Shiv Nath Katju, J. - (1.) It is only the right of the management in the affairs of the school which is involved in the suit in revision. I do not agree with the view of the court below that the value of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction has to be calculated on the basis of the value of the school properties. The subject matter of the suit is incapable of valuation and therefore the value put by the plaintiff is correct. It must be held that the court has jurisdiction to try the suit. A manager of a school cannot be said to have any beneficial interest in the properties of the school. The opposite parties relied on an observation made in V.C.S. Shamli v/s. Lakshmi Narain (1969 ALJ 748). The aforesaid case related to the powers and duties of a principal of an educational institution. It was observed that "the effective possession of the property and control of funds was really vested in the secretary manager and through him ultimately in the managing body of the society which ran the college." The Manager is an office bearer elected by the Managing Committee for looking after the affairs of the institution. It cannot be said that he has a personal interest in the properties of the institution.
(2.) With reference to S. 7(iv)(a) of the UP Court Fees Act (UP Amendment) a Division Bench of this Court in Madan Mohan v/s. T.G. V.H.S. Asson. ( : 1948 AWR 335) observed: The suit relates to a school. It is alleged that the school owns immovable properties. When the plaintiff claims the relief that he may be declared to be the "president of the Tej Ram George Coronation Hindu High School" he is, in substance, so runs the argument, claiming a relief for the management of the immoveable properties owned by the school. We see no force in this contention. The suit does not expressly or directly relate to any of the properties owned by the school. It refers to the personal right of the plaintiff to be the "President" of a juristic body called the Tej Ram George Coronation Hindu High School Association. It is a body registered under Act XXI(21) of 1860. The proviso to S. 7(iv)(a) refers to reliefs sought with reference to immovable properties. This reference to immovable properties must be direct and express. If the relief sought in a suit indirectly affects certain immovable property, that would be no ground for applying the said proviso. We think that in the present suit no relief is sought with reference to any immovable property, and, as such, the proviso to S. 7(iv)(a) does not apply to all.
(3.) Sri R.C. Ghatak, learned counsel for the opposite parties has placed reliance on a single Judge decision of the Madras High Court in Karuppanna Nadar v/s. Karuppa Nadar ( : AIR 1939 Mad. 776). It was observed by Somayya, J.: It cannot be said that the relief of possession of the office of managership is not related to things which have a definite money value and that the reliefs do not affect those things. The right to the managership certainly affects the right to be in possession of and to manage the institution and its properties. Hence the value for purpose of jurisdiction is the value of the properties affected. I beg to disagree with the aforesaid observations. The dispute in the case before me related to the office of the Manager of an educational institution. As was observed in Madan Mohan's case (supra), the suit does not expressly or directly relate to any of the properties owned by the educational institution. The mere fact that the manager in the course of his duties as an office bearer appointed by the school committee has to look after the affairs of the institution can not mean that the dispute directly relates to the properties of the educational institution. The aforesaid observation of Somayya, J. was quoted by the Division Bench of this Court in V.C.S. Shamli v/s. Lakshmi Narain (supra). As mentioned above, the division Bench was considering the case of a principal of a College and it distinguished the Madras case on the ground that the latter case involved a dispute with regard to the right of a manager of an institution. Learned counsel contended that the Division Bench expressed approval of the observations of Somayya, J. Even if it is so, they must be treated as obiter dictum as the Division Bench was not considering the case of a manager of an educational institution.;