Gopi Nath, J. - (1.) THIS is a revision from an order passed by the District Judge, Saharanpur dated 11-8-1980. By the impugned order leave has been granted under Sec. 18 of the Religious Endowment Act, 1863 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to the opposite-parties to institute a suit against the applicant for the following relief :- that the applicant be restrained from selling or in any manner alienating or disposing of any property endowed to Harihar Ashram Pahari Bazar, Kankhal or to Shiyji Mahraj installed in the temple known as Maha Mritunjaya Mahadev Mandir, Kankhal and to restore the boundary wall of the Harihar Ashram and to remove the applicant from the post of Manager and Trustee of the said institution. An application under Sec. 18 of the Act was filed to obtain permission to file the suit under Sec. 14 of the Act on the allegation that the applicant of the said application were the worshippers of the deity installed in the temple and were interested in the religious institution known as Harihar Ashram and the opposite party the applicant in the present revision was dealing with the property of the endowment as his personal property and trying to alienate the same.
(2.) LEARNED counsel for the applicant has conceded that the property in dispute is endowed property of the Harihar Ashram Shivji Mahraj installed in the temple mentioned above. The application was mainly contested on the ground that the applicant who was the opposite-party in the court below was the owner of the property and consequently could deal with it in any manner he liked and the case was not covered by the provisions of the Religious Endowments Act. The applicants of the application under Sec. 18 who are the opposite-parties to the revision are the Mahants and office bearers of the Juna Akhara. According to the opposite-parties the property in dispute is the property of the endowment created in the name of Harihar Ashram and Shivji Mahraj installed in the temple and it is a public trust. They have alleged that they being worshippers of the deity, are persons interested in the religious institution and the trust and are entitled to file the application for permission to sue under Sec. 14 of the Act. The trial court after a detailed discussion held that the persons who had filed the petition under Sec. 18 were persons interested with in the meaning of that section ; that the institution was a religious institution and the properties in dispute belonged to it. It further held that the properties did not vest in the applicant and they were not his personal property. The court further found that the petitioners-opposite-parties had made out a prima facie case for the grant of the permission prayed for under Sec. 18. Aggrieved by the order, the present revision has been filed. Learned counsel for the applicant urged that the opposite-parties who filed the petition under Sec. 18 were not the persons interested as they were not personally interested in either the management of the institution or the security of the properties. It was urged that the opposite-parties being only the office bearers of Juna Akhara were not the proper persons to apply for the permission under Sec. 18 of the Act. It may be observed that the opposite-parties in their petition alleged that they were the worshippers of the deity and they used to go to the temple and offer prayers and were closely connected with the management of the Harihar Ashram, the religious institution in question and hence they were persons interested in obtaining the permission. The court below accordingly rightly held that the opposite-parties were persons interested within meaning of Sec. 14 of the Act to apply for permission under Sec. 18 of the Act. Learned counsel then contended that the application did not contain the necessary averments as required by Sec. 13 of the Act, in regard to the regular keeping of accounts and the disbursement of income hence the application was not maintainable. Paragraph nos. 7 and 8 of the petition deal with this question. In para 8 it is alleged that the applicant is intending to dispose of the trust property and to use the sale proceeds and the income thereof for his personal ends. Section 14, deals with misfeasance, breach of trust or neglect of duty, of trustee, manager, superintendent of the institution. In para 32 of his petition the applicant has admitted that the sale of the properties or part thereof was intended. The applicant claimed an interest in the properties and asserted a right to sell them. The question, would be whether this assertion would amount to misfeasance, breach of trust or neglect of duty as contemplated by Sec. 14. The court below, while discussing this question observed as follows :- "in relation to the alleged neglect of duty on the part of the opposite-party or the breach of trust, reference has been made for the applicant to his resigning from the job of preaching and imparting religious education and the claim asserted by him in respect of the said property as being his own. This casts cloud on the title of the trust to the said property and creates obstacle in the proper discharge of the functions pertaining to the same."
(3.) THE finding calls for no interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this court and a case under Sec. 14 appears to be made out. THE learned counsel then urged that although the property was endowed yet no public trust was created in respect of it and hence the applicant could dispose it of in his own right. THE court below was required only to see a prima facie case to grant the permission sought for and the question now ought to be urged was never raised in the court below. THE merit of the suit is not in controversy at this stage, and on the submission made to the court below it cannot be said that the finding recorded on the question of misfeasance, breach of trust or neglect of duty suffers from any jurisdictional error the order granting permission under Sec. 18 calls for no interference. Learned counsel then urged that Sec. 14 of the Act did not apply to the instant case, as there was no averment in the application that the property involved in the religious institution yielded any income. Reliance was placed on Fatehchand v. Daulat Chand, AIR 1952 Alld. 358, Ram Narain v. Jai Narain, AIR 1961 Alld. 125, Kedar Nath v. Pearey Lal Gupta, AIR 1932 Oudh 152 and Sree Ishwar Sridhar Jew v. Smt. Sushila Bala Dasi, AIR 1954 SC 69. THE properties mentioned in the application include houses, land, establishments and gardens etc. THEy are income yielding properties. THE application clearly stated that property was being sold and the income derived therefrom was being sought to be utilised for the personal use of the applicant in the revision. Further this question was not raised in the court below and the question being one of fact cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage. THE findings recorded by the court below do not suffer from any jurisdictional error and no interference is called for in the exercise of this court's powers under Sec. 115 of the CPC. The revision accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.;