N. N. Mithal, J. - (1.) Plaintiff's revision is directed against the order of the Court below, by which it has refused to direct a decree being passed against the defendant No. 3 under Order 37 Civil Procedure Code. It appears that the plaintiff had supplied certain materials to Mis. Maheshwari khetan Mills, Ramkola and in connection with their bills for the same certain sum was due to it. At that time the said Mill was under the control of a Receiver appointed by the Collector for the recovery of certain Government dues. Under the U. P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1974, the Unit in question was acquired and vested in U. P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. , respondent No. 1. Although the Act had come into force in 1971 yet at the instance of the erstwhile proprietors. Maheshwari Khetan Mills Ramkola, who had filed a writ petition, stay of delivery of possession had been granted by the High Court. This stay was vacated only on the dismissal of the writ petition some time in 1979, thereafter the property and assets of the Mills became vested in respondent No. 1. The plaintiff instituted the suit under Order 37 Civil Procedure Code against the State of U P. (defen dant No. 1), Collector Deoria (defendant No. 2), U. P. State Sugar Corpora tion Ltd. (defendant No. 4) and the U. P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. Unit Maheshwari Khetan Mills, Ramkola (Defendant No. 3 ). In pursuance of the summons, the Defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 4 obtained necessary permission from the Court to file a written statement and to put up defence to the plaintiff's claim. However, no such application in pursuance of summons was made by respondent No. 4, who was Defendant No. 3 in the Court below. In the result, the plaintiff made a prayer that the Court should immediately pronounce judg ment and pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff as against Defendant No. 3. The Court below, by its impugned order, refused to do soon the ground that already permission has been granted to other three defendants to contest the suit it did not think it proper to grant a decree to the plaintiff as against defen dant No. 3 at that stage. It is this order which has been challenged by the revisionist. Shri Kailash Narain, learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that the provisions of Order 37 Civil Procedure Code procedure for summary trial for certain kind of suits has been provided and according to its provisions if the defendant wants to raise any defence against the claim put up by the plain tiff, then he must, within ten days of the service on him of the summons of the case, seek permission from the Court to defendant the suit and if he fails to do so, the Court is bound to treat the allegations made in the plaint to be admitted by such a defendant. The plaintiff in such a case would be entitled to a decree for the amount claimed in the suit as against such defen dant. The question for consideration here is as to whether the Court had any discretion in the matter of granting a decree or not, and, secondly, whether the provisions of Order 37 of the Code could be applied to a case of the nature presently under consideration. Sub-section (2) of Rule 1 of Order 37 Civil Procedure Code reads thus:- (2) subject to the provisions of sub-rule (1) the order applies to the following classes of suits, namely, (a) suits upon bills of exchange, hundies and promissory notes, (b) suits in which the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest, arising,- (i) on a written contract; or (ii) on an enactment, where the sum sought to be recovered is a fixed sum of money or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty: or (iii) on a guarantee, where the claim against the principal is in respect of a debt or liquidated demand only. " A plain reading of provisions would immediately lead to the conclusion that it is neither a suit of the nature given in sub-clause (a) of sub-section 2 nor on; lying under Clauses (ii) and (iii) of sub-clause (b) of sub-section 2 of Rule 1 of Order 37 Civil Procedure Code. The only provision under which the present suit can be said to be covered in Clause (i) i. e. , in respect of suits where the plaintiff only seeks to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant with or without interest. Whether in the present case, it can be said that the money which the plaintiff is demanding is a debt or liquidated demand of money "payable" by the defendant ? The contract for the supply of gunny bags in question had been entered into by the Receiver who was appointed by the Collector Deoria and was incharge of the management Maheshwari Khetan Mills at the relevant time. It is true that the assets of the said Mills had already become vested in the U. P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. , in view of Section 3 of U. P. Act No. XXV of J97i, which come into force on 3rd July, 1971 but the actual management continued in the hands of the receiver. If the management has now come in the hands of the Corporation it cannot be said that the same liability attaches to the Corporation as was incurred by the Receiver. The liability may continue to rest with him in this respect in spite of his now ceasing to be the Receiver. All these questions are not free from difficulty butprima facie the amount claimed cajmot be said to be "money payable" by the defendant No. 3. If that be so. Order 37 Civil Procedure Code could not be pressed into service against it, or the Mills. There is yet another angle from which the aforesaid question can be viewed. The defendant No. 4 is a Corporation in which the entire assets of the Sugar Undertakings have become vested. The Defendant No. 3, however, is the unit which stands acquired and had become vested in defendant No. 4. As the defendant No. 3 has no separate identity apart from that of the defen dant No. 4, to my mind, they must be deemed to be one and the same, Corpo ration being a statutory body one of whose unit is defendant No. 3. When the defendant No. 4, has been granted permission by the Court to file its defence, it is not necessary that the defendant No. 3 should separately be given permis sion of the like nature. Apart from the above, whether the amount claimed can be said to be debt or liquidated demand against the Defendant 4 ? The matter again will have to be gone into at the trial of the suit. I have, therefore, no hesitation in saying that to the case of defendant No. 4 procedure provided for under Order 37 of the Code cannot be applied. The entire scheme behind the provision appears to be to provide summary proce dure if cases where the defendant cannot possibly have any "defence worth the name and as not meant to cover cases where the very liability is questioned. Before parting with this case I may clarify that the observation made by me above may not be taken a finding on any of the matters and are just obser vations for showing the prima facie nature of the claims of rival parties, and these do not bind the Court below in any manner. The Court will be free to take its own decision on meiits when the evidence comes before it in accor dance with law. In view of the above, I do not deem it proper to interfere with the order passed by the Court below. The order appears to be just and proper at that stage of the suit and in the circumstances of the case. Since the impugned order does not suffer with any infirmity or jurisdictional error, the present is not a case which may require any interference by this Court. The revision, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. In the circums tances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs of this Court. .;