- (1.) THIS second appeal is directed against the decree pass ed by Sri S. L. Tripathi, Civil Judge. Mohanlal Ganj, Lucknow, on 18-10-1966 allowing Regular Civil Appeal No- 195 of 1966 and setting aside the decree passed by the learned Munsif on 27-5-1966 decree ing the suit for ejectment and recovery of Rs. 12/- per month as damages in favour of the appellant who was plaintiff before the learned Munsif. The plaintiff-appel lant filed the suit giving rise to this ap peal (Regular Suit No. 284 of 1964 in the court of Munsif North, Lucknow) for the ejectment of the defendant-respondent from a house situate in Mohalla Raiendra Nagar. Lucknow, and for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 60/- by way of damages. The learned Munsif, inter alia, framed the fol lowing two issues which were numbered as 1 and, 3. "1.-Whether the permission granted by the State Government was illegal, arbi trary, unjust and mala fide as alleged in paras 25 and 26 of the written statement. If so, its effect? 3- Whether the order of the State Government cannot be the basis of the suit as alleged in para 27 of the written Statement?" Before filing the suit the plaintiff-appel lant had sought the permission of the Dis trict Magistrate under Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for permission to sue the defen dant-respondent. The District Magistrate refused the permission and the revision application of the plaintiff-appellant be fore the Commissioner also failed, where after he applied to the State Government which passed the following order: "Sri Mangal Prasad ko unke uparukt vishay per dinank 21 December, 1962, , ke prarthana patra ke sandarbh me soochit kiya jata hai ke is mamle ke abhilekho kee pareeksha kar lee gayee hai aur virodhi paksha ke kathan tatha es mamle ke anya tathyon par bhi vichar kar liya gaya hai aur Nyaya ke driste se yah aawashyak samjha jata hai ke prashna-gat makan prarthi ko niju upyog ke liye uplabdha ho.
(2.) ATEYA Rajyapal, Uttar Pradesh. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 kee dhara F dwara prapt adhika-rpn ka prayog karke Additional Commis sioner, Lucknow, Division, Lucknow, dwara Revision Sankhya 36/13, of 1961.62 me diye gaye addesh dinank 22 Novem ber, 1962, ko jisme Rent Control and Evic tion Officer Lucknow ke aadesh dinank 21 September, 1962, kepushitee ke gaye hairadd karte hai tatha prartheeko vipak-shee ke virudh divani adalat me bedakhle ke mukdama dayar karne hetu ukt Act kee dhara 3 kee anumati pradan karte hai". It is on the basis of this permission that the suit giving rise to this appeal was fil ed by the plaintiff- appellant. The con tention of the defendant-respondent is that it is not a speaking order and is a nullity and for that reason civil courts are com petent to hold that the suit giving rise to this appeal on the basis of the order of the State Government aforesaid is bad in law and the civil courts have no jurisdic tion to entertain it. The learned Munsif overruled this objection, but the learned Civil Judge in appeal allowed it. Against the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-appellant and reversing the decree passed by the learned Munsif the instant second appeal has been filed in this Court. 2. The matter came up before our brother Sehgal, who referred the case to a larger Bench. This is how the matter has come before us. Sri S. D. Misra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, and Sri Jagat Bahadur Srivastava, learned counsel for the defendant-respondent have made a joint statement before us that the only question involved in the second appeal is whether the suit filed by the plaintiff-ap pellant is liable to be dismissed on the ground that the order passed by the State Government, mentioned above, is bad in law and for that reason the civil courts had no jurisdiction to try this suit.
(3.) NO other question has been rais ed before us. We have reproduced the order of the State Government in extenso above. In the_ first place, we are not satisfied that it is not a speaking order. The State Government has clearly stated that they have carefully perused the re presentations of both the parties and also considered all the circumstances operating in the case and having done so it appeared to them that it is necessary in the interest of justice that they should accord the plaintiff-appellant the necessary permis sion under Section 3 of the Act. Sri Jagat Bahadur, learned counsel for the defen dant- respondent has submitted that the order of the State Government, which we have extracted above, is in fact not an order of the State Government but only a communication of the order of the State Government. In our opinion, at this stage it does not lie in the mouth of the learned counsel for the defendant-respon dent to make such a submission. On the back of the order of the State Government, which has been marked as Ext. 1 by the learned trial Judge, the learned counsel for the defendant- respondent has made the following endorsement: "Formal proof dispensed with subject to pleas. Contents denied." It does not appear that in the court of the learned Munsif it was ever the defen dant-respondent's case that the order, mentioned above, is not the order of the State Government passed under Sec. 7-F of the Act and is only a communication. The defendant-respondent cannot now be heard at this stage to take such an objec tion when the litigation has proceeded on the footing that that is an order of the State Government, under Section 7-F of the Act.;