and liable to Commission at double the rate of market of the said amount. Sri Bharatji Agarwal, learned counsel for assessee on the basis of the terms of agreement/contract, relevant clauses of which have been quoted above, contended that the assessee was not carrying on any business of building construction nor any business of purchase and sale of cement and steel. He further contended that in view of section 14 of the Gas Act the assessee could not carry on any such business. It was also asserted that the ownership and title in respect of cement, iron and steel supplied by the assessee to the contractor always remained with the assessee and at no point of time there was any transfer of property for such cement, iron and steel which was supplied by the assessee to the contractor. On the basis of the language used in the terms of the contract he strenuously urged that there was no room for doubt that there was no transfer of any property in respect of steel, cement and iron supplied by the assessee to the contractor. In case it was so, there was no question of its being returned by the contractor and on not being returned the unused material the contractor was liable for penal consequences for the amount at double rate than the rate on which it was purchased by the assessee as provided in clause 33 of the contract. It was further contended that the value of the cement and steel supplied by the assessee to the contractor was deducted firm the running bill of the contractor only for the purpose of accounting with a view to reduce the contract value. On the basis of the submissions made above counsel summed up his first argument and contended that from the terms of the contract and from the aims and object of the Commission as prescribed under the Gas Act it is abundantly clear that the nature of the transfer entered into between the Commission and the contractor does not amount to sale and also cannot be termed "business" as defined in section 2 (aa) of the Act. In support of his above contention he has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Hindustan Housing Factory v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1989] 75 STC 233; UPTC 468. I have carefully perused the aforesaid judgment and in my opinion the facts of that case and the instant case are almost similar. Learned counsel for the assessee has specifically placed reliance on paragraph No. 9 (at page 245 of STC) of the aforesaid judgment which is as under : " It may be noted that Tribunal has taken the view that the ownership in the materials for which payment was made or agreed to be made would stand transferred to the assessee as soon as the materials were transferred. It appeared to the Tribunal that the letter 26th October, 1979 referred to above mentioning that the property in the raw materials made available for the manufacture of components had all along been vested with the U. P. State Electricity Board, had been brought into existence with the object of evading liability for the payment of tax and it did not fit in with the intention of the parties as expressed in the original letters exchanged in the year 1973. This view of the Tribunal is based on no materials and does not appear to be correct. A perusal of the letter dated 26th October, 1979, indicates that it was issued for the purpose of clarifying clause 4 of the contract and to ensure proper utilisation of raw materials made available by the U. P. State Electricity Board to the assessee. The recovery had been made at the specified rates mentioned in the conditions of the contract from the various running bills. The aforesaid letter also clarified that the property in raw materials made available by the U. P. Electricity Board to the assessee for the manufacture of components has all along been vested with the U. P. State Electricity Board and the assessee had no authority to sell/dispose of/utilise for the purpose other than the manufacture of components. It was made clear that this letter would form part of the contract. It is, therefore, apparent that till the relevant times the property in the raw materials made available by the U. P. State Electricity Board and not with the assessee. In this view of the matter as indicated above the various decisions relied upon by the Tribunal stand distinguished. " Apart from the aforesaid case learned counsel for the assessee also relied on another judgment of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Ansal Properties and Industries Pvt. Ltd. 1989 UPTC 1366 in which the view taken by this Court in this of Hindustan Housing Factory [1989] 75 STC 233; 1989 UPTC 468 was followed. The ratio laid down by this Court in the case of Hindustan Housing Factory [1989] 75 STC 233; 1989 UPTC 468 appears to be that in case the ownership and title in respect of the material supplied by the assessee-Commission to the contractor always remained with the assessee-Commission and the same was supplied for carrying on the construction and if after the completion of the construction and unused material was returned to the assessee then the same would not amount to sale and transaction would not be exigible to sales tax. Learned counsel for the assessee further contended that the counsel for the assessee at the time of the second appeal before the Tribunal specifically invited the attention of the Tribunal to the aforesaid two decisions of this Court but the Tribunal did not even care to notice the same and has also not cared to mention them in its judgment. The said contention has sufficient force and I am constrained to observe that if the cases decided by this Court or by the apex Court on the controversy involved in the cases before the Tribunal or the authority acting under the Act are placed, it is their bounden duty to consider and refer the same in the judgment. The tendency by the hierarchy of the Tribunal created under the Act in ignoring the judicial pronouncements of the apex Court as well as the various High Courts is highly deprecated and the same indicates the callousness and scant respect for judicial pronouncements on the subject. Learned Standing Counsel, on the hand, has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in N. M. Goel and Co. v. Sales Tax Officer [1989] 72 STC 368; ST1 1988 SC 140 and on the basis of the said decision contended that the transaction made by the assessee amounts to sale and was exigible to sales tax. Learned counsel for the assessee contended that the ratio laid down in N. M. Goel and Co. [1989] 72 STC 368 (SC); ST1 1988 SC 140 is not applicable as it was a case of N. M. Goel and Co [1989] 72 STC 368 (SC); ST1 1988 SC 140 clearly establishes that there was complete transfer of property inasmuch as the materials which remained unused was not required to be returned by the contractor and it was to be returned only after the contractor requires it to return otherwise the contractor shall be the absolute owner of the material supplied to him. Such is not the position in the instant case as in the case in hand the contractor was, on the completion of the contract, duty bound to return the unused material, i. e. , cement, iron and steel, etc. , to the assessee-Commission failing which he was liable for criminal breach of trust and penalty to the extent of twice the amount in view of clause 33 of the contract referred to above. Moreover a perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court in N. M. Goel and Co. [1989] 72 STC 368; ST1 1988 SC 140 indicates that the Supreme Court has held that the question whether a particular transaction would be a sale or not would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this connection I would like to refer a passage from the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court : " The question in each case