- (1.) THIS petition by M. M. L. Sahni made under the provisions 9f Article 226 of the Constitution of India contains the prayer that a writ of certiorari be Issued and the notice dated 3rd October, 1967 issued by the District Controller of Stores, the order of the District Controller of Stores dated 26th October, 1967 and the letter of the As sistant Engineer, Head Quarters, Nor thern Railway, Lucknow dated 9th Nov ember, 1967 (Annexures 9, 10 and 13 respectively) be quashad. There is also a prayer for the issue of a writ, direc tion or order in the nature of prohibi tion prohibiting the respondents, the Union of India, the Controller of Stores, the District Controller of Stores and the Assistant Engineer, Northern Railway from ousting the petitioner from the accommodation belonging to the Rail way, which he is occupying, or from demolishing the same. There is also a prayer to issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of mandamus com manding the respondents to place orders for stitching of uniforms which he used to do earlier. In addition there is an usual prayer for any other writ, direction or order as this court in the circumstances of the case may deem fit and proper to issue.
(2.) IT is not necessary to mention the various facts averred in the peti tion or what is contained in the coun ter affidavit or the rejoinder affidavit because the petition is clearly miscon ceived and is liable to be dismissed on the ground that it is not maintainable. The petitioner wants to enforce an agreement entered into by the respon dents with him and this cannot be done in the exercise of writ jurisdiction by this court. It may be stated that no breach of law is pleaded nor there is a complaint that any of the fundamental rights have been infringed. It is well settled that no writ lies to enforce a contract. It is true that certain cir cumstances even though the source of a right may be a contract or an agree ment, a writ may lie against the order of an authority having statutory powers. As for example, if an authority modifies an action taken by his subordinate au thority and thus deprives the petitioner of the right that accrued to him by virtue of the order of the subordinate authority, the writ may be maintain able. In the case of The D. F. O. South Kheri v. Ram Sanehi Singh, 1970 UJ (SC) 290, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows: "Counsel for the appellants con tends that since the dispute arose out of the terms of the contract and the Divisional Forest Officer under the terms of the contract had authority to modify any action taken by a subordi nate forest authority the remedy of the respondent was to institute an action In the Civil Court and that the writ peti tion was not maintainable. But in the present case the order is passed by a public authority modifying the order or proceeding of a subordinate forest au thority. By that order he has deprived the respondent of a valuable right. We are unable to hold that merely because the source of the right which the res pondent claims was initially in a con tract, for obtaining relief against any arbitrary and unlawful action on the part of a public authority he must re sort to a suit and not to a petition by way of a writ. In view of the judg ment of this court in K. N. Guruswamy's case, (1955) 1 SCR 305 = (AIR 1954 SC 592) there can be no doubt that the petition was maintainable, even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract, where the action challenged was of a public authority in vested with statutory power." It may also be mentioned that to. K. N.Guruswamy v. The State of My sore, 1955-1 SCR 305 = (AIR 1954 SC 592) (Supra) the cause of action that gave rise to the filing of the writ peti tion was the alleged irregular exercise of authority by the Excise Commis sioner. That was not an action for spe cific performance of a contract. The pith and substance in the present writ petition is an action for breach of an alleged contract and noth ing else. Besides, in a matter like this proper adjudication between the par ties cannot be made without there be ing detailed evidence on the questions involved. A case like this cannot be properly decided in the summary pro ceeding of a writ where the normal prac tice is to decide it on the basis of affi davits alone. It is also well known that in a case where damages are adequate remedy a Civil Court would not en force a contract alleged to have been breached. In the present case the peti tioner can on a proper case being made out be fully compensated in terms of damages. The petitioner has clearly an alternative remedy to file a suit. A writ of mandamus will not issue in view of that alternative remedy.
(3.) THE respondents are not a Judicial body or a quasi' judicial body. When they terminated the agreement, they acted administratively and not judicially or quasi-judically. A writ of prohibition would not go in such cir cumstances.;