K. M. Dayal, J. - (1.) Heard Sri Jagdish Swarup for the appellant and the learned Advocate General for State and the counsel for Town Area Committee, Pipraich, Gorakhpur, the respondent. The suits were filed claiming an injunction against Town Area Committee Pipraich, district Gorakhpur restraining it from imposing or realising tax as "circumstances and Property Tax" from the plaintiff. It so appears that the Town Area Committee imposed the tax on the plaintiffs under Section 14 (1) (f) of the U. P. Town Areas Act, 1914 as the tax on their Circumstances and Property. That Act is hereinafter referred to as the "act". The tax was challenged on grounds, inter alia, that the tax beyond Rs. 250/- under the aforesaid head was wholly illegal and ultra vires in view of Article 276 (2) of the Constitution of India. It was mentioned in paras 9 to 14 that the Rules framed by the Local Self Government Department on July 20, 1950 (i. e. after the commencement of Constitution of India), were invalid and ultra vires and an injunction was sought, on that basis. Under Rule 2 the tax was to be assessed separately in two parts. Firstly on the circumstances and secondly on the property. Rule 3 applied to the tax on circumstances at the rate of one anna in a rupee on income; and it was mentioned in clause (g) thereof that the total tax assessed should not exceed a sum of Rs. 250/- per year, in Rule 4 it was provided that the tax on property could be imposed at the rate of 12% on annual rental value not exceeding Rs. 2000/- including the tax levied under Rule 3. Shri Jagdish Swaroop relied upon the case of M/s. R. R. Engineering Co. v. Zila Parishad, Bareilly, A. I. R. 1980 S. C. 1088. He argued that by the impugned rules two distinct taxes were sought to be levied. Firstly a tax based on Income and secondly a tax based on property. He argued that the tax was a composite tax based on a man's financial position his status as a whole. Rule 3 was not merely referable to income but the tax was to be charged at the rate of one Anna per Rupee (6 ) on a persons' income. Income was the sole basis. Such tax was directly referable to and could be levied under clause (d) of Section 14 (1) of the Act. Rule 4 levies tax on property and nothing else. It is in the nature of a tax on property as contemplated by Section 14 (1 ). The clauses (a), (b), (c) and (e) attempt to tax the property. Rule 4 does the same. That changes the complexion of the tax levied. It may further be noted that the tax under Clause (e) cannot be levied if one is already taxed under Clauses (a), (b) and (c ). It appears that under the garb of these rules the Town Area wanted to impose the tax levied under clauses (a) (b), (c) and (d), again under clause (f) of Section 14 of the Act. I find sufficient force in the argument of Sri Jagdish Swaroop that it was not permissible to split up and levy taxes separately on income and property and then name it as "circumstances and Property Tax". Two taxes assessed and levied under separate heads and on different basis could not be totaled and named as "circumstances and Property Tax". Rules 3 and 4 framed under the Act, maintain the distinction in the two types of taxes. Their separate levy and entity is not changed by totaling up the two and giving a different name to the sum. It has been held from time to time that it is a Tax on "circumstances and Property". It has been referred to as a tax on 'status'. No doubt circumstances can be referred to income upto some extent, but that cannot be equated with Income. A person may be having a large income. But he may be indebted and out of the income a large portion may be consumed by the debts. If the tax is merely on 'income", the debts may be irrelevant. But if it is on circumstances the debt will be one of the most crucial circumstance and cannot be ignored. Similar will be the case of two persons having same income. But their circumstances may be quite different. One having large family, children receiving education, residing in Hostels or such other expenses. The other may be having a small family. Thus income being the same, the circumstances of two persons widely differ. The same may be true about the property. The tax is to be levied on the owner. The property may be mortgaged or leased may not be in possession of the owner. The "property" under clause (f) of sub- section (1) of Section 14 of the Town Areas Act has to be read in context of circums tances. It is not a tax under clauses (a) (b) (c) or (e) thereof when the land or buildings is to be taxed. The circumstances will not be merely the rental value, Other incidental charges in respect of, or income from the property will also be relevant. Cattle, vehicles, Boats trees valuable securities, cash etc. may also be property which could be directly referable to circumstances of a person. The Rule 4 in question completely overlooks this aspect and merely taxes the rental value of immovable properties, which the liable to tax under other clauses e. g. (a) (b) (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. Learned Advocate General wanted to argue that the tax imposed under the rules was not a tax under the 'circumstances and Property' head. I, however, am unable to accept the same. The preamble to Rules says; "rules regarding the limitations, restrictions and rate subject to which the circumstances and property tax shall be levied by Town Area Committee," Rule 2 reads as under: "the tax shall be assessed on every person on whom it is imposed, in two separate parts, namely (1) on his circumstances (2) on the property, if any, owned by him, and the aggregate of the sums so determined on both the counts shall constitute the total composite amount payable by him". There is no scope for doubt that the Rules relate to the Circumstances and Property Tax under which the plaintiffs are sought to be assessed. It was lastly urged by the learned Advocate General that the rules that have been challenged in the suit had already been considered and upheld by the Supreme Court, in Ram Narain v. State of U. P. and others, A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 18. It may be useful to give the brief facts of that case at this stage. Ram Narain filed a writ petition challenging the levy of Circumstances and Property Tax on him by Town Area Committee, Karhal. He resided in the Town of Mainpuri. He carried out business of plying a motor bus. Town of Karhal fell in the route and the passengers were dropped and picked up at Karhal bus stand. There was also booking office of the appellant within the limit of Town Area Karhal. The petition was filed on the ground that the appellant did not reside within the Town Area limits and that he did not carry on any trade or business in the Town Area and as such no Circumstances and Property Tax could be levied on him by the Town Area. The main contention was that as he did not reside within the Town Area limits, no tax could be levied on him under Rule 3. It was held that Rule 3, which permitted levy of tax on persons carrying on business within the Town Areas notwithstanding that they did not reside there, was valid. The aspect of the Rules involved in the present case was not considered. How far the judgments in one case could be binding as precedents in another case was considered the Supreme Court in M/s. Raval and Co. v. K. G. Ram Chandran and others (1974) 2 S. C. C. 424. It was held, "but we must point out that the general observations therein should be confined to the facts of those cases. Any general observation cannot apply in interpreting the provisions of an Act unless this Court has applied its mind to and analysed the provisions of that particular Act". I am unable to accept that the validity of the Rules as challenged in the present case was involved in the case of Ram Narain (supra) or the decision on that case was binding in the present case. In the result, I hold that the Rules framed on 20th July, 1950, as per Notification published in U. P. Gazette on July 22, 1950, are ultra vires and do not fall under the provisions of clause of (f) of sub- section (1) of Section 14 of the Town Areas Act, 1914. The present appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court are set aside and that of the trial Court are restored with costs throughout. .;