was one about the true agreement between the parties and the terms of the agreement must be deducted must be deducted from a review of all the attendant circumstances. But from the mere passing of title to goods either as integral part of or or independent of goods, it could not be inferred that the goods were agreed to be sold, and the price was liable to sales tax. Whether a contract for service or for execution of work involved a taxable sale of goods must be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case. The burden in such a case lay upon the taxing authorities to show that there was a taxable sale, and that burden was not discharged by merely showing that property in the goods which belonged to the party performing service or executing the contract stood transferred to the other party. " For the facts stated I am of the definite view that the ratio laid down in N. M. Goel and Co. [1989] 72 STC 368 (SC); 1988 SC 140 is clearly distinguishable from the present case and is wholly inapplicable. On the basis of the law laid down by this Court in Hindustan Housing Factory [1989] 75 STC 233; 1989 UPTC 468 and also on the basis of the agreement entered into between the parties and the language used therein, learned counsel for the assessee has serious objection to the last observations made by the Tribunal in its judgment before the operative portion, i. e. , "we are of the view that supplies of issue of steel and cement to the contractors in pursuance of agreement between the two and then adjustment of price thereof at the time of final payment to such contractor, are taxable". I am, therefore, of the view that the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) while deciding the case will not be guided by the aforesaid observation. Learned counsel for the assessee also contended that the contractor was only a bailee of the assessee-Commission and the supply of steel and cement to the contractor was only a bailment under 148 of the Contract Act, which reads as under : " 148. Bailment, bailor and bailee.- Bailment is the delivery of goods by one person to another for some purpose, upon a contract, that they shall when the purpose is accomplished, be returned or otherwise disposed of according to direction of the person delivering the goods is called bailor. The person to whom they are delivered is called the bailee. " Learned counsel for the assessee also submitted that the proceedings under section 10-B of the Act are illegal and invalid in view of the language of section 10-B of the Act because on the basis of subsequent materials proceedings could be initiated by the assessing authority himself but no proceeding can be taken on the basis of the materials received after passing of the assessment order dated December 19, 1985. He submitted that the power under section 10-B of the Act are analogous to power of section 263 of the Income-tax Act under which the Commissioner of Sales Tax or the Deputy Commissioner (Executive), Sales Tax as well as Commissioner of Income-tax can only exercise jurisdiction on the basis of material on record of that particular order and cannot exercise jurisdiction of revision on the basis of material which were not before the assessing authority and which did not form part of that record of the order. In support of the said contention he has placed reliance on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ganga Properties v. Income-tax Officer [1979] 118 ITR 447. The Calcutta High Court while entertaining the writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India filed against the notice issued by the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 263 of the Income-tax Act has held as under : ". . . . . . . Under this section, the Commissioner may call for and examine 'the record' of the 'proceeding' in order to consider in his revisional jurisdiction as to whether the order in question by the Income-tax officer 'is erroneous'. . . . . . . . in order to consider on the basis of the materials which were before the Income-tax Officer and formed part of that record the order passed by the Income-tax Officer is 'erroneous' and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. " The next submission made on behalf of the assessee by the counsel is that once the Tribunal allowed the appeal, had acted arbitrarily and illegally in directing the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) for deciding the case again after perusal of pages 42 to 47, 54 and 67 of the annual report and account 1983-84 in determining the nature of the transaction and the feasibility of subjecting the aforesaid transaction to payment of sales tax. It has been urged that the appeal was heard by the Tribunal first on July 18, 1991, when the arguments of the counsel for the assessee were heard. It was adjourned to July 19, 1991, for the reply of the department. Learned counsel submitted that on that date neither any written reply nor any written note was given by the department and the hearing was completed on July 19, 1991. It has further been alleged that at no point of time up to July 19, 1991, either the annual report and the accounts of the Commission was produced before the Tribunal or any argument was ever heard with regard to pages 42 to 47, 54 and 55 and 67 of the report and as such the Tribunal has violated the principle of natural justice in placing reliance on the aforesaid documents without notice to the assessee or without giving any opportunity to the Commission to state its case regarding the contents contained in these pages. As regards the question of remand of the case by the Tribunal to the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) for examining the documents referred in the judgment and passing fresh orders is concerned, after hearing counsel for the parties and also after a perusal of the order of the Tribunal I am unable to accept the argument of the counsel for the assessee that the order directing the remand is either illegal or erroneous and uncalled for in the facts and circumstances of the case. A grievance has been raised on behalf of the assessee that the order of the Tribunal in remanding the case amounts to violation of the principle of natural justice. Therefore, I think the Tribunal was wholly justified in directing the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) to examine these documents for which the assessee will be afforded full opportunity to put forward its case regarding those documents and as such I am not inclined to interfere with the order of the Tribunal in so far as it directs the matter to be re-examined by the Deputy Commissioner (Executive ). However, in view of the fact that according to the terms of the agreement entered into between the Commission and the contractor, the goods have been supplied to the contractor on specific rate for execution of the works contract, it is settled that the goods did not pass to the contractor and the same could not amount to sale within the meaning of section 2 (h) of the Act. In the result the revision is disposed of with the direction that the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) will decide the case ignoring the observations made by the Tribunal before the operative portion of the judgment and examine the documents referred in the judgment of the Tribunal after due notice to the parties and after examining the facts of the documents, will decide the case applying the principles laid down by this Court is Hindustan Housing Factory [1989] 75 STC 233; (1989) UPTC 468 and Ansal Properties 1989 UPTC 1366 and the observations made in this judgment. However, there will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal concerned as provided as provided under section 11 (8) of the Act for passing consequential order. .;