K.B. Srivastva, J. - (1.) OWING to a difference of opinion between Oak, C. J. and O, P. Trivedi, J. on the question of the competency of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Claims Tribunal) to entertain claims arising out of motor accidents which had occurred prior to the date of its constitution, the matter has come to me for opinion.
(2.) THE facts, in brief, are as follows: The truck of one Ram Singh collided with the scooter of one Amar Nath Misra on September 11, 1966 resulting in the latter's death. The Claims Tribunal was constituted under Section 110, Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on March 18, 1967. The legal representatives of the deceased Amar Nath filed an application for compensation to the Claims Tribunal on July 8, 1967. A preliminary objection was raised by the insurer, The New India Assurance Company Ltd.? that the Claims Tribunal had no jurisdiction in respect of a claim relating to a motor accident which had occurred prior to its constitution. The Claims Tribunal overruled the objection on September 11, 1968. Write Petition No. 2 of 1969 was then instituted for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Claims Tribunal and a Writ of mandamus commanding it not to entertain the application for compensation. A learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition and issued the two writs. The legal representatives of the deceased Amar Nath then instituted the special appeal. Oak, C.J., took the view that the Claims Tribunal had jurisdiction while O. P. Trived, J. agreed with the view, of the learned single Judge that it had no jurisdiction over a claim arising out of an accident which had occurred prior to its date of Constitution. This is how the matter has come up to me for opinion. Voluminous case law was cited at the Bar. Khatumal v. Abdul Qadir : A.I.R. 1961 M.P. 295 and Mani Bai v. Raj Kumar Harpal Deo : 1966 A.C.J. 107 lay down the law that a claims Tribunal will have no jurisdiction over suits for compensation arising out of motor accidents already pending before Civil Courts from before the date of its constitution. These two cases, therefore, are not relevant. The view taken in Sushma Mehta v. C.P.T. Services Ltd. : A.I.R. 1964 M.P. 133 supports the view of the learned Single Judge and O. P. Trivedi, J. the view taken by the Madras, Delhi, Gujarat, Punjab and Bombay High Court, however, supports the view of the Chief Justice, vide V.C.K. Bus Service v. H.B. Sethnaj : A.I.R. 1965 Mad 149 Thomas v. Hotz Hotels Ltd. : 1968 A.C.J. 338; Joshi Ratansi Gopaji v. Gujarat Raad Transport Corporation : 1968 A.C.J. 86; Zarin v. Santubhiai 1968 A.C.J. 327; Unique Motor and General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Kartar Singhi : A.I.R. 1965 P&H 102; Abdul Mohomad Aga v. Peter Leo D'mello : A.I.R. 1965 Bom 21 and Natwarlal Bhikhalal Shah v. Thakarda Khodalji Kalaji, 1969 A.C.J. 397
(3.) SECTION 110 to 110 -F were substituted for the former Section 110 of the Act by Section 80 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act (Act 100 of 1956) with effect from February 16, 1967. Under the common law before the date of the amendment, a claim for compensation of the nature in question had to be enforced by a suit in a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. The period of limitation for the enforcement of such a claim was one year under Article 21, Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and is now two years under Article 82, Limitation Act, 1963 which came into force on January 1, 1964. Court fees payable was ad valorem while now on an application for compensation before a Claims Tribunal the fee payable is only Rs. This then was the state of the common law before the insertion of Section 110 to 110 -F. The old remedy by way of suit entailed protracted litigation in the Civil Courts involving one and even two appeals. The legal representatives of a person dying as a result of a motor accident, had a long period of waiting. If a claimant belonged to a poor section of the community, he could not claim a reasonable amount on account of heavy ad valorem Court fees, unless he chose to enlarge the period of waiting further by resort to a pauper suit. There was obvious frustration to persons who stood in urgent need of financial help. The Parliament stepped in to eliminate or mitigate these evils and provide a more speedy and cheap remedy. The new sections provide for the constitution of a Claims Tribunal by taking away the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. The Court fees payable is practically nominal. The long period of waiting has been curtailed by a shorter period of limitation with one right of appeal direct to the High Court and with no right of appeal whatsoever if the amount in dispute is less than Rs. 2000 / -. In Heydon's case Co. Rep. 7 a it was resolved by Barons of the Exchequer that: For the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general...four things are to be discerned and considered : (1st) What was the common law before the making of the Act. (2nd) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. (3rd) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the common -wealth and, (4th) the true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such constructions as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true interest of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.;