R.R.K.Trivedi - (1.) IN this petition, Sri R. K. Pandey filed a caveat for respondent no. 4 and has filed a counter affidavit. Rejoinder affidavit has also been filed by the petitioners. I have heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri R. K. Pandey for respondent no. 4. Learned counsel for the parties have agreed that this writ petition may be heard and disposed of finally.
(2.) BY this writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 15th October, 1990, passed by the Deputy Director of Education, 1 Region, Meerut, which is Annexure-10 to the writ petition. This order has been passed by respondent no. 1 in exercise of his powers under Section 16-A (7) of U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and by this order respondent no. 1 has recognised the committee of management of which Shri Satya Narain Mahesh- wari and Shri Narendra Kumar Maheshwari are president and Manager respectively. Sri Ashok Khare, learned counsel for the petitioners, has assailed impugned order passed by respondent no. 1 on the ground that no reasons have been recorded by respondent no. 1 for accepting the claim of respondent no. 4. According to the learned counsel, the respondent no. 1 under Section 16-A (7) of the Act, exercising quasi judicial power, was under legal obligation to pass a speaking order and to record reasons for accepting the claim of one party and rejecting the claim of other party. Sri Ashok Khare has further submitted that the Deputy Director of Education under Section 16-A (7) of the Act cannot decide the dispute regarding election of rival management committee. The Deputy Director of Education has no jurisdiction to decide the validity of the election. BY the impugned order, the respondent no. 1 has only decided the dispute of election and has not adverted himself towards necessary- facts as to which party had been in actual control of the affairs of the institution. Sri R. K. Pandey learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 4 on the other hand, has submitted that the order passed by respondent no. 1 is perfectly legal and justified and does not suffer from any error of law. It has been contended that in the order the evidence and pleadings of both the parties have been noted in detail and after considering the same respondent no. 1 concluded that the committee of management headed by Narendra Kumar Maheshwari as Manager has been legally and validly elected and the same has rightly been recognised. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels and I have also perused the impugned order passed by respondeat no. 1, There is no dispute that under Section 16-A (7) of the Act, Regional Deputy Director of Education exercises quasi judicial powers for determining the dispute with respect to the Management of the institution. A bare perusal of the provisions contained in Section 16-A (7) of the Act will make it clear that the Regionl Deputy Director of Education is required to pass an order after affording reasonable opportunity to the rival claimants and after giving them opportunity to make representations in writing. Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Court in a number of decisions have expressed the view that the authority exercising quasi judicial power must disclose the reasons for its conclusion. In the case of M/s. Travancore Rayons Ltd. v. The Union of India, AIR 1971, SC 862, Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : "Necessity to give sufficient reasons which disclose proper appreciation of the problem to be solved and the mental process by which the conclusion is reached in cases where a non-judicial authority exercises judicial functions, is obvious. When judicial power is exercised by an authority normally performing executive or administrative functions, this court would require to be satisfied that the decision has been rached after due consideration of the merits of the dispute, uninfluenced by extraneous considerations of policy or expediency. The Court insists upon disclosure of reasons in support of the order on two grounds : one, that the party aggrieved in a proceeding before the High Court or this Court has the opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case were erroneous : the other, that the obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the executive authority invested with the judicial power". In another case of The Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. The Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785, Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 6 observed as under : "It is not suggested that the Collector should have made an elaborate order discussing the arguments of the appellants in the manner of a court of law. But the order of the Collector could have been a little more explict and articulate so as to lend assurance that the case of the appellants had been properly considered by him. If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative law, they may have to be so replaced it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explict reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi- judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must in form every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law." This Court also in a Full Bench case Ram Murti Saran v. State of U. P., AIR 1971, Alld. 54, observed as under : "Where the administrative authorities, which have not the habit of mind of acting judicially, are required to act judicially, they must give reasons for their orders as the giving of reasons. (i) give satisfaction to the party as it comes to know why an adverse order has been passed against it ; (ii) prevents or at least minisises arbitrariness and ensures the application of mind ; and (iii) makes the exercise of the constitutional power of the High Courts under Art. 226 and 227 and of the Supreme Court under Article 136 effective". A Division Bench of this court in the case of State of U. P. v. Managing Committee Arya Kanya Inter College, Jhansi, AIR 1973, Alld. 458 also expressed the same view.
