O.P. Trivedi, J. - (1.) Seen the office objection which arises from the filing of First Appeal by Sohan Lal Sah in this Court. It appears that respondent Smt. Aruna Sah filed a petition under Sec. 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter called the Act) against appellant Sohan Lal Sah for judicial separation. In the plaint the following reliefs were claimed: 1. A decree for judicial separation between the parties. 2. An order directing the present appellant Sohan Lal Sah to return ornaments belonging to her. 3. An order for the payment of maintenance and cost. The valuation of the petition for jurisdiction was shown in the petition as Rs. 5,000/- on which the prescribed court fee of Rs. 37.50 P. was paid. The value of the ornaments for the return of which a prayer was made in the petition was disclosed in the petition as Rs. 23,200/-. The petition was heard by the Additional Civil Judge, Gonda. No objection was raised before the trial court disputing valuation of the petition for jurisdiction which was given as Rs. 5,000/-. A plea was, however, raised that the court had no jurisdiction to grant the relief for return of ornaments in a petition under Sec. 10 of the Act. This question was decided by the trial court as a preliminary point. During arguments on this point a statement was made on 11-3-1968 by the learned counsel for the petitioner-respondent that Sec. 27 of the Act does not cover claim for return of ornaments etc. and on this ground the petitioner did not press her claim for return of ornaments and other articles and reserved her right to claim the same through an appropriate separate proceeding. Upon this statement the trial court noted that inasmuch as the petitioner did not press the claim for return of ornaments and other articles in the proceedings before him the petitioner's claim in that respect will not be enquired into in the said proceedings and she will be at liberty to claim that relief in separate proceedings. A decree for judicial separation was allowed. A further decree for Rs. 550/- as litigation expenses and Rs. 450/- as pendente lite interest and permanent alimony at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month was granted by the trial court. Aggrieved from this decree Sohan Lal Sah filed an appeal in this Court showing the valuation of the suit in the memo of appeal at Rs. 35,400/-. An objection was filed by respondent Smt. Aruna Sah submitting that the valuation of the original petition being Rs. 5,000/- in view of Sec. 21 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 as amended by the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1968 this appeal lay before the District Judge and not before this Court. The respondent questioned the correctness and bona fides of fixing the valuation of the appeal at Rs. 35,000/-. The appellant in reply maintained that the appeal had been correctly valued at Rs. 35,000/- according to the claim made in the plaint and he justified it on the ground that the value of ornaments i.e. Rs. 30,400/- for the return of which a relief was contained in the plaint should be added to the value of the claim shown in the petition for purposes of jurisdiction i.e. Rs. 5,000/- leading to the aggregate figure of Rs. 35,400/- which according to the appellant represented the true valuation of the petition and not Rs. 5,000/-. On this basis the appellant maintains that this appeal lay before this Court and not before the District Judge in view of Sec. 21 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act read with the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1968. The office has reported that inasmuch as the valuation of the petition was Rs. 5,000/- this appeal should have been filed before the District Judge and has invited decision of this Court on the objection raised by the respondent. The short ques ion which arises is whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal or whether it lies before the District Judge. Sec. 19 of the Act provides that every petition under this Act shall be presented to the district court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction the marriage was solemnized or the husband and wife reside or last resided together. The question is which is the court in whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction the marriage was solemnized or the husband and wife reside or last resided together for purposes of determining the forum for the appeal. Sec. 21 of the Act provides that subject to the other provisions contained in this Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf, all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. For purposes of determining the forum for appeals one has, in the circumstances, to look to Sec. 21 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act which says:- " (1) Save as aforesaid, an appeal from a decree or order of a Civil Judge shall lie- (a) to the District Judge where the value of the original suit in which or in any proceedings arising out of which the decree or order was made did not exceed ten thousand rupees, and (b) to the High Court in any other case." By the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1968 this figure of Rs. 10,000/- has been amended to Rs. 20,000/-. It follows therefore, from the language of Sec. 21 of the Act, that an appeal from a decree or order of a Civil Judge shall be to the District Judge where the value of the original suit out of which the decree was made did not exceed Rs. 20,000/- and it would be to the High Court if it exceeds Rs. 20,000/-. In view of Sec. 21 of the - Act it is well settled that the test for determining the forum of an appeal against the decree of a Civil Judge is the value of the original suit and the value for which the decree or order may have been passed or the value of the subject matter of the appeal are irrelevant. This was the view expressed by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of P.N. Agarwal v. Ragho Prasad, 1969 ALJ 244 . Similar view was expressed earlier in a Single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Sri Purshottam Das Tandon v. Sri Shyam Nath Segal, 1957 ALJ 495 , where it was observed : "For the purpose of finding the forum of appeal it is the value of the original suit which has to be determined and not the value of the appeal itself." The cardinal question therefore is what was the value of