JUDGEMENT
D. P. S. Chauhan, J.- -
(1.) THE problem of scarcity of newsprint paper in the country and catering of the need by importing it from foreign countries at a huge cost of foreign exchange led the Government of India to establish a newsprint paper project in the district of Moradabad through the National Newsprint and Paper Mills Limited (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as 'Nepa') where for proceedings for acquisition of land situate in village Budhan- pur Atmali, Tehsil Moradabad Sadar and Villages Bathuva Khera Atmali, Phaciapura Gannu Mustakham, Manpur Dattaram, Gajhera Sai, Tehsil Thakur- dwara, District Moradabad, started. THE State Government through Notification No. 2834/XVIII-4-10 (PP) Dated September 8, 1989 (published in U.P. Gagette Extraordinary dated September 8, 1989) as also corrigendum Notification No. 3548/XVIII-4-10 (PP) dated November, 7, 1989 (published in U. P. Gazette Extraordinary dated November 8, 1989) and Notification No. 2919/XVIII-4-10 (PP)-89 dated September 26, 1989 (published in U. P. Gazette Extraordinary dated September 27, 1989) issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') notified for general information that the land mentioned in Schedule thereto was urgenty needed for a public purpose, namely for establishment of a newsprint paper project for a planned industrial development of the district of Moradabad through Nepa. It was also stated in the said notification that the Governor being of the opinion that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act were applicable to the land, has directed under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act that the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act would not apply. THEse notifications were followed by a declaration made under Section 6 of the Act through Notification No. 4101/XVIII-4-10 (PP)-89 and No. 4262/XVIII-4-10 (PP)-89 both dated January 6, 1990 (Published in U. P. Gazette Extraordinary, dated January 8, 1990) contained a direction under Section 7 of the Act to the Collector, Moradabad for taking steps for acquisition of the land also for possession under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act without there being any award under Section 11 of the Act.
(2.) BY means of Writ Nos. 3134, 3330, 3332, 3334, 3335, 3336, 3337. 3338, 5445, 5560 and 9042 of 1990, the petitioners invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the proceedings relating to acquisition of their land The aforesaid notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act and declarations made under Section 6 of the Act are the subject matter of challenge in this writ petitions.
Under Rule 2 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of Court, 1952, with the consent of the counsel for the parties, all these petitions are being decided together as the purpose for which the acquisition has been made, is one and the same and the subject matter of challenge and the points for determination are common. Writ Petition No. 3330 of 1990 is being taken up as a leading case and the decision in this case will govern all the writ petitions.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and the learned Standing Counsel.
(3.) BY means of a supplementary counter affidavit filed in Writ No. 3330 of 1990, during the course of arguments, learned Standing Counsel raissd an objection of preliminary nature regarding the maintainability of the writ petition. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor, Delhi, 1974 SC 2077 and Smt. Ratni Devi v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi, 1975 SC 1699, an argument was built up that the petitioners being guilty of laches cannot maintain the petition as they instead of challenging the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act and declarations made under Section 6 of the Act at the earliest opportunity, allowed the proceedings under Section 5 of the Act to proceed.
In Aflatoon's and Smt. Ratni Devi's cases (supra) the facts before the Supreme Court were quite different than those herein the present case. In Aflatoon's case, a notification under Section 4 of the Act notifying the requirement of the land for planned development of Delhi was made on November 13, 1959, and a declaration under Section 6 of the Act, after disposal of the objections under Section 5-A of the Act, was made through notification dated March 18, 1966 and notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act requiring the petitioners to state their objections, if any, to the assessment of compensation were issued in the year 1V72. The validity of the acquisition proceedings was being challenged before the Delhi High Court by way of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the acquisition was not for public purpose but was for a company and the provisions of Part VII of the Act ought to have been complied with ; that since no part of the compensation came from the public exchequer, the acquisition was not for a public purpose and that the proceedings for acquisition violated the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution of India and there was unreasonable delay between the publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act and issuance of notice under Section 9 of the Act with the result that they were deprived of the benefit of appreciation in value of the property after the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act. The High Court dismissed the petition where against an appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court. In appeal, for the first time, it was agitated that the public purpose specified in the notification under Section 4 of the Act, namely "planned development of Delhi" was vague and as a result whereof they could not effectively exercise their right under Section 5-A of the Act. In the background of these facts, the Supreme Court, disallowing new plea being raised, observed that- "Nor do we think that the petitioners in the writ petitions should be allowed to raise this plea in view of their conduct in not challenging the validity of the notification even after the publication of the declaration under Section 6 in 1966. Of the two writ petition, one is filed by one of the appellants. There was apparently no reason why the writ petitioners should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notification issued in 1959 on the ground that the particulars of the public purpose were not specified. A valid notification under Section 4 is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners".;