- (1.) THIS is an execu tion second appeal arising out of an application made under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Judgment debtors which was allowed by the lower appellate court and aggriev ed by the same the decree-holders have preferred this appeaL
(2.) THE facts giving rise to this second appeal lie within a short com pass. The appellants obtained a decree against the respondents In regard to dower debt that was due to their predecessor-in-interest against the respon dents. The decree was passed for a total sum of Rs. 1250/- with costs of the suit. This decree was put into exe cution and the Zamindari bonds of the respondents were attached. They there fore filed an objection under Section 47, Civil P. C. for deduction of the amount under Section 9 of the U. P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act, 1952, (U. P. Act No XV of 1953), according to the for mula given in Schdule II of that Act. This application was opposed by the decree-holders. The question, therefore, which arose for determination was whe ther the decretal amount in question was a 'debt' within the meaning of Sec tion 2 (f) of the Zamindars' Debt Reduc tion Act. The learned Munsif held that the dower debt was not covered by the definition whereas the appellate court came to a contrary conclusion. The same controversy has been canvassed before me. 'Debt' has been defined in Sec tion 2 (f) of the Zamindars' Debt Re duction Act as follows "Debt" means an advance in cash or in kind and includes any transaction which is in substance a debt but does not include an advance as aforesaid made on or after the first day of July, 1952, or a debt due to ft) the Central Government or Gov ernment of any State. V (ii) a local authority (iii) a schedule bank (iv) a co- operative Society, (y) a waqf trust or endowment for charitable or religious purpose only and
(3.) THE limited Question which falls for decision in this appeal Is as to whether a dower debt amounts to a debt' within the meaning of the above definition. We are not concerned with the larger question as to whether it fulfils the general ingredients of debt as understood in popular parlance or even debt as defined in wider terms in other statute. There is no direct authority on the point in controversy and the matter has, therefore, to be decided on first principles and on an Interpretation of the language of the Act. It is obvi ous that 'debt' Is a term of art as usedl in the statute under consideration and its essential ingredient Is 'advance'. It may either be technically an advance' or an advance in substance but in any case the essence of the definition is that it must possess the element of 'advance'. Therefore, this is the key word in the definition which must govern the con notation of the term under the Act-The word loan' has been defined in very much similar language in the U. P. Agriculturists' Relief Act which is as follows :- "Loan means an advance In cash or kind made before the first day of June, 1940, ......... ...... and includes any transaction which in substance amounts to such advance; but does not include an advance." Yet another definition of 'loan' Is iound in Section 2 (a) of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934, accord ing to which "a 'debt' includes any pecuniary liability except a liability for unliquidated damages." The legislature while enacting the Zamindars' Debt Re duction Act had adopted the definitions of loan* In the Agriculturists' Relief Act and Debt Redemption Act as the definition of Debt and not the definition of debt contained In the Encumbered Estates Act. It follows that 'debt' under this Act is intended to apply only to a case technically or substantially of an advance and not to one of mere pecuniary liability. The Intention of the legisla ture to restrict the Act to a pecuniary liability arising out of a loan as under stood in the Agriculturists" Relief AcB or the Debt Redemption Act cannot be mistaken. The result is that every pecuniary liability cannot be equated with debt for the purposes of the present Act. Here the essential condition of 'debt' is that there must be an advance. The word 'advance' conveys the idea of furnishing, tendering or offering some thing which may be returned in the same form. It is not synonymous with exchange for money. That is why re covery of price of goods sold had not been adjudged as a case of advance. In sale the property at once passes to the purchaser and what is recovered is merely its equivalent in money. In order to be an advance the tender must be of something "which can be return ed in the same specie". Sale excludes such requirement. In paying the price the vendee does not return the very thing delivered by the vendor. Hence, debt may have a wide or a restricted meaning depending upon the termino logy used by the legislature in a parti cular statute. In the Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act it has been assigned a limited meaning; it is not debt simpli-citer.;