- (1.) WRIT Petitions Nos. 3408 of 1969. 3425 of 1969. 2982 of 1969. 2967 of 1969 and 3343 of 1969 were heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment as they raise a common question of law. All these five peti tions have been filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh and seek to quash the orders made in revisional jurisdiction by the District Judge acting as a Tribunal under the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (here inafter referred to as "the Act") as amended by the Indian .Forest (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1965. (U. P. Act No. XXIII of 1965).
(2.) IT is not necessary to set out in detail the facts relating to these peti tions and it is sufficient to mention the following few bald facts for the purpose of these petitions. Some notifications were issued by the State Government under Section 4 of the Act declaring that it had been decided to constitute the lands specified therein as reserve forest and. in response to the proclamation under Section 6 of the Act which follow ed the notification, the contesting oppo site parties to these petitions (herein after referred to as "the claimants") pre ferred claims to certain rights over some of the lands; in Writ Petitions Nos. 3408 of 1969 and 3425 of 1969 the rights claim ed were Bhumidhari rights while in the remaining three petitions the rights claimed were rights to forest produce. The Forest Settlement Officer, who in vestigated the various claims, rejected the claims of the claimants in Writ Petitions Nos. 3408 of 1969 and 3425 of 1969 under Section 11 of the Act and of the claim ants in the other Writ Petitions under Section 12 of the Act; appeals filed by the claimants were dismissed by the Addi tional Commissioner in 1962. The claim ants went up in revision to the State Government purportedly under Section 18 (4) read with Section 22 of the Act. The Act was amended by the Indian Forest (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act. 1965 (hereinafter referred to as "the Amend ing Act"). Section 16 (5) of which pro vided for the transfer of pending revi sion petitions to a Tribunal constituted under Section 16 (3) consisting, as provided in Sec. 16 (4) of the Act, of the District Judge. All the revision ap plications were then transferred to and allowed by the District Judge on 30th May. 1969, after hearing the State and the claimants.These petitions under, Article 226 of the Constitution challenge-ing the validity of the orders of the District Judge were presented by the State in August and September. 1969. The grounds attacking the orders of the District Judge, as set out in the five petitions, raise questions of fact; however on 4th December 1969 the State applied for permission to amend the petitions by adding one more ground, namely that the Tribunal (the District Judge) had no jurisdiction to decide the revision petitions; the permission was granted and the petitions were amended accordingly. The learned Advocate-Gene ral appearing for the State fairly con ceded that the questions of fact rais ed in the petitions could not be agitated in these proceedings and confined his arguments only to the added ground that the Tribunal was not competent to enter tain the revision petitions and hence the orders allowing the revision petitions were null and void.
(3.) IN M/s. Pannalal BinjraJ v. Union of India. AIR 1957 SC 397 aris ing out of a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the trans fer of certain income-tax cases to the Income-tax Officer the Supreme Court observed:- "......... none of the petitioners rais ed any objection to their cases being transferred in the manner stated above and in fact submitted to the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officers to whom their cases had been transferred. It was only after our decision in Bidi Supply Co. v. The Union of India. AIR 1956 SC 479 was pronounced on 20th March 1956, that these petitioners woke up and asserted their alleged rights ......... If They acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officers to whom their cases were transferred they were certain ly not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32. It is well settled that such conduct of the petitioners would disentitle them to any relief at the hands of this Court ........." (paragraph 45). These observations establish the pro position that where a party has submitted to jurisdiction it cannot be allowed to plead want of jurisdiction in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Advocate-General however drew my attention to the following ob servations in the majority judgment of the Supreme Court in Arunachalam Pillai v. Southern Roadways AIR 1960 SC 1191:- "In our opinion although the res pondent had submitted to the jurisdic tion of the Regional Transport Officer and had not in his petition under Arti cle 226 in the High Court taken the ob jection that that officer had no jurisdic tion to vary the conditions of a permit. the High Court acted rightly in allow ing the respondent to urge that the Re gional Transport Officer had no jurisdic tion to vary the conditions of a per mit. It was not until the decision of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1955 that it became the considered view of that Court that the Regional Trans port Officer had no jurisdiction to make any such variation. When the law was so declared by the High Court it could not reasonably be said that the High Court erred in allowing the respondent to take this point although in its petition under Article 226 the point had not been taken. This was obviously because the decision of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1955 had not been given at the time of the filing of the petition. Since the question went to the root of the mat ter and it involved the question whether the Regional Transport Officer had juris diction to vary the conditions of a per mit the High Court faced with a Divi sion Bench decision of its own on the matter could not very well refuse per mission to the respondent to rely on that decision in support of its petition ques tioning the validity of the order of the Government of Madras made under Sec tion 64-A of the Act." (Paragraph 5). Relying upon these observations the learned Advocate-General submitted that the correct legal position that no revision lay was declared by a Division Bench of this Court in Spl. Appeal No. 931 of 1969 connected with Special Appeals Nos. 880, 930 and 928 of 1969 (All) and hence the State should be allowed to raise the plea of lack of jurisdiction in the Tribunal to entertain the revision petitions even though the State had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in those petitions. This submission has been stoutly resisted by Shri S. C. Khare, contending that what ever doubt there might have been on the question was resolved as long back as 1961.;