M. Wahajuddin, J. - (1.) This application has been moved by one Vishnath Prasad, praying that the preliminary order of the District Magistrate, respondent No, 1 dated 24-1-1981 and the other order of the same date, appointing opposite party No. 2 as a Receiver of the institution involved in the proceedings be both quashed. The impugned orders are Annexures "2" and "3". Annexure "2" runs as follows J- "whereas, I. R. N. Sinha, District Magistrate, Ballia, am satisfied from the report of Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Ballia, dated 12-1-1981 that because of the rival claims of the 1st and llnd parties, mentioned above, to be the manager with two managing committees of Shri Dona Bhagat Junior High School, Baghauli, P. S. Bansdih Road, district Ballia, there exist a dispute likely to cause breach of peace concerning its possessions and control of management of the said institution situate in village Baghauli, Police Station Bansdih Road within my jurisdiction. I, therefore, order the parties to attend my Court in person or by pleader on 9-2-1981 at 10 A. M. in my Court and to put in written statement of their respective claims in respect of the facts of actual possession of the said pro perty. As it is an emergent nature of dispute likely to cause breach of peace, I direct both the parties not to interfere in the said management of the above institu tion till further orders. " Vide Annexure "3" another order of the same date the very Officer, i. e. , the District Magistrate, Ballia, appointed the Sub-Divisional Magis trate, Ballia, as receiver of the institu tion. The two grounds that have been urged during arguments are i- (a) the proceedings could not be initiated under Section 147 Cr. P, C. , and is bad in law, (b) in a proceeding under Sec tion 147, Cr. P. C. neither any attachment can be made, nor any receiver can be appointed. The learned Counsel for the appli cant has relied upon a number of rulings in support of his conten tions. The Onkar Nath Tewari v. Sri Ram Anjore 1973 Cr. L. J. 1885, has been cited. In that case certain disputes cropped up between Ram Anjore Misra and another 1st Party and Onkar Nath and others 2nd party, regarding the administration and management of the School, the validity of its Managing Committee and the validity of the appointment of the Principal, each party claiming to be legally entitled to manage the institution. The Magistrate passed the following preliminary order;- "whereas I am satisfied from the report of the S. I. Police dated 22-5-1969 that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists regarding the right of user of the Administration, the Management, Managing Committee and the Principalship of the Higher Secondary School, Lalganj. . . . . . . . including landed property and buildings and land appurtenant thereto between. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1st party and. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Second party. Whereas I consider the case one of emergency Therefore, I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . attach the subject in dis pute and direct the S. O. to execute the order of attachment and to put the property under dispute in the custody of the District Inspector of Schools. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . who may be assisted by a Senior Officer of Education Department. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and who shall take over the entire adminis tration of the said school, includ ing the management, the manag ing committee and the principal-ship of the said subject of dispute and shall perform such of the duties as are enunciated in the Education Code or other Educa tional enactment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . in cluding receiving due tuition and other fee including Government grants disbursing due and legiti mate salary to ail concerned and taking up examinations and announcing results and the like and shall keep proper accounts of public fund involved in the entire affairs aforesaid and produce in this Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It is further ordered that the two parties aforesaid or their accomplice or friends including students. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Asstt. Teachers Lecturers, Demonstrators, Labo ratory Assistants, Clerks and the peons or the like shall not inter fere with the exercise of the right of user by the supurdar afore said. " Such order was passed both under Sections 145 and 147 Cr. P. C. It was held that while the 'land belong ing to the School or its buildings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . constitute land and mov able properties of the nature of furni ture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . may also go along with land. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to enter into respective titles of the two parties as validly competent to con stitute the Managing Committee or to administer the affairs of the College. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . is a matter within the province of a Civil Court and not of a Criminal Court. ' It was held that the question of title are out of place in proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. Any opinion upon the legality of combining the proceedings under Sections 145 and 147, Cr. P, C. both was not express ed and it was simply held that pro ceedings under Section 147 Cr. P. C. could not be decided on affidavits, as the law then existed. The next case that has been relied upon is Muktanand Chaturvedi v. State 1977 A. W. C. 602. It was also a case of education institution. On the facts of that case Hon'ble H. N. Kapopr, J. , found that from the reading of the preliminary order, read as a whole, it is clear that the proceedings related to immovable property only and not in respect of management. It was further held that in such situa tion proceedings could be initiated