S. J. Hyder, J. - (1.) :-
(2.) THE second appeal raises an interesting question as to the interpretation of the first proviso to clause (b) of sub section (2) of Section 3 of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918 hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. It would be relevant to mention that the proviso aforesaid has been added to the principal Act by U. P. Act 23 of 1934. The suit giving rise to this second appeal was instituted by Ratan Singh plaintiff respondent no. 1 on the basis of a mortgage deed dated June 17, 1964. The relief sought by the plaintiff respondent was that decree for a sum of Rs. 3093.07 p. be awarded in his favour and in case of default of payment of the said amount the mortgage property may be sold at a court auction for the realisation of the said amount. The plaintiff's claim found favour with the trial Court. It decreed the plaintiff's claim and directed that if the defendant appellant failed to pay the decretal amount within the time stipulated in the decree, the mortgage property shall be auctioned to satisfy the mortgage debt. It further directed that a preliminary decree under Order 34 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be drawn up. The defendant appellant felt herself aggrieved by the decree of the trial Court. She accordingly preferred an appeal which has also failed. Faced with this situation, the defendant appellant has approached this Court by filing this second appeal. A few facts which are necessary to appreciate the controversies between the parties may be stated. Phul Chand defendant respondent no. 2, was the original owner of the mortgage property. He executed a mortgage deed in respect of the said property in favour of Ratan Singh plaintiff-respondent no. 1. The mortgage debt was to the tune of Rs. 1500/- only. It was stipulated in the mortgage deed that the mortgagor shall pay interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month with six monthly rest. Phul Chand the original mortgagor transferred the equity of redemption in favour of Asharfi Devi, defendant appellant by means of a registered sale deed dated September 24, 1964. Since neither the interest nor the principal of the mortgage debt had been paid, the plaintiff filed the suit giving rise to this second appeal on September 1/2, 1970.
(3.) THE suit was contested by the defendant appellant on a number of grounds. In this second appeal, we are only concerned with the question whether the interest agreed upon between the parties to the mortgage was unconscionable and excessive and was liable to be reduced under Section 3 of the Act, as amended in this State. THE question has been answered against the defendants appellant by the two courts below and has been canvassed once again at the bar. In order to appreciate the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, the provisions of the Act, in so far as they were relevant, may be briefly surveyed. The preamble of the Act shows that the Act was enacted to give additional powers to the Court to deal with certain cases of usurious loans of money or kind. It is evident from the preamble and the scheme of the Act that it was a remidial measure intended to give benefit to impecunious persons who by force of circumstances, had to borrow money either by executing a mortgage or otherwise. As such it would not be proper for this Court to place a restrictive interpretation on the provisions of the Act. The constructions of its provisions has to be made keeping in view the principle that in the case of remedial measures, the court should lean in favour of advancing the remedy and should take care to suppress the mischief.;