S. D. Agarwala, J. - (1.) This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of a suit No. 29 of 1972 filed in the Court of Judge Small Causes, Deoband. The suit was filed by the opposite parties No. 3 and 4 against the petitioners treating the petitioner No. 1 as tenant and alleging the petitioner No. 2 to be sub tenant of petitioner No. 1. The case of the opposite parties No. 3 and 4 was that the petitioner No. 1 was their monthly tenant of the shop in suit at the rate of Rs. 18/- per mensem; that the petitioner No. 1 had sublet the shop in suit to the petitioner No. 2 Dhararmdas Shastri and he put him in exclusive possession of the shop and the petitioner No. 2 is now carrying on the business in the shop in suit. The case was contested by the petitioners on the ground that the shop in dispute had been taken on rent by the petitioner No. 1 in the year 1955 from the opposite parties No. 3 and 4 and that he has been carrying on business of medical stores in it since then. Petitioner No. 2 is the real brother-in-law of petitioner No. 1 and they are both partners in the medical stores business and there is no relationship of tenant or of sub-tenant between them, and the petitioners were carrying on the business of medical stores since 1955 in the premises in dispute, as partners. The trial Court by judgment dated 30th January, 1975 decreed the suit after recording a finding that the petitioner were not partners. The trial Court was of the view that the case would come under Section 12 (I) (b) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, U. P. Act XIII of 1972, hereafter referred to as the Act, and by virtue of Explanation (1) to Section 25 of the Act it would be deemed that the property had been sublet as the petitioner No. 1 has allowed the building to be occupied by a person who is not a member of his family. The judgment dated 30-1-1975 was impugned by the petitioners before the revisional Court under Section 26 of the Small Causes Court Act. The revisional Court by judgment dated 21st May, 1976 dismissed the revision. The revisional Court, however, recorded a finding that the petitioner No. 2 was sub-tenant of the petitioner No. 1 and therefore, ultimately the decree passed by the trial Court was affirmed by the revisional Court. The judgment of the revisional Court dated 21-5-1976 as well as of the Judge Small Causes Court dated 30-1-1975 have been impugned in the present petition. Learned counsel for the petitioners has raised three contentions before me. His first contention is that the finding of the trial Court that the petitioners were partners in the business could not have been upset by the trial Court. The revisional Court could have only remanded the matter to the trial Court in case it came to the conclusion that the finding was in any manner vitiated in law. The second submission of the learned counsel is that it was incumbent upon the trial Court as well as the rcvisional Court to have recorded a finding to since when the partnership commenced because that would be relevant for determining as to whether the property would be deemed vacant or not. The third submission of the learned counsel is that in case it is found as was found by the trial Court that the petitioner No. 2 was admitted as a partner by petitioner No. 1 prior to the commencement of the Act the provi sions of Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act would not apply and as such it could not have been held that the property had been sublet under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, he is not liable for ejectment. I have heard the learned counsel for the opposite parties No. 2 and 3 at length. The trial Court had recorded a finding to the effect that the petitioner No. 2 is the partner with the petitioner No. 1 and he has been carrying on business of medical stores in the shop in suit. This finding has been reversed by the re visional Court and after re-assessing the evidence on record came to the conclusion that in fact, the petitioner No. 2 is running business in the shop as sub tenant and not as a partner of petitioner No. 1. I have examined the judgment of the revisional Court. The revisional Court it appears re-assessed the evidence because it was of the view that certain material evidence was not considered by the trial Court. After re-assessing the evidence the abovementioned finding was recorded, namely, that the petitioner No 2 is a sub-tenant of petitioner No 1. In Laxmi Kishore v. Har Prasad Shukla (1979 A. W. C. 746), a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view that in case the revisional Court comes to the conclusion that the finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law it has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact itself. If it cannot be disposed of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact, it should send the case back after laying down proper guidelines. It cannot enter into the evidence, assess it and determine an issue of fact. This Court further held that in case there is no evidence to sustain a finding on a particular issue of fact, it can ignore that finding. Same would be the case where the finding is based on inadmissible evidence. In such cases the Bench 1-eld that the revisional Court was justified in deciding the question of fact itself because the evidence is all one way. In the instant case the trial Court had recorded a finding that there was a relationship of partners between the petitioner No. 1 and 2 This finding was set aside by the revisional Court after assessing various evidence on the record. This evidence was not all one way The Court had to apply its mind and to accept one version or the other. In the circumstances, the principle laid down in the case of Laxmi Kishore (supra) would clearly apply and the revisional Court did not have jurisdiction to set aside the finding of fact record ed by the trial Court after re-assessing the evidence on the record. In the result the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, is well founded. In regard to the second submission also, in my opinion, since the peti tioner has alleged that since 1955 when the property was taken on rent the petitioners have been carrying on business as partners in the shop in dispute, it was necessary to record a finding as from when the partnership commenced, if partnership was established, because on this finding depended the further question as to whether the petitioner No. 2 would be deemed as sub-tenant of petitioner No 1 or whether the provisions of Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act would apply or not In regard to the third submission, Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act lays down that a landlord or a tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family. Section 12 (2) of the Act provides that in the case of a non-residential building, where a tenant carrying on business in the building admits a person who is not a member of his family as a partner or a new partner, as the case may be, the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. Section 12 (1) (b) has to be read along with sub- section (2) of Section 12 in the case of non-residential building, intention of the Legislature appears to be that in case a tenant is carrying on business in partnership in the property in dispute who is not a member of his family prior to the commencement of the Act he would not be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. It is only after the commencement of the Act that if a tenant admits a person to be a partner who is not a member of his family, he would be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. Sub section (2) of Section 12 of the Act has been held to be prospective by a Full Bench of this Court Smt. Kesar Bai v Distt Judge and others, (1980 A. L. R. 165 ). Therefore, in a case where in a partnership prior to the commencement of this Act a person has already been admitted, sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act would not apply and the tenant cannot be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. In the case of a non-residential building therefore in such a case resort to Section 12 (1) (b) cannot be made. In the circumstances, so far as the third submission of the learned counsel is concerned, it is also well founded. In view of the above submission, it is necessary that the entire case be reconsi dered by the trial Court, in the light of the observation made by me above. In the result, the petition is allowed. The judgments dated 30-1-1975 and 21-5-1976 are quashed. The matter is remanded to the Court of Judge Small Causes Deoband, Saharanpur for decision afresh in accordance with law In the light of the observations made by me above. The suit being of the year 1972, the Judge, Small Causes Court, Deoband, Saharanpur is directed to decide the suit very expeditiously. Parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs of this petition. .;