under Section 145, Cr. P. C. , and an order of attachment under Section 146 Cr. P. C. could also be passed. On such findings and conclusions, the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 145, Cr. P. C. as well as under Section 146, Cr. P. C. was upheld and the revision was dis missed. In the aforesaid ruling the case of Onkar Nath Tewari (supra) was also considered, observing that on the basis of that authority also the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. could be initiated, in case of dispute about the possession of immovable property of institution as distinguished from simply the right of Management of such institu tion. The next case relied upon is Sheo Mural Upadhyaya v. Stote 1975 A. L. R. 177. It is a pronouncement of Hon'bls P. N. Bakshi, J. The dispute related to the educational institution. Both sides claimed right to manage the educational institution. It was held that attachment under Section 145, Cr. P. C. was illegal and the Magis trate could proceed only under Sec tion 147, Cr. P. C. , if the Magistrate is of the opinion that Section 147 Cr. P. C. is attracted. On which point opinion was not expressed. It was further observed as follows;- "the application filed by Brij Pat Singh under Section 145 (5), Cr. P. C. which is pending can be legally considered even during the continuance of the proceed ing under Section 141, Cr. P. C. " Vide this pronouncement the question whether Section 147. Cr. P. C. , is attracted was left open, but on the facts of the case Section 145, Cr. P. C. , was held to be inapplicable, making the following observation on the facts of the case:- "in the present case it is evident that both the parties are claiming a right to manage the institution. Personal rivalry and bickerings between the parties should not be allowed to hamper the smooth working of an educa tional institution. Section 145, Cr. P. C. concerns itself with disputes concerning immovable property. This is not a case in which the contesting parties are claiming possession over immov able property. The right to manage an educational institution cannot be deemed to be covered within the provisions of Section 145, Cr. P. C. where the Court is merely concerned with disputes regarding possession of immov able property. In this view of the matter, the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. and the preliminary order which has been passed there under are mis conceived and not legally main tainable. " The next case relied upon is Hausla Bux Singh v. Smt. Prembala 1981 A. L. J. 783. In that case neither any earlier case law is cited, nor consider ed. The case also did not relate to right to manage any institution, nor did it relate the right to possession of any property of the institution. The case related the right of user of passage. The plea raised was that the construction being carried by the other side obstructed the passage. The Magistrate directed that in view of the breach of peace the construc tion be stopped meanwhile. In that background and context, it was urged that under Section 147, Cr. P. C. the Magistrate had no power to issue any interim order and could direct the removal of any obstruction only at the stage of final order, hence the violation of the interim order did not entail any penal consequences and any proceedings under Section 188, I. P. C. could not be initiated. It is a well settled law that individual facts of the cases differ and it is the background and context in which any observation has been made has to be borne in mind particularly, when there are conflicting views expressed. The next case referred to by the applicant's Counsel, regarding the view of some other High Courts pointing out the material difference between the two provisions, i. e. Sec tion 145 Cr. P. C. and Section 147 Cr. P. C. in respect of scope and subject of dispute, is Uchab Chandra v. Khirod Chaudhry 1972 Cr. LJ. 1148. In this case following other rulings of various High Courts have also been con sidered; Ahmmakiitty v. Kunjavam 1967 Ker. LJ. 450, Phillip v. Velayudban 1964 Ker. L. T. 292, Trijugi Tewari v. State 1963 A. LJ. 784, Rameshwar Rai v. Raghu A. I R. 1961 Pat. 369, Ram Lal v. Chunni Lal A. I. R. 1960j. K. 66. Mukul Ranjan Chaiterjee v. Champa Bala Roy A. I. R. 1966 Cal. 231, and Rudi v. Ram Kumar A. I. R. 1955 Raj. 75. Stress has been laid upon material difference between the scope as well as the subject of dispute in two kinds of proceedings, observing that the two proceedings cannot be equated. It would, however, appear that in support of the arguments by the other side that while enacting sub-section (1) of Section 147, the legislature intended that as far as possible the Magistrate may exercise all powers during the enquiry which are avail able to him under Section 145. Cr. P. C. the cases of Trijugi Tewari (supra) and Mukul Ranjan Chatterjee (supra) were cited and it was oberved that the Hon'ble Judge was unable to accept the view expressed in the case of Trijugi Tewari (supra ). This Court however, has to consider the reason ings contained in the pronouncement of this Court. In the case of Trijugi Tewari which is relied upon by the opposite side's Counsel, Hon'ble W. Broome J. held that a Magistrate acting under Section 147, Cr. P. C. can attach the land or water Involved in the dispute before him during the pendency of the proceedings in exercise of powers conferred by last proviso to clause (4) of Section 145, Cr. P. C. Reliance was placed upon the case of Mukul Ranjan Chatterjee. The following observation made in Trijugi Tewari case are important; "in either case the subject-matter of the dispute, viewed from the broad common sense angle, is the immovable property itself. More over, both under Section 145 and under Section 147 the primary object of the proceedings is to avoid a breach of the peace, and it seems an odd conclusion to draw that whereas the legislature intended to grant Magistrate the