the petition out of which the present appeal arises. The respondent-petitioner had expressly shown the value of the subject-matter of the petition for purposes of jurisdiction as Rs. 5,000/-, which was never contested in the trial court. Learned counsel for the appellant now disputes the correctness of this valuation given in the petition and submits that the true valuation of the petition could be arrived at by summing up the value of all the reliefs claimed in the petition. It is pointed out that there was a specific prayer for return of ornaments in the petition which were valued at Rs. 23,200/- and if that figure is added to Rs. 5,000/- then the valuation of the petition would exceed Rs. 28,000/-. This submission to my mind is without force. It is a well settled principle that if a suit relates to two or more causes of action or two or more reliefs based on the same cause of action the aggregate value of the reliefs claimed will determine the valuation of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction of the suit as well as appeal (see Shidappa Venkatrao v. Rachappa Subrao, 1912 ILR 36 Bombay 628 ; Neelakandhan v. Ananthakrishna Ayyar, (1907) ILR 30 Madras 61 and Konna Pannikar v. Karunakara, (1893) ILR 16 Madras 328 . The question therefore arises what was the aggregate value of the reliefs claimed in the petition. As already stated, upon the appellant's objection that the relief with regard to return of ornaments was not maintainable under Sec. 10 of the Act that relief was expressly given up and dropped by he petitioner before the trial court and a right was reserved to claim it in a separate proceeding. After that relief was dropped the return of ornaments and other articles was no longer the subject-matter of the petition and it can no longer be treated as one of the reliefs claimed in the petition notwithstanding that the pet Lion insofar as that relief was concern was not actually deleted by formal amendment. When a party does not press a particular relief or claim or drops it before passing of the decree then it follow that there was no dispute with regard to claim so dropped and in such a situation the court must see what were the subsisting claims or reliefs of the suitor at the time of passing of the decree or order. When part of the claim has been expressly dropped then clearly the valuation of the reliefs can be determined only with reference to the reliefs subsisting at the time of passing of the decree as a result of dropping some of the claims or reliefs. In that view of the matter a relief although contained in the petition but subsequently not pressed cannot be taken into account in determining the value of the subject-matter of the petition because it was no longer subject-matter of the claim or one of the reliefs sought in the petition. The result will be that the value of the reliefs subsisting at the time of the decree of the trial court was reduced to Rs. 5,000/-. In this view of the matter I feel fortified by the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Madhusudan Dahvabhai v. Manilal Harilal, A.I.R. 1963 Gujarat 291 . In that case a suit for declaration, injunction, partition and also for possession of immovable property was filed. Later on, the prayer for declaration and possession in respect of immovable property was dropped. It was held that for the purpose of deciding the jurisdiction of the appellate court the amended plaint at the time of decree should be looked into and not the original plaint. For purposes of determining the valuation of the subject-matter of the suit under Sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act the value of the relief concerning declaration and possession also was excluded from consideration. To point out that in that case part of the claim was dropped by amendment of the plaint whereas in this case no amendment of the petition was effected is to point out only a difference with no distinction. I can see no difference between a case where part of the claim or relief is dropped by amendment of the plaint or petition and a case where the same is not pressed or is dropped by statement of the party or counsel. The principle which was applied in the case of Madhusudan Dahvabhai v. Manilal Hari Lal, A.I.R. 1963 Gujarat 291 must to my mind apply to the present set of circumstances also. It was held in the case of Neelachalam v. Narasinga, A.I.R. 1931 Madras 716 that it is open to the plaintiff to relinquish a portion of his claim to bring it within a certain court fee and the suit cannot be dismissed under Sec. 10 (2) of the Court Fees Act. On principle I cannot see any legal objection to a suitor relinquishing a portion of his claim during the trial for whatever reasons and if he does so his action is bound to affect the valuation of the suit because the number of reliefs claimed will stand consequently reduced. Quite apart from these considerations to my mind the valuation of the relief with regard to the return of ornaments and other articles could not be taken into account for determining the valuation of the petition for a definite reason also. That reason is that the relief for return of ornaments and other things was not maintainable in a petition under Sec. 10 of the Act or indeed under any provision of the said Act. In other words, that relief the Civil Judge had no inherent jurisdiction to grant. If a party introduces a relief which is patently not maintainable and which patently the court has no jurisdiction to grant the valuation of the suit or the petition cannot be permitted to be inflated by the introduction of such a relief. There may be cases where such relief may be added from oblique motive of ousting the jurisdiction of a particular court. It is plain that the court cannot permit itself to be a party to such a fraud. From whatever angle therefore we look at the matter it is clear that from the facts of this case the valuation of the original petition was only Rs. 5,000/-. That being so, having regard to Sec. 21 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act read with the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1968 it is the District Judge who has jurisdiction to hear the present appeal which does not lie in this Court.
(2.) The respondent's objection is upheld. This appeal shall be transferred from this Court to the court of the District Judge, Gonda. Appeal transferred to D.J. ;