- (1.) This is a plaintiffs second appeal in a suit for the declaration that the three orders passed against him were illegal, ultra vires, unconstitutional and arbitrary. The first order is an order dated ll/12th Oct, 1966 stopping the passes and P.T.Os. of the plaintiff for one year. The second order is an order of the District Controller of Stores, Gorakhpur, dated 2/4th Sept., 1967 stopping the increment of the plaintiff for one year with cumulative effect The third order is an order of the Assistant Controller of Stores, Gorakhpur dated 10/11th Sept., 1967 stopping the passes and P.T.Os. of the plaintiff for one year. So far as the first and the third orders are concerned, they exhausted themselves long ago and there being no prayer for any consequential relief no declaration of their invalidity could be granted, and the lower appellate court is right in saying so. With regard to the second order there is a prayer for a consequential relief for the declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to emoluments consequent upon the declaration of the invalidity of the order.
(2.) The only ground on which the validity of the order was attacked before me was that the disciplinary authority has not given any reasons for the order. Particular attack was directed on this ground not so much against the impugned order of the District Controller of Stores, Gorakhpur, but against the order passed by the appellate authority rejecting the plaintiff's appeal by an order dated 3rd Oct., vide Ext. A-18. The order reads as under : "DCOS(GKP)/D Discussed. There is no case for review of the orders already passed. The applicant may be informed accordingly. Sd/- S. N. Dutt. 3/10" Before that order there is a direction dated 28th Sept., which reads as under : "Dy.CO.S. DCOS(GKP)/Depot may please discuss. S. N. DUTT 28/9" As would appear from Ext. A-19, whereby the said order was communicated to the plaintiff by the District Controller of Stores, the order was passed by the Deputy Controller of Stores and the contents of Ext. A-18 referred to above do show that the Deputy Controller of Stores passed his order after discussing the matter with the District Controller of Stores, Gorakhpur, and, it appears, after applying his mind to the matter. This order has to be seen in the light of the impugned order dated 2/4th Sept., 1967 which is the order of the District Controller of Stores and which was sought to be declared illegal, ultra vires, unconstitutional and arbitrary under relief (B) claimed in the plaint. Either the impugned order of the District Controller of Stores could be said to have merged in law in the order dated 3rd Oct., 1967 of the Deputy Controller of Stores, or not to have so merged therein. According to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. V/s. Mohammed Nooh, 1958 AIR(SC) 86) (para. 13) there is no merger of orders in a case of this kind and if that be the true position, the order of the Deputy Controller of stores, not having been challenged in the plaint, no relief can be granted to the plaintiff on the basis that the order was illegal or ultra vires. Nevertheless even on the footing that the impugned order of the District Controller of Stores dated 2/4th Sept., 1967 had merged in the order dated 3rd Oct., 1967 of the Deputy Controller of Stores, the reasons given in the order dated 2/4th Sept., 1967 by the District Controller of Stores have to be read into the order of the Deputy Controller of Stores dated 3rd Oct., 1967. The order of the District Controller of Stores, Gorakhpur dated 2/4th Sept., 1967 is Ext. 8 on the record. It is impossible to say in respect of this order that it does not give adequate reasons for imposing the punishment of withholding increment for one year from the next due date, with cumulative effect against the plaintiff, more particularly when that order is read along with the previous papers on the file after the service of the show cause notice by the District Controller of Stores to the plaintiff against his view that the punishment proposed by the Assistant Controller of Stores did not appear to him to be sufficient. Thus the only ground on which the appeal was pressed before me has no merit. The appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances I would direct the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.;