A. N. Varma, J. - (1.) :-
(2.) THIS petition is directed against an order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 30th of March, 1972 under U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. These are the facts x The respondent no. 2 was recorded in the main column as the tenure holder of the land in dispute in the basic year's khatauni whereas the petitioner was recorded in class (9). An objection was filed by the petitioner claiming that he was entitled to be recorded as Sirdar by virtue of his possession. The objection was contested by the respondent no. 2. Both the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) decided the case in favour of the petitioner. Aggrieved the respondent no. 2 filed a revision under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which was allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by the aforesaid order. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the first two courts having given decision in favour of the petitioner on the basis of both oral and documentary evidence, it was incumbent upon the Deputy Director of Consolidation while reversing those orders expressly to consider the oral evidence led on behalf of the petitioner. In support learned counsel for the petitioner cited a few decisions of this court including 1977 Allahabad Weekly Cases 721, 1978 Revenue Decision 180. In these cases this court has held that a court reversing the findings recorded by the authorities below, must consider oral evidence and discuss the same.
(3.) HAVING heard learned counsel for the the parties, I find no merits in this petition. The Consolidation Officer as well as the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation both appear to have rested their decision primarily on the interpretation which they gave to the various khasras filed by the parties. No doubt the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) has observed in his order that the khasras are corroborated by the statement given by Ramraj, son of the petitioner. However, there is no manner of doubt that the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) relied mainly on the documentary evidence consisting of the extracts of khasras filed on behalf of the petitioner. The revisional court came to a contrary conclusion upon an assessment of those very extracts and other documents existing on the records. Although, there is no express discussion in the oral evidence in the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, it is not possible to say that the Deputy Director of Consolidation did not consider the oral evidence. Like the first two courts, the Deputy Director of Consolidation also appears to have attached greater importance to the documentary evidence in preference to the oral evidence. The question, however, is what is the effect of an omission to refer specifically to the oral evidence. In the case of Gauri Shanker v. Deputy Director, Consolidation, reported in 1980 Revenue Decision 250, a learned Single Judge of this court after considering this very controversy at some length held that a mere omission to refer to the oral evidence is not sufficient for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned orders. In order to entitle the petitioner to such a writ, the petitioner must further establish the precise effect which the non-consideration of the oral evidence has had upon the orders impugned in the petition. I am in respectful agreement with this view. There may be cases where non-consideration of the oral evidence may, by the very nature of the issues involved, produce an error appearent on the face of record. However, in each case, the petitioner must satisfy the court that non-reference to oral evidence has resulted in patent error or injustice. In the present case I am not satisfied that a mere failure to refer to the oral evidence has produced any error. As mentioned above, none of the courts was influenced to any substantial degree by the oral evidence on the record. Further-more, the petitioner has not filed with the petition, copies of the statements of the witnesses which might have enabled this court in coming to the conclusion whether the evidence was of such decisive character as to render the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation vitiated in consequence of his failure to refer to the same.;