- (1.) N. N. Mithal, J. The appellant is a Chit Fund Company which had advanced certain loan to respondent No. 1, and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 stood sureties for him executing certain documents in favour of the appellant. When the amount loaned was not repaid within the time and the dispute arose between the parties, the matter was referred to arbitration and the O. P. No. 1 filed a compromise. After hearing the parties an award was given on 27-10-1977 which was filed in suit No. 814 of 1970 for being made rule of the Court. On 29-5-1971 in spite of objections filed by respondent No. 1, the award was made rule of the Court relying upon the cases M. S. Krishna Iyer v. Subramania Mooppanar and others, A. I. R. 1963 Mad. 243. Managing Committee, Krishak Higher Secondary School v. Ishan Singh, 1965 A. L. J. 1116. Aggrieved by this decision the respondent No. 1 alone filed an appeal No. 372 of 1971 which too was dismissed on 12- 2-1972. Thereafter an execution (No. 192 of 1971 was started for attachment of the salary of respondent No. 2 who happened to be an employee of the Employees State Insurance Corporation. Objections under Section 47 C. P. C. were filed separately on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 which were registered as Misc. Case No, 342 of 1974 and 429 of 1974. Objec tions were similar in nature and the main grounds urged therein were that the reference to arbitration being unilateral was invalid, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to give any award; there was no dispute which could be referred for arbitration, the decree was declaratory in nature and thus could not be executed and that an execution under Order 21, Rule 48 C. P. C. could not be launched. These objections were heard by the executing Court and were dis posed of by two separate orders passed on 24-1-1976. The objector, feeling aggrieved by the said decision, filed one Misc. Appeal No. 209 of 1976 in which both the judgment debtors, who are respon dent Nos. 1 and 2 here, had joined as appellants. This appeal has been allowed by the Court below and hence the decree holder now came up in appeal. In the first place it may be stated that two separate objections under Section 47 C. P. C. had been filed before the executing Court which were disposed of by two separate orders, though on the same date. Two appeals therefore ought to have been filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. A single appeal that had been entertained by the Court below was illegal and improper. The Court ought not to have allowed this. It appears from the record that although two separate judgments had been given by the execution Court while disposing of the objection filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 yet only one formal order was prepared and the same had been filed before the lower appellate Court. The memo of appeal shows that the appeal was directed against the order of the executing Court dated 24-1-1976 in Misc. case No. 342 of 1973 and it appears that no appeal at all was filed against the decision given in the other Misc. Case No. 437 of 1974 arising from the objections filed by respondent No. 2. The above defect apart, the order of the 'court below, cannot be sus tained at all. Relying upon Beebi Patnakar and others v. C. G. Shastri, 1961 S. C. 272 and the case of Jagdish Kapoor and others v. Premier Credit, 1973 All. 49. The Court below has proceeded to treat the decree as totally without jurisdiction and has entertained a plea regarding lack of jurisdiction to execute the decree. The Court, however, ignored from consideration that there must be inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Court passing the decree and not merely wrong assumption of jurisdiction by it. The award after being made rule of the Court, becomes a decree of the Court and it cannot be urged that the Court had no jurisdiction to make the award rule of the Court. Once an award has been made rule of the Court it partakes the nature of a decree and becomes executable as decree of the civil Court. In execution of such a decree no objection can be taken that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to give the award. This objection could have been taken only at the time when the objections against the award were being considered by the Court before mak ing such an award rule of the Court. An objection was in fact taken at that stage and was turned down by the Court on the material before it. That decision was also upheld in appeal and, therefore, it is not open for the judg ment debtor now to raise this issue once again at the time of execution of the decree. The judgment debtors cannot be allowed to have another innings to agitate the same points over again. Once a point has been settled and the Court has though it fit to make the award rule of the Court the matter must end there. It then becomes a decree of the Court and it certainly cannot be argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to make the award rule of the Court. There was no question of lack of jurisdiction in the Court which passed the decree, inherent or otherwise, and the Court below was not right in holding to the contrary. The Court below has clearly misunderstood the ratio of decision in the two cases relied upon by it. The Court below has then referred to the case of Amoi Kumar Verma v. Hari Prasad Verma and others, 1958 All. 20. The facts of that case were entirely different. There the award had not been filed in Court under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act. It was in a separate suit that one of the parties wanted a decree in his favour in terms of the award without first getting the award made rule of the Court. It was in these circumstances, that the Court held that unless the award was filed in the Court and if it was not set aside under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, the same must first be clothed as rule of the Court before it can become an executable decree. The facts of that case are thus clearly distinguishable from the facts of the instant case and can have no application to the case that is now before me. It is thus clear that the Court which passed a decree did not lack in herent jurisdiction to pass it and, no such objection could be raised in the execution proceedings. The Court below has obviously erred in holding that the reference to arbitration being unilateral, no award could be given by the arbitrator and a decree passed in terms of such an award was not executable. It has lastly contended that the execution could not proceed under Order 21 Rule 48, C. P. C. as the judgment debtor was not a Government employee. This question has not been decided either by the executing Court or by the lower appellate Court. Objection to this effect bad been taken in the objections and will now be considered by the Court executing the decree when the matter now goes before it. In the result the appeal succeeds. The order of the lower appellate Court is hereby set aside. The executing Court will now execute the decree in accordance with law after considering the only remaining objection regarding excitability of the decree in view of Order 21, Rule 48, C. P. C. In the cir cumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs. .;