Broome, J. - (1.) THESE three writ petitions challenge a notification issued by the U. P. Government under Sec tions 14 and 20 (4) of the U. P. Excise Act and published in the U. P. Govern ment Gazette of 28-3-1970, prohibiting the import, export, transport and posses sion of liquor and intoxicating drugs in the districts of Tehri-Garhwal and Pauri-Garhwal. The petitioners, who were liquor dealers running liquor shops in the districts in question, at first acqui esced in the notification, being advised that the imposition of prohibition was valid. On 13-4-1971, however, the posi tion was radically changed by the deci sion given by this Court in writ petition 3430 of 1970 (All), holding Section 20 (4) of the Excise Act to be void. The petitioners sought to take advantage of this decision by bringing it to the notice of the District Magistrate concerned and asking them to grant licences for the vend of liquor, as had been done before the issue of the impugned notification; but it appears that the matter was re ferred to the Excise Commissioner of U. P. for instructions and no action was taken to afford the petitioners any re lief, with the result that they were eventually obliged to file these writ petitions in July, 1971.
(2.) TWO preliminary objections have been raised on behalf of the res pondent State of U. P.: firstly, that the petitioners have no locus standi entitl ing them to present the petition, arid secondly, that the petitioners have been guilty of undue delay in seeking redress from the Court. We can see no force whatsoever in either of these conten tions. It is difficult to conceive of any one who could have a better locus standi than the petitioners to challenge the impugned notification. The peti tioners in writ petitions 4210 and 4234 had been carrying on the business of retail vend of country liquor in the districts of Tehri-Garhwal and Pauri-Garhwal respectively for a number of years before prohibition was introduced by means of the said notification; and in the auctions of country liquor shops for the 1970-71 season the petitioners were among the bidders and their bids were the highest, with the result that they would in the normal course have been granted licences, had it not been for the introduction of the impugned notification. Similarly the petitioner in writ petition 4233 had for many years been the sole vendor of foreign liquor in the district of Tehri-Garhwal and could normally have expected his licence to be renewed from 1-4-1970, if the impugned notification had not been issu ed. The petitioners have, fundamental right to carry on their trade and are, clearly entitled to claim relief from this Court if they are prevented from doing so on account of the enforcement of a notification which has been rendered in valid and inoperative by a decision of this Court. The objection regarding delay is equally untenable. It is no doubt true that the petitioners did not come forward to challenge the notification at the time when it was issued in March, 1970; but that was because they were advised that, as the law was then un derstood, the imposition of prohibition was valid. When, however, the decision given by this Court on 13-4-1971 show ed that the notification issued in March 1970 was invalid, the petitioners lost no time in approaching the District Magistrates concerned and asking them to take suitable action in the light of the Court's decision. Thereafter no action seems to have been taken by the State authorities either in the district concerned or in Lucknow; nor was any communication sent to the petitioners to inform them that their request had been rejected. The petitioners very properly waited for some response from the State and it was only when it be came apparent by lapse of time that the State was going to do nothing in the matter that the petitioners felt obliged to come forward and file the present writ petitions. We fail to understand how it can be suggested that in cir cumstances such as these the petitioners have been guilty of any laches disentitl ing them to the issue of a writ in their favour.
(3.) COMING to the merits of the petitions, we are satisfied that the impugned notification of 20-3-70 cannot stand, in view of the decision given by this Court on 13-4-1971 in Writ Petn. 3430 of 1970 (All) declaring sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the U. P. Excise Act to be void. Oddly enough, the stand taken by the State in its counter-affida vits is that Section 20 (4) of the Excise Act "still holds the field"; but learned Standing Counsel was obliged to admit that so long as the decision given by this Court on 13-4- 1971 remains opera tive this assertion is meaningless.;