(3.) NOW the impugned order passed by respondent no. 1 has to be considered in the light of the aforesaid legal position as to how far the respondent no. 1 has been able to record reasons for his conclusion given by the impugned order. From the perusal of the impugned order it appears that the respondent no. 1 firstly narrated under separate heads the evidence and pleadings of the parties and he concluded in favour of respondent no. 4 by simply saying that he perused the letters, complaint, representation and after perusing the evidence on record and the Scheme of administration and the arguments of the rival parties, I have reached to the conclusion that the committee of management of which Sri Narendra Kumar Maheshwari as Manager has been legally and validly elected. In my opinion, this manner of appreciation of the contention of the rival parties is not in controvance with the legal requirement regarding function of administrative authorities acting quasi judicially as laid down by this Court an Hon'ble Supreme Court. Sri Ashok Khare has rightly argued that the respondent no. 1 has not recorded any reason for accepting the claim of respondent no. 4 and for rejecting the claim of petitioner. The petitioner has filed a copy of its representation as Annexure-9 to the writ petition. Along with this representation as many as 35 documents were also filed. No reasons have been recorded for rejecting the evidence and submissions made on behalf of petitioner. The respondent no. 1 has only mentioned in heading Khand-GA, the case of the petitioner. In fact the respondeat no. 1 was required under law to record reasons for not accepting various grounds taken by petitioner to show that the committee of management of which Smt. Anandi Devi Gupta was legally and validly elected on 22nd February, 1990. It is true that the respondent no. 1 cannot be expected to record elaborate finding like a civil court but he ought to have disclosed his mind for not accepting various documents and contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners. From perusal of the impugned order it also appears that the respondent no. 1 expressed his disliking that Smt. Anandi Devi Gupta instead of appearing herself deputed somebody to pursue her case. There was nothing objectionable so far as this aspect of the case was concerned. From perusal of the representation filed by the petitioner and her case noted in the impugned order, the observation of respondent no. 1 to the effect that the petitioner only had been making complaint against respondent no. 4 is not justified. The petitioners also claimed election of the committee of management on 22nd February 1990 and filed evidence to prove the alleged election. All these evidence ought to have been considered and reasons should have been assigned for not accepting the same. In my opinion the respondent no. 1 has failed to decide the case in accordance with law and committed manifest error of law in passing the impugned order. So far as the second contention of Sri Khare that the respondent no. 1 has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute of election, is concerned, is not acceptable. In the present case, it is clear from the documents filed on record that the last election took place on 23rd February, 1986. Dispute pertains to Intermediate College and under the scheme of administration now applicable to such institutions provide that the committee of management could be allowed to remain in office only for three years and for a period of one month's thereafter for holding election. After expiry of the aforesaid period of three years and one month the committee of management cannot be allowed to function or remain in control. This provision in the scheme of administration has been introduced to avoid the possibility on the part of the managing committee in office to delay the election for indefinite period which was generally happening before such provision was introduced in the scheme of administration. As three years and one month's period had already expired none of the rival committees of management could be said to be in actual control of the affairs of the institution, in such circumstances the respondent no. 1 rightly adverted himself to test the legality and validity of the process of election claimed by rival committees of management claiming themselves to be legally elected committees. Sri Ashok Khare placed reliance in a Division Bench case Maharshi Sukhdeo Vidyalaya Shukartal v. Regional Deputy Director of Education 1st Region (D. D. R.) Meerut, 1985 ALJ 471. The Division Bench while saying that the Deputy Director has no jurisdiction to hold a detailed /enquiry and function like a Election Tribunal has observed that the Deputy Director of Education can prima facie satisfy himself about the validity of the election for purposes of recognising the committee of management for being allowed to be in actual control of the affairs of the institution. It is to be remembered that before section 16-A (7) was substituted by U. P. Act No. 26 of 1975 in the Statute book the function regarding recognising committee of management was discharged by District Inspector of Schools. Under section 16-A (7) of the Act in case of dispute the same function is now being discharged by the Deputy Director of Education and while determining such dispute the Deputy Director of Education can test the legality of election of the rival management committee for granting recognition. Thus in the facts and circumstances of the case, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondent no. 1 has no jurisdiction is devoid of any merits and cannot be accepted.;