power to forestall such a breach during the pendency of a case under Section 145, it refused or omitted to grant a similar power to avoid a breach during the pendency of proceedings under Section 147. " The view taken is that the proceedings both under Section 145, Cr P. C. and under Section 147, Cr. P. C. are of the same nature. Approached from the broad common sense angle and that being the position it could not be the intention of the legis lature to give powers of interim attachment in the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. while omitting to grant such powers under Sec tion 147, Cr. P. C. when both the proceedings are directed to prevent the breach of peace, if interim attach ment is to serve that objective in case of proceedings under Section 14d, Cr. P. C. it would equally serve such objective in case of proceedings under Section 147, Cr. P. C. with approach from such angle, the Magistrate cannot be devoid of such powers under Section 147, Cr, P. C. proceedings as to let the parties have a free hand until final orders are passed. The case of Trijugi Tewari was neither referred, nor considered in the case of Hausla Bux. In the arguments urged by the learned Counsel for the applicant a distinction was made between the new Cr. P. C. and the old Cr, P. C. It was urged that the pronounce ments based on the old Cr. P. C. regarding power of attachment may not hold good now. It would appear that the old as well as the new Cr. P. C. under Section 147 (2) provide that the provisions of Section 145, Cr. P. C. shall so far as may be apply in the case of such enquiry. It is submitted that while under the old Cr. P. C. the power of interim attachment was contained under Section 145 Cr. P. C. itself and interim attachment may have been permissible in view of the language of Section 147 (2) Cr. P. C. it would not be so, when under the new Cr. P. C. such powers are not contained in Section 145, Cr. P. C. and there is another section, namely, Section 146 Cr. P. C. providing for interim attachments and Section 146 Cr. P. C. has not been made applicable under sub-section (2) of Section 147, Cr. P. C. In that connection, firstly, it may be observed that the principle laid down in the case of Trijugi Tewari is not based upon the language of Section 147 (2) Cr. P. C. The principle laid down in that ruling is that the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. and 147 Cr. P. C. are of similar nature, both relating to apprehension of breach of peace centering round dispute over immovable property, and it being so, when powers of interim attachment exist in proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. , they would also so exist in the proceedings under Sec tion 147 Cr. P. C. as well. It is noteworthy that the legislature itself by enacting Section 147 (4) in the new Cr. P. C. has recognized the two proceedings to be of the same nature as to provide for converting proceedings commenced under sub section (1) of Section 145 into pro ceedings under Section 147 Cr. P. C. and vice versa, recording reasons there for, and continuing the very proceeding instead of dropping one proceeding and initiating the other one passing any fresh orders under sub-section (1) of the two sections, as the case may be. It would further appear that though a separate section namely, Section 146 has been provided in the new Cr. P. C. laying down the powers for interim attachment, Section 146 is not an independent section nor it has any independent existence. But for Section 145 Cr. P. C. the provision of Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. would be meaningless. Section 146 (1) provides that in certain situation after order under sub-section (1) of Section 145 is passsed at any time, the interim orders as laid down in Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. can be passed by the Magistrate. I may also mention that it is not that such powers have been provided for the first time, they al ready existed under Section 145 old Cr. P. C. but the legislature while enacting the new Cr. P. C. for a better arrangement of the provisions of such proceedings made it a separate section. The same view has been taken is the case of Day Ram Sharma v. U. P. State 1975 A. C. C. 227, hold ing that proceedings under Section 146 Cr. P. C. are continuance of proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. and such proceeding is part or compliment of it and has no in dependent existence. In the circum stances, the case of Trijugi Tewari will have the same force notwith standing the enactments of new Cr. P. C. and Section 146, Cr. P. C, will be taken to be a part of and compliment to Section 145, Cr. P. C. without having an independent existence. I may also mentiond that in the case of Irshad Ahmad v. State 1978 A. C. C. 304, it has been held that by applying the provisions of Section 145, Cr. P. C. to proceedings under Section 147 Cr. P. C. the legislature thought it fit that the emergency powers should exist in the proceedings under Sec tion 147 Cr. P. C. also otherwise odd consequences may follow. In fact, if such powers are not held to exist, the very object of prevention of breach of peace, for which Section 147 Cr, P. C. has been enacted, would be defeated. In the case of Irshad Ahmad the case of Fakhruddin v. Mushtaq Ahmad A. I R. 1949 Alld. 616, was distinguish ed. The view expressed in Devi Dayal v. Murlidhar Misra 1945 A. W. R. 731, was dissented from. Thus, in this case all the earlier rulings of this Court have been considered. So far as the powers of attach ment are concerned, after consider ing the nature of the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. and 147, Cr. P. C. and further consider ing that for the purpose of enquiry Section 145 Cr. P. C. provision have been made applicable to proceedings under Section 147 Cr. P. C. I am of the view that power of interim attachment and orders must exist and Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. is just compliment and part of Section 143 Cr. P. C. and has no independent existence. The next point arising for con sideration is as to which of the two sections would apply to this case. It is not that neither Section 145 nor Section 147 Cr. P. C. would be attracted and where there is any dis pute regarding the management of any institution, there will be no remedy under any of the two sections. The views have been divergent, as laid down earlier. In the case of Muktanand Chaturvedi v. State (supra) it was held that the proceed ing related to improvable property only and not in respect of manage ment, hence Section 145, Cr. P. C. was attracted. In the case of Sheo Murat Upadhyaya v. State (supra) Hon'ble P. N. Bakshi, I, held that where both sides claimed to manage the educational institution, the dis pute would not be covered under Section 145, Cr. P. C. and the Magis trate could proceed only under Section 147, Cr. P. C. if he was of such opinion. Hon'ble P. N. Bakshi, J. however, did not express opinion whether Section 147 Cr. P. C. would be attracted, but the implication of his pronouncement is that the dis pute will be covered under Section 147, Cr. P. C. As observed earlier, it is not that no remedy, at all, would be available under the provisions of the Cr. P. C. In the case of Bhagwati Din Tewari v. State of U. P. 1978 A. C. C. 24, the report made was as follows on which the proceedings were initiated:- "i have to report to you that the three Colleges in the Samodhpur College Campus, P. S. Sarpataha Jaunpur, the Inter mediate College, the Degree College and the Physical Educa tion section have become hot beds of intrigue and violence between the two rival parties claiming the management. On 5th September there was a clash resulting in one death. While investigation is pending in the offence committed in the clash, the apprehension of further breach of peace continues. It is, therefore, recommended that to avert further breach of peace of the three Colleges should be attached under Section 145 Cr. P. C. immediately. " The following observations have been made in that case by Hon'ble B. N. Katju, J. which are signifi cant;- 'it is true that in the applica tion moved by Bans Bahadur Singh on 3-12-1973 it is mention ed that there is a dispute between the parties with respect to the right to manage the colleges and it is mentioned in the report of the S. O. Sarpataha dated 4-12-1973 that a dispute exists between the parties with regard to the right to manage the colleges and also with respect to their land and buildings but in my opinion the real dispute bet ween the parties is with respect to the right to manage the Colleges and not with respect to the possession of the buildings and the land of the Colleges. The dispute between the parties with respect to the right to manage the Colleges is essentially a dispute regarding the right of user of the buildings and land of the Colleges as contemplated by Sec tion 147 Cr. P. C. and is not a dispute with respect to the posses sion of the buildings and land of the colleges as contemplated by Section 145, Cr. P, C. as the phrase 'user of land' in Section 147 Cr. P. C. is of wide import. It may be mentioned that the word 'land' in Section 147 Cr. P. C. has the meaning given to it in sub-section (2) of Section 145, Cr. P. C. " On a perusal of the preliminary order passed in the present case also it is manifest that the two parties had rival claims to the Managership with two Managing Committees. The dispute, which was found likely to cause breach of peace, concerns the possession and control of management of the institu tion concerned. True that while inviting written statements per later part of the order respective claims in respect of the facts of actual possession of the said property has been invited but actually the sub stance of the order clearly indicates that the dispute concerns the right to manage the institution. While the right to manage the institution may also involve management of land and buildings, but the dispute is not confined to the possession of the building and the land of the institu tion. The right to manage an institution has wider implication and possession of land and buildings or other assets of the institution is only a complement to such a right and ancillary to it, but the main dispute is always with regard to the right to manage the institution and whenever the dispute is regarding any right of use of any land or water, which would cover right to manage an institution, it is Section 147 Cr. P. C. which would be attracted. In fact the expression 'water and land' has the same meaning as assigned to it under Section 145 (2 ). Cr. P. C. Under Section 145, Cr. P. C. the dispute is to be concerning any land or water, while under Section 147 Cr. P. C. the dispute relates to a right of user of any land or water. Where any educational institution is concerned, it is right to manage the institution which is the real dispute and such right to manage covers the right of user of 'land or water', which is necessarily ancillary to it. When that is the position, I feel that it is the nature of dispute which has to be taken into consideration and as in case of institutions the main dispute is concerning the right to manage the institution including right to manage the land, building etc. of the institution, the appropriate section which would apply is Section 147cr. P. C. Each case has to be decided in the light of its individual facts and circumstances. I have referred to the preliminary order passed in this case and if the order is read and interpreted as a whole, it is manifest that the dispute involves the right to manage the institution and when a right is involved in that sense covering user. Section 147, Cr. P. C. is attracted. The result is that I do not find any force in this application under Section 482 Cr. P. C. and the application is dismissed. .;